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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis asks what it is that we are doing when we talk about trust in international 
politics. It begins by reviewing the recent and growing body of literature on trust and 
International Relations, locating this more nascent collection of literature within a wider, 
established body of social science work on trust in disciplines such as psychology, 
political science, business and management studies. It claims that an implicit but 
ubiquitous assumption about how words gain meaning underpins the literature, and that 
this assumption precedes and limits the range of possibilities for the form of the 
subsequent research. The thesis challenges this way of understanding by deploying 
Ludwig Wittgenstein‘s Philosophical Investigations. It then undertakes an alternative 
study of trust that acts as an ostensive challenge to the literature and thus shows by 
example how accepting different sites and processes of meaning can add to our 
understanding of words such as trust in International Relations. It accomplishes this 
through a ‗grammatical investigation‘ of the uses of trust by President Richard M. Nixon 
and President Ronald Reagan regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear arms control with 
the Soviet Union. Using these examples, the thesis then suggests several alternative ways 
of talking about trust that would provide avenues for further research while avoiding the 
semantic and methodological difficulties of the dominant social science approaches. The 
contribution of this work is to challenge prevailing assumptions about words and meaning 
that exist within the literature and in so doing, to open up a path for alternative ways to 
talk about words like trust in International Relations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This research was funded by the ESRC as part of their ‗Global Uncertainties‘ project and I 
am grateful for the opportunity they provided to me. I am also very grateful to the 
Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth who generously awarded me an E.H. 
Carr Studentship to supplement the ESRC award. The Department supported my work in so 
many ways during my time in Aberystwyth, from providing assistance for my research 
training to the interest and support shown by so many members of the staff and I cannot 
imagine a better place to do a Ph.D. 
 
I am also grateful to the Kluge Center at the Library of Congress in Washington DC for 
granting me a fellowship to conduct research at the Library and for the great assistance and 
amazing knowledge of the many archivists and librarians I worked with, both at the Library 
of Congress and at the Nixon and Reagan Presidential Libraries.  
 
Thank you to my supervisors Nick Wheeler and Andrew Priest for their constant 
encouragement and positivity. I am very grateful for their support and guidance in doing this 
project. I also want to thank Al Shepherd for offering his help in those final months, it was 
very much appreciated.  
 
Finally, thank you to my family, friends and my wonderful office mates for the many ways in 
which they made this process more enjoyable. Thank you for the coffees, the talks, the 
breakfasts, the seafront walks, the dinners and the wine, without which I doubt I would have 
been to complete the Ph.D and without which I certainly wouldn‘t have wanted to. 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
List of Acronyms                                   viii 
Introduction                                                                                                                          1 
Chapter 1. ‗Back to the rough ground!‘ A grammatical approach to trust  
        and International Relations                                            19 
Chapter 2. ‗Trust me, I‘m the president‘, Richard Nixon and the battle for Safeguard     75 
Chapter 3. ‗Trust the people‘, Reagan, trust and nuclear arms control                            123  
Chapter 4.   Reassessing assumptions and insights about trust               176 
Conclusion                     208 
Bibliography                                                                                                                     223  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
ABM  Anti-Ballistic Missile  
ACDA   Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
ALCM   Air-Launched Cruise Missile 
ARPA   Advanced Research Projects Agency  
CBMs   Confidence Building Measures  
CIA   Central Intelligence Agency  
CPD   Committee on the Present Danger  
CPSU   Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
CSCE   Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe  
DDR&E   Director of Defense Research and Engineering  
DIA   Defense Intelligence Agency  
DOD   Department of Defense  
GAC   General Advisory Committee (on Arms Control and Disarmament) 
GE    General Electric  
GSS   General Social Survey  
ICBM   Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile  
INF   Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces  
JCS   Joint Chiefs of Staff  
MIRV   Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle  
MIT   Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
ix 
 
NCA   National Command Authority  
NES   National Election Studies  
NPT  Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
NSA  National Security Advisor (Assistant to the President for National             
Security Affairs)  
NSC   National Security Council  
NSDD   National Security Decision Directive  
NSDM   National Security Decision Memorandum 
NSPG   National Security Planning Group  
NSSM   National Security Study Memorandum 
NST   Nuclear and Space Talks  
NTM   National Technical Means  
OEO  Office of Economic Opportunity 
PD    Presidential Directive  
PSAC   President‘s Science Advisory Committee  
RNC  Republican National Committee 
SALT   Strategic Arms Limitation Talks  
SCC   Standing Consultative Commission  
SDI   Strategic Defense Initiative  
SDIO   Strategic Defense Initiative Organization  
SLBM   Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile  
START   Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty  
UNGA   United Nations General Assembly  
x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In Raymond Carver‘s short story ‗What We Talk About When We Talk About Love‘, two 
married couples sit around a kitchen table drinking gin and trying to explain the meaning 
of love. Terri, one of the wives, attempts to do this by describing her ex-boyfriend who 
loved her so much he tried to kill her and then killed himself. She asks, ‗What do you do 
with love like that?‘ Terri‘s husband Mel is sceptical. ‗My God, don't be silly‘ he says. 
‗That's not love, and you know it.‘ Mel, a cardiologist, says he can explain what real love 
is, or at least can ‗give you a good example.‘ He then speaks of two of his patients, an 
elderly couple who had been horrifically injured in a car crash. The husband, bound head 
to toe in casts and bandages and immobile, is most depressed by his inability to turn his 
head and see his injured wife in the hospital bed next to his. This is how Mel describes 
love. The other couple are more recently married and say that they know what love is, 
though neither of them can articulate it. They try to explain love instead by demonstrating 
it; they touch knees, hold hands, blush and the conversation ends. At the end of the story 
they are all silent and sit with the empty bottles as the room grows dark.  
The story is about the complexity of language, the difficulty in defining or 
expressing a complete meaning for a complicated word, and the different types of 
description we employ in the attempt. It is not about misunderstanding or truth, the two 
couples‘ ability to disagree about meaning rests on a level of mutual understanding, and no 
one‘s description of love is incorrect, but rather it illustrates the many different things we 
talk about when we talk about a word like love. 
2 
 
This thesis is about trust. Or perhaps it is better to say that this thesis is about what 
we talk about when we talk about trust.
1
 Trust is a complicated word like love and how we 
talk about it is important because words such as trust come in and out of fashion as tools 
of understanding and are promoted as new ways to learn about the world and our 
discipline. This project examines why and how the topic of trust has been promoted as a 
theme for scholarship in International Relations, and asks what implications this has and, 
importantly, what it is that we are doing when we talk about trust. 
The thesis begins by reviewing the recent and growing body of literature on trust 
and International Relations, locating this more nascent collection of literature within a 
wider, established body of social science work on trust in disciplines such as psychology, 
political science, business and management studies. It claims that an implicit but 
ubiquitous assumption about how words gain meaning underpins the literature, and that 
this assumption precedes and limits the range of possibilities for the form of the 
subsequent research. 
How words get their meaning might seem like a somewhat tangential point to the 
study of trust in International Relations but this work argues that it is a centrally important 
consideration for any work that thinks about organising the world it examines according to 
a word such as trust. This is because there are certain assumptions about meaning that are 
necessary to enable the word ‗trust‘ as a viable tool of analysis in international politics, 
such as the notion of a certain level of stability of meaning across time and space, as well 
as the idea that one can uncover a correct or true understanding of a word. The common 
way of talking about trust in the existing research is thus beginning with assumptions 
about meaning that become inbuilt into the types of questions it is possible to ask using the 
word. 
While the present literature on trust in International Relations emerges from 
several different traditions – for example, game theory economic modelling, social 
psychology, sociology and literature on emotion and politics, this thesis contends that 
these disparate approaches are nonetheless all based on the same assumption about words 
and meaning. The thesis will categorise the trust literature into two main strands: the 
                                                 
1
 By ‗we‘ here I mean scholars of International Relations. Although this project also includes how politicians 
talk about trust as examples of alternative ways to describe trust in practice, the wider point is in reference to 
the study of International Relations. 
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rational choice approach, and work that criticises this method. Research that rejects the 
rational choice approach is generally founded on the same critique: that the rational choice 
account of trust equates trust and knowledge and thus trust remains unexplained and is 
often made redundant in these accounts. However, this thesis will argue that in all 
accounts of trust in the existing literature, both rational choice and its critics, there is a 
similar difficulty in explaining or understanding trust. Trust remains a deus ex machina, a 
force that changes social possibilities and enables or constrains action but that has not 
been fully explained.  
The idea of the inscrutability of trust is not new to the literature; Chapter 1 will 
show how many of the authors who write about trust lament the challenges of explaining it 
and then propose new ways of understanding it. However, my project significantly differs 
from any of the preceding literature as I argue that this inscrutability is not a problem to be 
overcome, rather, this inability to ‗understand‘ trust lies in the fact that the literature 
conceives of understanding in a specific and limiting way. The problem of trust is not that 
we have yet been unable to fully answer the questions that we ask; the problem is that the 
existing literature on trust in the social sciences is asking questions that are based on a 
particular vision of language and the world that has, so far, gone unchallenged.   
 
The purpose of the thesis 
The contribution of this thesis is to challenge the dominant means of asking questions 
about trust and International Relations. It will demonstrate how the questions of the 
existing literature are predicated on a specific approach to trust which views it as an 
internal motivating source for social action. Trust (or the lack of trust) is conceptualised as 
an inner force that enables or constrains actors; it has universal characteristics and a 
universal or at least a generalisable social function that can be defined, understood and 
thereby operationalised.
2
 The literature frames the understanding of trust in terms of 
                                                 
2
 See for example Aaron M. Hoffman, Building Trust: Overcoming Suspicion in International Conflict 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006); Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International 
Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Deborah Welch Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust: 
U.S.-Soviet Relations during the Cold War (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997); Brian 
Rathbun, ‗Before Hegemony: Generalised Trust and the Creation and Design of International Security 
Organizations,‘ International Organization 65, no. 2 (2011): 243-273; Brian Rathbun, Trust in International 
Cooperation: The Creation of International Security Institutions and the Domestic Politics of American 
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finding the correct meaning for trust, the question it poses, either explicitly or implicitly, is 
‗what is trust?‘ To understand trust is therefore to gain insight into the ‗essence‘ of a stable 
and uniform thing that a) exists in the world and b) is represented by the label ‗trust‘.   
This may seem like quite a sensible and obvious way to think about the subject.
3
 If 
one wants to find out about trust one should ask ‗what is trust?‘ It does not seem absurd to 
also claim that there should be a minimum foundation of meaning that all instances of trust 
share, that there are a set of common characteristics that are necessary to acquire the label 
trust. However, if one starts to unpack the assumptions contained in this view, it actually 
requires a specific approach to the philosophy of language to make it valid. This thesis 
will argue that the current way of talking about trust in the literature is not the natural or 
common sense way to talk about the subject but in fact rests on the adoption of a particular 
representational view of language where words represent things. In this view, words are 
labels that we attach to things that exist in reality, and learning a language is a matter of 
learning for what thing each word represents.  
My thesis will challenge this by describing an alternative approach to language and 
by illustrating how taking this approach would enable different ways to talk about trust. It 
introduces the challenge to traditional theories of meaning put forward by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations. This is that ‗[f]or a large class of cases--
though not for all--in which we employ the word ―meaning‖ it can be defined thus: the 
meaning of a word is its use in the language [emphasis in original].‘4 Words are not labels 
that represent things and that can be explained and defined in the abstract, they get their 
meaning through their use and in context. Understanding a word is not equal to 
interpreting what thing the word represents, but rather understanding how to use the word 
in the ‗form of life‘ that is our language.5 Understanding is therefore not an experience or 
a body of knowledge to acquire but a practice. Trying to acquire a universally correct 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Multilateralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). The literature on trust and International 
Relations will be reviewed in full in Chapter 1. 
3
 The idea of the dominant view of meaning as a ‗sensible‘ or common sense view has been previously 
discussed by Véronique Pin-Fat, Universality, Ethics and International Relations (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2010), 9.   
4
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), 43. References to the 
Philosophical Investigations in this work that include a number refer to the numbered paragraph in the text 
rather than to the page number. 
5
 Ibid., 23. 
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meaning of a word in abstract actually takes it away from the place where it gains 
meaning: its use.  
This is important for approaches to the study of International Relations that begin 
by trying to understand a word such as trust because it changes the question about 
meaning from ‗what is trust?‘ to ‗in what circumstances do we use the word trust?‘ The 
contribution of this project is to show how the Wittgensteinian description of language as 
‗part of an activity‘ challenges the way in which trust has been discussed in the existing 
literature.
6
 It does not argue that the current way is necessarily incorrect, but rather that an 
unacknowledged decision about meaning has been made that will necessarily limit the 
form of the subsequent research and the choice of method.  
This thesis will show how the form of the research on trust will be pre-determined 
by this assumption so that trust scholars are actually beginning at a point where certain 
significant choices have already been made. It will also demonstrate how the assumptions 
about meaning lie in the language that we use to talk about trust. The idea, or to put it in 
Wittgensteinian terms, ‗picture‘ of language as representation is so dominant because, as 
Wittgenstein claims, it resides in our language and ‗language seemed to repeat it to us 
inexorably.‘7 The thesis will illustrate how the dominant ways of talking about trust are 
replicated and maintained by the repetition of the typical language and research questions 
that scholars use to explain it. It will highlight the importance of the words that we use 
when we talk about International Relations and show how certain assumptions about 
meaning are so persistent because they are located in our language. 
The contribution of this work is to use Wittgenstein‘s challenge of ‗meaning as 
use‘ to unsettle the dominant and unquestioned representational view of meaning within 
the current literature, and in so doing to present the alternative possibilities this opens. 
This is relevant for the specific literature on trust and International Relations but the point 
also has implications for other bodies of work. Though this project is focused on how we 
talk about trust, there are other words that, to a greater or lesser extent, we use to organise 
and understand the world or as tools of categorisation and measurement. The use of these 
words also relies on specific ideas about definition and a type of understanding that can be 
challenged by the Wittgensteinian critique of this project. This thesis therefore also has a 
                                                 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Ibid., 115. 
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wider relevance for the form of our research questions and the limitations in our 
conceptual approaches to the study of International Relations more generally. Accepting 
the Wittgensteinian challenge to how we understand understanding allows us to recognise 
where the picture of language as representation lies in our language, and how that picture 
might shape how we talk about International Relations.  
 
How this will be accomplished 
The thesis contains both a conceptual and empirical challenge to the current literature on 
trust. I use the Philosophical Investigations as a means of challenging existing descriptions 
of trust through the introduction of meaning as use to illuminate how the current literature 
rests on a way of conceptualising meaning that should not be taken for granted as the only 
possible option. I claim that a study of trust that does not rest on a representational view of 
meaning could ask different questions to those contained in the existing literature. The 
thesis will then undertake an alternative study of trust that will act as an ostensive 
challenge to the literature and will thus show by example how accepting different sites and 
processes of meaning can add to our understanding of trust in International Relations. This 
will be accomplished through a grammatical investigation of trust in two historical cases 
based on the Wittgensteinian notion of ‗grammar‘.8  
Wittgenstein describes grammar as expressing a word‘s ‗essence‘.9 If the meaning 
of a word is in its use, grammar is the range of possible uses for a word and thus tells us 
what ‗kind of object‘ something is.10 A grammatical investigation thus examines the place 
of and use for trust in context and in relation to other words. It will ask how and why trust 
is being used; not ‗what is trust?‘ but ‗what is meant by trust here?‘ The point of the 
grammatical investigation is to stay on the surface of language. It rejects the possibility of 
a more true meaning for trust than what we mean when we say the word ‗trust‘. Rather, 
the grammatical investigation accepts meaning as use and examines the use of the word in 
its place. 
                                                 
8
 Wittgenstein‘s meaning for grammar here is not the system of how words fit together in a sentence (the set 
of rules for the correct structure of nouns, verbs etc.) but how words go together in different contexts to 
create meaning, the different potential uses for words in relation to each other. This will be explained further 
in Chapter 1. 
9
  Ibid., 371. 
10
 Ibid., 373. 
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To illustrate this point, the thesis will undertake a grammatical investigation of the 
use of trust by two US Cold War presidents regarding nuclear weapons. This investigation 
will not be based on the idea of meaning as representation but on meaning as use. 
Therefore the focus will not be on identifying characteristics of a pre-determined 
phenomenon that I have labelled as trust influencing or acting within the situation. It will 
instead examine the ordinary meaning given to the word ‗trust‘ by actors within their 
specific background. This type of investigation must be historical or context bound and its 
purpose is not to generate any theories of trust that can be operationalised, instead it must 
take any insight into meaning from the specifics of the situation under investigation. This 
is what Wittgenstein expressed as the approach of ‗look and see‘, and its purpose is one of 
description rather than explanation (in a covering-law sense).  
The project will investigate the use of trust by President Richard M. Nixon and 
President Ronald Reagan regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear arms control with the 
Soviet Union. This research focuses on the United States and on the issue of nuclear 
weapons during the Cold War for several reasons. Firstly, much of the literature on trust in 
International Relations takes the Cold War as its case and tries to ‗explain‘ certain action 
or lack of action through the idea of trust as a motivating factor.
11
 Rather than accept the 
common narrative of trust or mistrust as having a role in the Cold War, this project takes 
the example given in much trust research and asks what taking a different approach can 
accomplish. Similarly, the issue of nuclear weapons is one that has been consistently 
framed in terms of trust, both by politicians and by scholars of International Relations.
12
  
The Cold War and specifically the issue of nuclear weapons are also apposite 
topics for any research that takes language as its subject, particularly the language of 
                                                 
11
 Examples include Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and 
Trust in World Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International 
Relations; Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust; Deborah Welch Larson, ‗Trust and Missed Opportunities in 
International Relations,‘ Political Psychology 18, no. 3 (1997): 701-734; Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‗Investigating 
diplomatic transformations,‘ International Affairs 89, no. 2 (2013): 477-496. 
12
 The most famous being Reagan‘s repeated ‗trust but verify‘ with regard to the practice of arms control 
with the Soviet Union. See for example Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations; Jan Ruzicka 
and Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‗The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,‘ 
International Affairs 86, no. 1 (2010): 69-85; Jan Ruzicka and Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‗Decisions to Trust: 
Maintaining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime,‘ RUSI Journal 155, no. 2 (2010): 20-25; Nicholas J. 
Wheeler, ‗Beyond Waltz‘s Nuclear World: More Trust May be Better,‘ International Relations 23, no. 3 
(2009): 428-445. 
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‗trust‘.13 With the development of the hydrogen bomb and ICBMs in the 1950s, mass 
destruction – omnicide - became possible. Campbell Craig describes the consequences of a 
large scale Soviet missile attack on the United States in bleak terms, 
the existence of the U.S. as a sovereign state and distinctive national society would 
come to an end. The chaos, anarchy, destruction, misery, and governmental 
collapse following a nuclear attack would have succeeded in eliminating American 
civilization as it is commonly regarded.
14
 
This possibility fundamentally changes politics. It is, as Robert Jervis claims ‗a 
change that turns established truths about the relationship between force and statecraft on 
their heads.‘15 This means something that is quite unique and significant for the expression 
of trust in relation to governance, as citizens can no longer guarantee that their leaders can 
keep them safe because that is simply not possible. The language of trust is also connected 
to the language of deterrence as leaders must also trust in each other to adhere to the 
international conventions of nuclear ownership. Therefore any use of trust by political 
leaders will be shaped by the political imperatives of the nuclear revolution and reflect the 
limitations and contradictions of governing in a nuclear age. How leaders discuss the issue 
of trust and the international is also a means through which one can investigate the 
limitations and constraints of practicing foreign policy through describing these multiple, 
interconnecting levels of trust, examining how actors talked about trust and why and how 
it is being used as a means of explanation.  
The project is centred solely on the United States for several reasons. Firstly, my 
research is focused on the use of language and conducting research on political speech 
across different countries or languages would make any attempt at comparison not only 
difficult but potentially misleading. Words do not simply translate across different 
languages and are not used in analogous ways, so a cross-language study would create 
                                                 
13
 There is a significant body of work on Cold War rhetoric and nuclear weapons including Paul Chilton, ed., 
Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate: Nukespeak Today (London: F. Pinter, 1985); Carol Cohn, ‗Sex and 
Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals,‘ Signs: Journal of Women and Culture 12, no. 4 
(1987): 687-718; Martin J. Medhurst and H.W. Brands, eds., Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking 
Rhetoric and History (College Station Texas: A&M University Press, 2000); Martin J. Medhurst, Robert L. 
Ivie, Philip Wander and Robert L. Scott, eds., Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology (East 
Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1997);  David S. Meyer, ‗Framing National Security: Elite Public 
Discourse on Nuclear Weapons during the Cold War,‘ Political Communication 12, no. 2 (1995): 173-192.  
14
 Campbell Craig, Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morganthau, and 
Waltz (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 27. 
15
 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca 
& London: Cornell University Press, 1989), 15. 
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multiple practical and methodological pitfalls. I believe that a companion study of the use 
of language during these times within the Soviet Union or in other states could be a 
valuable piece of research but this lies outside the limits of my thesis. Secondly, the 
political structure and importance of domestic politics and political communication makes 
a study of the United States a particularly illustrative instance of the issues of language 
and communication under study in this project.
16
 Finally, the length of the research and the 
allowed time would not allow for a detailed, multi-country archival study, the time spent 
in researching the empirical chapters would be cut to the detriment of the quality of 
information within.  
Presidents Nixon and Reagan are the subjects for the historical study for many 
reasons also. It is important to note at this point that this project is not one that operates 
within the parameters of traditional social science methodology. In fact, it is the influence 
of science that Wittgenstein views as responsible for some of the more egregious 
assumptions of philosophy. Taking a Wittgensteinian approach is therefore deliberately 
not working within the boundaries of International Relations if framed as a social science. 
However, this does not mean that decisions can be made without grounds, and while I did 
not select my cases (in fact I have deliberately avoided calling them cases or case studies 
in order to reinforce the rejection of the International Relations as science label) with 
regard to conventions of ‗typical‘, ‗most similar‘ or ‗most different‘, my choices were not 
without reason.  
There are certain notable similarities to the two examples I chose that make for a 
useful comparison. Firstly, both were Cold War presidents and, as was mentioned above, it 
was important to keep within the Cold War period. Secondly, both were Republicans and 
therefore were able to speak of foreign policy and the Soviet Union in a different way to a 
Democratic president. Both were also known as firm anti-communists and hardliners with 
regards to the Soviet Union before taking office. Moreover, the two presidents are notable 
for undertaking major nuclear arms control efforts with the Soviet Union which resulted in 
                                                 
16
 As Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall have stated, while international multi-country and archival 
histories have added much value to the study of the Cold War, the United States can nonetheless remain a 
significant subject for research itself as it was ‗never, after 1945, merely one power among many.‘ I agree 
with Craig and Logevall that the ‗extreme power imbalances‘ during the Cold War make detailed study of 
US political systems and the link between the international and domestic elements of decision-making 
worthwhile. Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America‘s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity 
(Cambridge, Mass; London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 5.  
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landmark arms control treaties, and were then responsible for selling these treaties to the 
American public.  
However there are also differences between the two examples, the two presidents‘ 
time in office occurred in differing domestic and international political environments. 
How they framed the world and how we would typically describe them now in terms of 
trust were also dissimilar. The dominant popular and academic view of Nixon is that he 
was untrusting and untrustworthy, whereas Reagan, at least in the United States and 
regardless of differences in political affiliation, is generally remembered as a trusting and 
trustworthy leader in the broad public imagination.
17
  
Because of these useful similarities and differences, investigating these two 
examples of the use of trust provides distinctive insights into issues of meaning and 
context in international politics that will demonstrate and thus reinforce the broader point 
of the project. The thesis will show how the two presidents both talked about trust in very 
different terms with regard to nuclear weapons, and how they located their meanings for 
trust on different bases. President Nixon talked about trust with regard to domestic politics 
but did not speak about US relations with the Soviet Union in terms of trust and did not 
frame the ongoing Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) as a matter of trust. Nixon‘s 
grammar of trust included words such as ‗knowledge‘, ‗intelligence‘, ‗facts‘, ‗information‘ 
and ‗judgement‘ and he used trust in an attempt to secure domestic consent for his policy 
choices regarding nuclear weapons.  
President Reagan, in contrast, talked about trust as a uniquely American 
characteristic. Reagan‘s grammar of trust included words such as ‗freedom‘, ‗faith‘, 
‗people‘ and ‗democracy‘. His most repeated saying regarding trust was not the famous 
‗trust but verify‘, but rather ‗trust the people‘, a phrase that he used often with reference to 
the American public.
18
 In contrast to Nixon, Reagan talked about the ongoing Nuclear and 
                                                 
17
 Recent polling shows Reagan‘s retrospective approval rating at 78%, second only to JFK‘s and more than 
double that of last placed Nixon‘s (31%), ‗CNN Poll: JFK tops presidential rankings for last 50 years,‘ 22 
November, 2013. http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2013/11/22/cnn-poll-jfk-tops-presidential-rankings-
for-last-50-years/ See also similar Gallup polling numbers: ‗Americans Rate JFK as Top Modern President.‘ 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/165902/americans-rate-jfk-top-modern-president.aspx Last accessed 4 April, 
2014. 
18
 Reagan used the phrase ‗trust but verify‘ sixteen times in speeches from 1986-1989. He used the phrase 
‗trust the people‘ twenty four times. The latter was also part of the Republican Party Platform in the 1988 
presidential election. ‗Republican Party Platform of 1988,‘ 16 August, 1988. Online by Gerhard Peters and 
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Space Talks (NST) with the Soviet Union, which would eventually result in the landmark 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START), as a matter of trust. He spoke often of a link between trust and nuclear arms 
control and framed the international as a realm of trust and mistrust. 
This thesis will illustrate how the two presidents‘ meanings for trust were bound up 
in their specific contexts. The two leaders operated in particular political environments, 
both domestically and internationally, and had distinct styles and methods of leadership 
and communication as well as particular political personalities. Their use of the word 
‗trust‘ was shaped by the contemporary political climate as well as the political culture of 
the US. Both leaders were also using the word ‗trust‘ with regards to nuclear weapons and 
in an age of total nuclear vulnerability, which influenced their meaning for trust. This 
research will show how all these things influenced how they talked about trust in the 
context of nuclear weapons and will therefore argue that investigating a word like ‗trust‘ 
in context can provide a more useful description of trust and international politics.  
The purpose of this research is not to question or ‗prove‘ if trust is a factor or plays 
a role in international politics. Whether growing trust enabled the process of détente in 
Nixon‘s first term or mistrust inhibited the SALT negotiations, or whether Reagan and 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, (CPSU) General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev 
began to develop a trusting relationship in Reagan‘s second term are not the questions 
asked in this thesis. Indeed, this research queries the assumptions that underlie such 
questions and Chapter 1 will contend that they rest on some problematic assumptions 
about meaning. Instead of trying to get below the surface of language to access a deeper 
understanding of trust, this thesis takes the Wittgensteinian approach that what we are 
looking for is already in plain view when asking questions about meaning. It is not the 
concealed motivations of the individual that are under examination in this project but the 
context of their speech and the function of their language, the endeavour is therefore to 
‗command a clear view of the use of our words [emphasis in original]‘.19  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25846 
[hereafter The American Presidency Project.] Last accessed 19 March, 2014. 
19
 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 122. For a further discussion of this distinction see Karin M. 
Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 59-64. 
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Notes on the form of the thesis 
The empirical research in the historical chapters is based on extensive archival work at the 
Nixon Presidential Library and Museum in Yorba Linda, California and the Ronald 
Reagan Presidential Library and Museum in Simi Valley, California and, to a lesser 
extent, on research undertaken at the United States Library of Congress, Washington DC, 
the United States National Archives at College Park, Maryland and the National Archives 
of the Government of the United Kingdom at Kew. It also makes use of the public 
speeches and interviews given by the presidents collected in the Public Papers of the 
Presidents and the public statements from the Department of State that are contained in 
the Department of State Bulletin.
20
 I have also used contemporary newspaper articles and 
memoirs of administration officials as well as secondary literature on the topics. To all 
these sources I have adopted the Wittgensteinian ‗look and see‘ approach. Arriving at the 
archives, I had no predetermined narrative (for example that trust was/was not important 
to the process of nuclear arms control between the United States and the Soviet Union) or 
hypothesis to test (indeed the idea of hypothesis testing is counter to the nature of this 
investigation). Instead, I embarked on a systematic reading of the documents regarding 
nuclear arms programmes and arms control, as well as the documents regarding the public 
presentation and communication strategies for these policies, to assess if they talked about 
trust at all and if so, how.   
The two historical narratives are therefore different in nature. Chapter 2, which 
examines President Nixon‘s use for trust, is an account of a detailed process of political 
decision-making that focuses on a domestic audience. Chapter 3, which examines 
President Reagan‘s use for trust, is a broader account of the domestic and international 
framing of arms control negotiations and nuclear weapons spending that relies more on an 
analysis of public speech. The chapter on President Nixon takes place over a shorter 
period of time (mainly 1969 to 1970) and is restricted to a much smaller issue: the 
domestic battle over the development of an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) System during 
the first years of Nixon‘s first term. The chapter on President Reagan, in contrast, 
encompasses all of Reagan‘s second term (1985 to 1989) and includes both Reagan‘s 
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 The Public Papers of the President are available online at the American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ Archived copies of The Department of State Bulletin are available 
online at https://archive.org/details/USGovernmentDocuments  
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domestic push for the administration‘s defence spending plans as well as both the 
domestic and the international dimensions of the ongoing arms control negotiations with 
the Soviet Union and the thawing of superpower relations that preceded the end of the 
Cold War. While this is a product of the approach to the archives taken in this research, I 
do not believe that it is a disadvantage but that it in fact reinforces the flexibility of the 
grammatical approach, something that will be discussed further in Chapter 4. 
The structure of the thesis is also perhaps not a typical one. The body of the thesis 
is made up of only four chapters, all of which are longer than a standard thesis chapter and 
three of which are significantly longer. This came about organically and, while unusual, is 
important for each part of the research to maintain a coherent narrative and progression of 
argument. Chapter 1 incorporates both the trust literature review and the Wittgensteinian 
challenge of ‗meaning as use‘. While splitting these two up may have made for two more 
manageable chapters, it also would have damaged the integrity of the claim. The chapter is 
not a critique of the current methods of studying trust followed by the suggestion of a 
Wittgensteinian alternative, the reading of the trust literature is deeply intertwined with the 
Wittgensteinian challenge and the two cannot be separated without creating a contrived 
and misleading distinction. Chapters 2 and 3 are also long but again, there is no point at 
which they could be split into smaller chapters while maintaining the coherence of the 
narrative and without the divide seeming artificial.  
Chapters 2 and 3 are focused on examples of public presidential speech. It is 
therefore necessary to clarify what I mean when I talk of the ‗president‘ or the ‗White 
House‘ as speakers or actors. The ‗president‘ as discussed in this research is not just the 
expressions or preferences of Richard Nixon or Ronald Reagan as individuals but as 
political symbols that include the army of speechwriters, counsellors and spokespeople 
who come together to express the ‗voice‘ of the administration.21 This ‗voice‘ is not a 
homogenous one however but includes many divergent opinions. As Keith Shimko states, 
this is an issue of degree of difference and of perspective. For example, it is possible to 
                                                 
21
 For a further discussion of the process of presidential speechwriting see Kathleen Jamieson, Eloquence in 
an Electronic Age: The Transformation of Political Speechmaking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); 
Robert Schlesinger, White House Ghosts: Presidents and their Speechwriters (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2008); Craig Allen Smith and Kathy Smith, The White House Speaks: Presidential Leadership as 
Persuasion (Westport Connecticut: Praeger, 1994). For debate on the idea of the rhetorical presidency see 
Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987); 
Martin J. Medhurst, ed., Beyond the Rhetorical Presidency (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 
1996). 
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view the Reagan administration as either ‗a bunch of hardliners whose differences were 
dwarfed by their similarities‘ or in contrast as ‗a conglomeration of pragmatic and 
ideological hardliners whose difference were very important.‘22 However, within any 
bureaucracy there are of course differences of opinion and while this work treats the 
President and the White House as entities, it is with the recognition that this includes 
varying and sometimes contradictory opinions and policy preferences. 
This project makes use of several different bodies of literature to make a central 
point about meaning and trust. The thesis includes literature on the study of trust across 
the social sciences, literature on Wittgenstein and the philosophy of language as well as 
the historical and International Relations literature on the Nixon and Reagan eras and US 
Cold War History. This includes a number of large and established bodies of dedicated 
work and this thesis cannot engage with any of them with the depth of a piece of 
committed, specialist research and is therefore perhaps doomed to disappoint an expert in 
any of these particular fields. However, the thesis brings all these disparate groups of 
literature together with a specific intent to create an approach to the topic of trust and 
International Relations that has not been attempted before. It is this synthesis of these 
distinct literatures that allows for a new perspective on the topic and challenges the 
conventional ways of talking about trust in the current literature. 
Finally, unlike in much of the existing trust research, there is no distinction made 
here between words such ‗trust‘, ‗mistrust‘, ‗distrust‘, or ‗trustworthiness‘ as ways of 
talking about trust, unless the person who expresses trust makes such a distinction.
23
 This 
is a necessary decision based on the approach to meaning taken in this research; I am 
making no knowledge claims about trust but rather examining those made by others. For 
example, if President Reagan declares ‗the Soviet Union needs to prove that it is 
trustworthy‘, and this could be rephrased as ‗the Soviet Union needs to prove that it is 
worthy of trust‘ without disruption, then I approach these as two variants of talking about 
                                                 
22
 Keith L. Shimko, Images and Arms Control (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1991), 232. 
23
 For example the current trust literature includes work on the difference between ‗trust‘ and a ‗trusting 
relationship‘, see Aaron M. Hoffman, ‗A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations,‘ European 
Journal of International Relations 8, no. 3 (2002): 375-401; and between ‗trust‘, ‗mistrust‘ and ‗distrust‘, see 
Patti Tamara Lenard, ‗Trust Your Compatriots, but Count Your Change: The Roles of Trust, Mistrust and 
Distrust in Democracy,‘ Political Studies 56, no. 2 (2008): 312-332; Mark Saunders and Adrian Thornhill, 
‗Trust and mistrust in organizations: An exploration using an organizational justice framework,‘ European 
Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology 13, no. 4 (2004): 493-515. For a distinction between ‗trust‘ 
and ‗trustworthiness‘ see Margaret Levi and Laura Stoker, ‗Political Trust and Trustworthiness,‘ Annual 
Review of Political Science no. 3 (2000): 475-507. 
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trust. Similarly ‗I do not trust the Soviet Union‘ and ‗I distrust the Soviet Union‘ can be 
viewed as alternatives. By creating an analytical difference between ‗trust‘ and 
‗trustworthiness‘ I would be imposing my distinctions and definitions on the research and 
that would be contra to the point of the project. Therefore I include variants of speech 
based on the word ‗trust‘, but at all times the decision is based on how the word is being 
used in context.   
 
Plan of the thesis 
Chapter 1 of the thesis contains a review of the existing literature on trust in International 
Relations and situates this work within the literature on trust in other social science 
disciplines. It contends that, as a whole, the social science approach to trust takes a 
particular direction that is based on internalising a specific way of thinking about meaning 
that goes unacknowledged and shapes the subsequent research. The chapter illustrates how 
the current way of talking about trust necessarily leads to the privileging of one‘s 
definition of trust as somehow ‗true‘ and universal. While I do not argue that definition is 
negative per se, the approach to meaning inherent in the existing work places a notional 
boundary of meaning around trust through definition and promotes this definition as a 
means of study in itself, leading to the hypostatisation of trust as something with universal 
characteristics that both ‗is‘ and ‗does‘. While instances of trust might share what 
Wittgenstein terms ‗family resemblances‘, I argue that research based on the idea of 
unearthing the universal, hidden characteristics of a term will inevitably encounter certain 
semantic and methodological challenges.
24
 
The chapter then asserts that by privileging a particular approach to understanding, 
authors are left with the need to ‗explain‘ trust in a specific way. This leads to a series of 
common descriptive fallacies that are prevalent in the literature: false analogies, multiple 
typologies and negative description. The chapter will demonstrate how these fallacies are a 
function of the need for a generalisable definition that animates the social science method 
of studying trust, and that this need is predicated on the assumption of meaning as 
representation. 
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The chapter introduces the Wittgensteinian critique of the current literature and 
uses the Philosophical Investigations to contest the theory of meaning as representation. It 
claims that, if one accepts the challenge of ‗meaning as use‘, then the way in which we 
talk about trust in International Relations can change. It then proposes a grammatical 
investigation of trust that will adopt this alternative way of thinking of meaning, a method 
of description based the Wittgensteinian concept of grammar and the ethos of ‗look and 
see‘. Rather than explaining the meaning of trust, the chapter contends that the 
grammatical investigation will show how the word ‗trust‘ is used in a particular context.  
Chapter 2 is the first of the two historical chapters and contains a grammatical 
investigation of President Richard Nixon‘s use of the word ‗trust‘ in relation to the issue of 
nuclear weapons during his first term. It focuses on Nixon‘s use of trust in the domestic 
political battle over the deployment of an ABM system during 1969 and 1970. President 
Nixon took office at a time when the United States was troubled and divided by issues 
such as civil rights, inflation and the Vietnam War. The previous Cold War foreign policy 
consensus was beginning to break down and Nixon was becoming increasingly challenged 
on foreign policy and military decision-making.
25
 In this atmosphere, spending on a high 
profile strategic programme such as ABM came under unprecedented scrutiny, which was 
amplified by public criticism of the programme by prominent scientists who questioned 
the ABM‘s technical feasibility and fitness for purpose.  
During this period of domestic unrest, Nixon viewed the ABM as the first big 
challenge to his presidential authority and therefore placed great effort in passing the 
ABM deployment plan through Congress. After a public political battle in 1969 that 
damaged much of the programme‘s credibility, the chapter will show how the 
administration turned to the use of trust to try and convince a sceptical public to support 
the ABM. Nixon began to talk about the ABM in terms of trust, asking the public to ‗trust 
the president‘. He placed this request within the language of authority, knowledge and the 
prestige of the presidential office. Nixon related trust to his presidential prerogatives for 
autonomy in decision-making and made use of a meaning of trust that was a reflection of 
the contemporary political climate, US political culture and Nixon‘s response to the 
                                                 
25
 Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon‘s Vietnam War (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1998); Richard A. 
Melanson, American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War: The Search for Consensus from Richard Nixon 
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imperatives of conducting politics in a nuclear age. In an era of challenges to current 
authority figures, Nixon attempted to de-contextualise his request for trust by linking it 
back to an ideal of trusting in past leaders.  
Chapter 3 investigates President Reagan‘s use of trust with regard to nuclear 
weapons during his second term in office (1985 to 1989). It will illustrate how, in contrast 
to Nixon, trust was a large part of Reagan‘s vocabulary. During his political career Reagan 
had developed a specific meaning for trust as a uniquely American trait. He related this 
trust to his deeply conservative values and bound it in speech with ideals of small 
government and American exceptionalism. The chapter will show how the particular 
public meaning for trust as used by President Reagan was a reflection of the current 
political climate, Reagan‘s role in US political culture and the often disingenuous 
character of foreign policy rhetoric in a nuclear era.  
For reasons which the chapter will outline, Reagan did not engage with the Soviet 
Union on nuclear issues during his first term in office. However, during his second term he 
began to work with the new Soviet leader Gorbachev on matters of nuclear arms control 
that eventually led to two significant arms control treaties: the INF Treaty and START. 
The chapter will investigate how Reagan began to use the specific meaning for trust that 
he had employed domestically in his public speech in the international realm and 
regarding the superpower relationship. By talking about trust as an inherently American 
characteristic and framing the arms control process as a narrative of trust, Reagan was able 
to make use of trust as part of an attempt to achieve particular policy goals. These included 
the implementation of his strategic modernisation programme, his administration‘s policy 
of interim restraint regarding adherence to the non-ratified SALT II treaty, and the 
ongoing negotiations on nuclear arms control with the Soviet Union. This chapter will 
show how Reagan used trust in his public diplomacy efforts, most notably targeted at 
Western Europe, by portraying the Soviet Union as an inherently untrustworthy partner in 
arms control. 
The two chapters demonstrate how Nixon‘s and Reagan‘s uses for trust were 
located within a wider context of meaning and show how looking at the meaning of trust 
in this way avoids the potential for dehistoricising the meaning of trust as the typical 
approach would unavoidably entail. This alternative approach instead provides a 
perspective from which to describe the particular meanings for trust in their place. 
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Chapter 4 brings the two historical chapters together and asks what can be learned 
by adopting the grammatical approach to investigating trust in international politics, as 
well as what consequences this may have for the study of trust and International Relations. 
It will accomplish this in two parts. Firstly, the chapter examines the differences in 
meaning for trust as used by Nixon and by Reagan and asks how we can understand trust 
as located within the context of the era and the speaker. It will argue that these differences 
in meaning demonstrate why one should try to understand how and why President Nixon 
and President Reagan were talking about trust, rather than imposing a generalised and a-
historical definition for trust onto the situation. In doing so, the chapter presents a practical 
argument against the idea of an essence, or core meaning for trust that strengthens the 
conceptual argument outlined in Chapter 1. 
The second part of the chapter then asks what this means for the broader study of 
trust in International Relations. It contends that, if the central assumption of the existing 
literature - that meaning is a process of representation and therefore trust has an essence 
that can be understood and operationalised - has been successfully challenged by this 
work, then the current methods of talking about trust in International Relations should be 
reconsidered. It argues that the grammatical approach actually allows for a wide range of 
possible ways of talking about trust that take meaning from the subject matter under 
investigation and are more self-reflexive and critical in their approach. Based on the 
findings of this research, the chapter suggests several ways of talking about trust in these 
particular examples that would provide avenues for further research in this area and that 
avoid the semantic and methodological difficulties of the dominant social science 
approaches.  
This thesis does not put forward any theory of trust and indeed the perspective on 
meaning adopted here is antithetical to any such idea. I argue instead for a limit to what 
we should study with the tools we have at hand. However, I believe that this work will 
demonstrate that accepting the inability to gain a deeper understanding of a word such as 
‗trust‘ than that which is located in its use is not a limitation. Accepting the challenge to 
meaning proposed in this thesis is actually a release from the methodological imperatives 
of meaning as representation that dominate the trust literature. The point of this work is to 
challenge prevailing assumptions within the literature and in so doing, to open up a path 
for alternative ways to talk about words like ‗trust‘ in International Relations. 
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‘Back to the rough ground!’ A grammatical approach to trust and 
International Relations 
 
‗When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I 
choose it to mean — neither more nor less.' 
'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.‘ 
- Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass 
 
 
Introduction 
The idea of the importance of trust in International Relations has become a prominent one 
over recent years. There is a rapidly expanding body of literature on trust and International 
Relations, and trust has featured as a theme of many recent academic conferences and 
conference panels. Those who study trust argue that it is both important and, apart from 
some discussion of the perils of misplaced trust, generally a good thing.
1
 However, if the 
manifest difficulties of its study articulated by these scholars is to be believed, trust, as 
Martin Hollis succinctly states, ‗works in practice but not in theory‘.2 This chapter will 
review the current literature on trust in the field of International Relations and the social 
sciences in general. It will argue that throughout the social sciences the study of trust is 
limited by an approach to the term which contains specific assumptions about how 
language and meaning function. These assumptions about language create several 
problematic tendencies that lead to unnecessary semantic problems, increase the 
complexity of any possible analysis and limit the effectiveness of the endeavour as a 
whole. The chapter will identify each of these counter-productive tendencies in the 
                                                 
1
 For example Diego Gambetta, ‗Can We Trust Trust?‘ in Diego Gambetta, ed., Trust, Making and Breaking 
Cooperative Relations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988); Deborah Welch Larson, ‗Distrust: Prudent if not always 
Wise,‘ in Russell Hardin, ed., Distrust (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004). 
2
 Martin Hollis, Trust Within Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1. 
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literature before concluding that a more critical approach to the study of trust would be 
useful to help recognise and avoid the current issues. The chapter will then suggest an 
alternative way of talking about trust in the field of International Relations that avoids 
these semantic problems.  
The chapter will propose a method of talking about trust that challenges the 
representational view of meaning implicit in the current trust literature. This approach 
questions the efficacy of studies of trust that are based on the assumption that a general 
definition and explanation for the term can provide a foundation for cross-case and cross-
disciplinary study. It will advocate for an approach to meaning that regards it as located in 
a practice rather than in the knowledge of a set of words that correspond to and describe 
things in reality, and will ask what consequences this approach to meaning might have for 
the study of trust in International Relations. 
The chapter will adopt the challenge to traditional theories of meaning and 
language proposed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations. This is 
that, in general, the meaning of a word is its use in everyday speech. Therefore, taking the 
word ‗trust‘ out of the context in which it is used creates a set of difficulties that will limit 
the form of the questions that can be asked about it. This is the substance of the critique 
made by this review of the literature on trust within International Relations specifically 
and of the social sciences in general. By removing trust from the place in which it receives 
meaning, namely the context and intent of its use, the study of trust in its current form 
renders the word ‗trust‘ less meaningful and therefore makes its study less efficient as well 
as limiting the possibility for alternative ways of addressing the topic.  
The increased focus on trust in the International Relations literature neglects the 
fact that there is no such thing as the ‗concept of trust‘ that exists outside of our 
conceptions of trust and our use of the word ‗trust‘. Research that relies on defining and 
explaining trust in some abstract and generalisable manner therefore rests on a problematic 
view of where the meaning of words resides. Current literature on trust and International 
Relations has a tendency to hypostatise its conception of trust and so often overlooks the 
fact that the reason why one studies a subject such as trust will influence one‘s conception 
of that term; that is, its meaning is shaped not only by how but also why the word is being 
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used.
3
 If one is to use the word ‗trust‘ as a tool of International Relations, it should be used 
with acknowledgement of the importance of intent in shaping meaning, recognition of the 
role of context in understanding language, and an acceptance of the limitations of 
definition and the dangers of hypostatisation inherent in the current form of study.  
This will proceed in several parts, firstly the chapter provides a brief overview of 
the current literature on trust and International Relations and situates this within the 
broader range of work on trust in the social sciences that have preceded and influenced the 
International Relations literature. The chapter will then argue that the current scholarship 
rests on a particular view of meaning: that of words as representations. It will then show 
how the challenge to the representational view meaning within the Philosophical 
Investigations can shed light on the assumptions held in the existing trust literature. By 
doing this it will illustrate some of the methodological and semantic problems that are 
common in the literature. The chapter will conclude with the suggestion of a method of 
description based the Wittgensteinian notion of grammar and the ethos of ‗look and see‘ 
that could contribute to a more critical approach to the use of words such as trust in the 
study of International Relations.
4
 
 
A review of the literature on trust  
A common account of trust within the International Relations literature is that of trust as a 
rational choice. The rational choice school of trust scholarship portrays specific actors who 
are self-interested, rational agents. These actors make strategic decisions in particular, 
limited contexts of potential cooperation. These decisions can be influenced by managing 
preferences and outcomes that are external to the actor. Trust in this account is a cognitive 
notion and is generally discussed as the calculation that one party makes about another 
party being potentially trustworthy (i.e. cooperative) in a given situation. This school of 
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 The idea of the ‗hypostatisation‘ of trust is taken from Henry Staten, ‗Wittgenstein and the Intricate 
Evasions of  ‗‗Is‘‘,‘ New Literary History 19, no. 2, (1988): 281-300. 
4
 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 90. 
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thought is represented by influential authors outside of International Relations such as 
Russell Hardin, and within International Relations by Andrew Kydd and Aaron Hoffman.
5
  
Russell Hardin proposes a rationalist account of trust that he terms ‗encapsulated 
interest‘.6 He summarises this as ‗I trust you because I think it is in your interest to attend 
to my interests in the relevant manner.‘7 Hardin claims that this trust goes beyond the mere 
prediction of cooperation; the cooperation involved must result from a consideration of the 
trustor‘s interests rather than merely a compatibility of interests between the two parties. 
In short, trust is the belief that one party has the other party‘s interests at heart in a specific 
situation. He does not distinguish between the possible motivations for this encapsulated 
interest which could be anything from expecting material gains from the continuing 
relationship, egoistic concerns, altruism, loyalty or love. These motivations could all fit 
under the rubric of the trust as encapsulated interest. Hardin works under the assumption 
that people are motivated by self interest, and that trust is the rational expectation about 
the behaviour of the trusted actor whose interests, for whatever reason, include the 
trustor‘s. This trust is always located in a specific context and so the phrase ‗I trust you‘ 
always has the implicit addition of ‗to do x‘ or ‗in circumstance y‘. For Hardin, trust is not 
generalised or limitless in any relationship which is in part due to the fact that he places 
the idea of competency at the heart of his meaning for trust. Trust does not just involve the 
belief that another is willing to do something, but also that they have the capability to do 
so. Hardin also declares that trust is cognitive rather than behavioural. One may act on 
trust, but the action is not trust itself, rather evidence of that trust. In other words, trust 
does not require action. Therefore Hardin asserts that ‗the declarations ―I believe you are 
trustworthy‖ and ―I trust you‖ are equivalent.‘8 
Andrew Kydd discusses the role of trust and mistrust in International Relations, 
specifically examining their roles in the Cold War. While accepting a Hobbesian anarchy, 
he nonetheless claims that states with benign motivations can get along if trust is involved, 
and that trust can be built by observation and cooperation. He therefore advocates for a 
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 Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002); Hoffman, 
Building Trust; Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations. See also Partha Dasgupta, ‗Trust as a 
Commodity,‘ in Gambetta, ed., Trust, Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. 
6
 Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 173. 
7
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8
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‗better theoretical understanding of trust and cooperation in international relations.‘9 He 
defines trust as ‗a belief that the other side is trustworthy, that is, willing to reciprocate 
cooperation‘.10 So to trust someone as Kydd defines the concept is ‗to believe it relatively 
likely that they would prefer to reciprocate cooperation.‘11 Kydd develops a set of models 
that deal with trust to illustrate how the trusting preferences of the actors in specific 
situations and conditions have an influence on their ability to cooperate. He asserts that 
cooperation demands a certain amount of trust between states, and that they can indicate 
their willingness to cooperate through a process of costly signalling; making small but 
meaningful gestures to illustrate their potential trustworthiness.
12
 
Aaron Hoffman argues for the importance of studying trusting relationships which 
he describes as the ‗behavioural manifestations‘ of trust. He defines trust as ‗an attitude 
involving a willingness to place the fate of one‘s interests under the control of others in a 
particular context.‘13 This willingness is founded on the belief that the potential trustee 
will protect one‘s interests. Hoffman differentiates between relationships that consist 
purely of cooperation and relationships of trust by asserting that cooperative risk-taking 
behaviour does not necessarily imply trusting behaviour. Trusting relationships occur 
when actors ‗grant others discretion over their interests based on the belief that those 
interests will not be harmed.‘14 Trustors make predictions based on the estimation that 
their interests will be taken into account by the trustees. Hoffman admits that these 
predictions are subject to errors and misperceptions but that this can be improved by 
adding to the amount of information available.  
Hoffman argues that it is institutions (through the creation of oversight 
mechanisms and restrictions on action) that cause trusting relationships to emerge between 
states. By creating or participating in these institutions, potential trustors and trustees are 
more certain that their trust will not be taken advantage of and that their decision to enter 
into a trusting relationship will not backfire. This approach explains Hoffman‘s ‗trusting 
relationship‘ as a relationship under such conditions that would make trust less risky. 
Hoffman‘s conceptualisation of trust is focused on its relational manifestation and based 
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on an institutional framework that makes the consequences of placing one‘s interests into 
the hands of another less uncertain. For Hoffman, trust is action and in his discussion of 
trust he is actually speaking of ‗trusting‘ (by which he implies cooperative) behaviour. 
Trust is thus a calculative action based on prediction. Situational variables, such as the 
presence of institutions, increase or decrease the likelihood of its success and the trusting 
relationships can vary in their extent and intensity. As with Hardin and Kydd, trust is more 
context-dependent rather than actor-dependent.
15
 
While Hardin and Kydd‘s definitions refer to beliefs about preferences rather than 
beliefs about predicted behaviour, Hoffman‘s rational choice account differs in his focus 
on trust as beliefs about future actions instead of beliefs about the other‘s intentions. Diego 
Gambetta also focuses on predicting behaviour rather than intentions. He maintains that 
‗when we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean that 
the probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to 
us is high enough for us to consider engaging in cooperation with him.‘16  
 
Alternatives to the rational choice approach 
This rational choice approach to trust has many critics. Their primary criticism is that by 
treating trust as a function of varying knowledge and incentives, rational choice theories of 
trust actually render obsolete what they attempt to explain.
17
 For example, Jonathan 
Mercer asserts that ‗[e]mphasizing incentives as the basis for trust eliminates both the need 
for trust and the opportunity to trust‘.18 Mercer goes on to criticise the context-dependent 
nature of rational choice explanations, claiming that ‗[t]rust is a feeling toward someone, 
not toward an inanimate object or toward a situation...If observers attribute cooperation to 
the environment rather than the person, then trust cannot-and need not-develop.‘19 Mercer 
describes the cooperation that is used synonymously with trust in these explanations as 
actually incentive-based rather than trust-based behaviour. The central point that critics of 
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these approaches make is that rational choice explanations of trust are tautological in 
nature and thus offer an explanation of the concept that makes it superfluous to their 
argument. They argue that the rational choice account of trust is an incorrect one as it does 
not fully capture the nature of trust. However, later sections of the chapter will show that 
this criticism is itself located on the problematic implicit premise that there is a ‗true‘ 
nature for trust that can be captured by definition, and that one definition can be more 
correct than another. 
The second, related critique of this approach is that it reduces potential trustors to 
multiple, interchangeable rational egoists, assuming that all action is based on self-interest. 
This ignores the possibility of a more complex system of personal decision-making and 
the dispositional, emotional and interpersonal components of trust that authors such as 
Brian Rathbun, Deborah Larson and Jonathan Mercer argue are important.
20
  
Rathbun proposes an alternative explanation of trust and cooperation in 
International Relations founded in social psychology research and based on Eric Uslaner's 
account of generalised trust. Uslaner contends that trust is important because it goes 
beyond a simple, strategic calculation and contains a moral dimension. He describes 
generalised trust as ‗a moral commandment to treat people as if they were trustworthy 
[emphasis in original].‘21 Uslaner argues that the strategic conception of trust as a tool to 
reduce the risks of collective action by providing information to actors is incomplete. He 
proposes a definition of trust that has ethical roots and is based on the belief that most 
people share the same moral values. He claims that this meaning for trust explains things 
that the strategic account cannot, for example widespread civic engagement.
22
 He argues 
that while strategic trust might explain the continuance of a relationship it cannot explain 
its origins. If strategic trust is knowledge-based as rationalists claim, it could develop 
through repeated cooperation but Uslaner questions how this cooperation could be 
initiated without the knowledge required to begin the relationship. Uslaner suggests that 
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this origin is based in what he terms ‗moralistic trust‘, the belief that ‗people ought to trust 
each other [emphasis in original]‘.23 Strategic trust only explains cooperation with other 
actors about whom you have a certain level of knowledge, but moralistic trust allows for 
action without knowledge of each specific actor. He divides this notion of moralistic trust 
into categories of particularised and generalised trust. Particularised trust is limited to 
specific situations and members of an in-group, while generalised trust is stretched over a 
wider feeling of general trustworthiness and potential reciprocation from others. While 
particularised trust has a narrow focus, generalised trust is the belief that most people can 
be trusted. 
Rathbun adopts Uslaner‘s idea of a moralistic, generalised trust that is not based on 
interests and claims that the diffuse reciprocity that this conception of trust allows is a 
necessary component of multilateral cooperation in international politics. He argues 
against the rationalist focus on the situation in favour of a focus on the disposition and 
social orientation of the individual, which he believes has been neglected in previous work 
on the topic. He declares that 
[f]or almost half a century, social psychologists have demonstrated (and 
international relations scholars have largely ignored) the importance for 
cooperation of what Uslaner calls generalized trust-the belief that others are largely 
trustworthy...Unlike strategic trust, which is a function of the structural situation, 
generalized trust is an attribute of individuals.
24
  
Rathbun attempts to explain international cooperation and the development of 
international organisations with recourse to this notion of generalised trust.
25
 He critiques 
what he sees as an assumption of the rational choice work on cooperation from Robert 
Keohane‘s After Hegemony, and replicated since by Kydd and Hoffman with their more 
explicit focus on trust: that international institutions create trust by institutionalising 
cooperation.
26
 Rathbun declares that the study of trust cannot rely on context-specific 
research because ‗individuals approach the same problems of cooperation differently. This 
is largely based on how and whether they trust others.‘27 Trusting is therefore a function of 
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disposition rather than merely of incentives or structural factors. Rathbun argues that these 
dispositional factors work in tandem with structural factors to create outcomes of trust and 
mistrust. 
Another, similar critique of the rational choice model of trust is made by Deborah 
Welch Larson, who proposes a model of trust in International Relations that is rooted in 
cognitive psychology. She analyses the reasons for the pervasive mistrust that existed 
between the two superpowers during the Cold War, assessing three potential causes: 
rational choice preferences, domestic issues and cognitive psychological explanations. 
Larson claims that cognitive psychology provides the most convincing explanation for 
what she contends were the many missed opportunities for cooperation during the Cold 
War. These missed opportunities stemmed from the mistrust between the two states, which 
was based on ‗ideological differences, historical baggage and intuitive mental biases.‘28  
Larson categorises trust into three qualities of ‗predictability, credibility and good 
intentions.‘29 These categories vary from the belief that another‘s behaviour is merely 
predictable and they will therefore carry out their expected role competently and as 
expected, to ‗credibility‘, where trust involves reliance that the trusted party will adhere to 
any commitments or promises made, to the final category of belief in the trustee‘s good 
intentions towards the trustor. This final type of trust is more generalised within the 
relationship rather than restricted to specific actions or duties. Trust, in Larson‘s 
conception, is not just founded on an assessment of the situation and the structure of 
incentives, but is based on a judgement of the potential trustee‘s character. This brings in 
an element of emotion that goes beyond a purely rational, strategic action or decision. In 
Larson‘s account of trust, like in a rational choice account, knowledge does play a role but 
it is filtered through interpretations and biases that are not always based solely in reason. 
Trust goes beyond mere expectation and also contains a normative constituent; one feels 
outrage as well as merely disappointment when trust is dishonoured. Assessment of 
potential trustworthiness ‗is qualitative rather than quantitative, perceptual rather than 
concrete, and influenced by the history of her relations with the other, which gives some 
events symbolic value.‘30 Therefore, actions that may be interpreted as unfavourable in 
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one set of conditions may be judged favourable if a generalised belief in the other‘s good 
intentions already exists within the relationship.  
Other recent work has also critiqued the assumption that trust in International 
Relations should be conceptualised as just a strategic choice to cooperate. Jonathan Mercer 
criticises the understanding of rationality as completely distinct from psychology and 
emotion in the rational choice literature. He questions the prevalent assumption that 
psychology can only explain deviation from pure rationality.
31
 Based on social identity 
theory, Mercer suggests that trust is an ‗emotional belief‘ and involves feelings that go 
beyond observable evidence or mere reliance on predictability.
32
 He proposes that trust is 
founded on an emotional identification with other members of a perceived in-group. 
Jan Ruzicka and Nicholas J. Wheeler claim that the rational choice view of trust is 
unable to comprehend the possibility that actors in the international realm might develop a 
trusting relationship that could function separately from any structure of incentives and 
pay-offs. They raise the possibility of a connection between trust and the idea of friendship 
and propose an approach, based upon the work of Martin Hollis, which considers trust as a 
form of ‗binding‘.33 Thinking about trust as ‗binding‘ incorporates a normative dimension 
to the concept where agents place value on the continuance of the trusting relationship that 
is detached from any specific pay-offs.  
Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler assert the value of trust which they believe to 
be ‗basic to all society‘.34 They describe trust as existing along a continuum which 
stretches from the strategic ‗trust-as-predictability‘ to ‗interpersonal bonding [emphasis in 
original]‘.35 While allowing for variation in the scope and intensity of trust along this 
scale, Booth and Wheeler argue for the necessity of an emotional base to trust that cannot 
be properly accessed by a rationalist understanding. They also claim that the capacity for 
empathy is a key pre-condition to any trust-building. For Booth and Wheeler, the success 
of trust is reliant on what they describe as ‗the world of feelings‘, so in order to better 
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understand its properties they advocate a ‗multi-disciplinary approach rooted in a fuller 
appreciation of the human factor.‘36 
All of the authors reviewed above have claimed that the rational choice approach 
to the study of trust is somehow lacking in its explanatory ability. They have argued that 
the traditionally dominant, rational choice accounts of trust equate trust with knowledge 
and that trust therefore remains unexplained and often redundant in these accounts. They 
have therefore attempted to develop an alternative means of talking about trust. However, 
later parts of the chapter will illustrate how these alternative accounts nonetheless share 
the same approach to meaning as the rational choice approach and are therefore limited in 
the same manner. 
 
Trust and the ‗practice turn‘ in International Relations 
In his work on trust, Torsten Michel reviews the rational choice approach to trust and its 
critics and finds both lacking. He critiques the rational choice accounts of trust which he 
claims have ‗so far overlooked the central role of emotions in acts of trust.‘37 However, 
Michel is also critical of previous accounts of the nature of emotion in trust by authors 
such as Booth and Wheeler, Larson and Rathbun. He argues that, while these accounts 
criticise the rational choice approach, they have still been unable to fully explain the role 
of a ‗human factor‘ within trust, merely treating it as ‗a black box whose existence is 
confirmed but its nature unexplored.‘38 In fact, while these authors criticise the rational 
choice approach, Michel asserts that these accounts nonetheless ‗remain very close, if not 
completely in line, with a rationalist conception of trust and therefore forfeit any 
substantial advancement beyond earlier conceptions.‘39 He argues that all the existing 
accounts of trust pre-structure their method of inquiry ‗in such a way as to imply a specific 
nature of trust (as a result of human decision-making) and also a specific way of studying 
                                                 
36
 Ibid., 234. See also Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‗Beyond Waltz‘s Nuclear World: More Trust May be Better,‘ 
International Relations 23, no. 3 (2009): 428-445; Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‗Investigating diplomatic 
transformations,‘ International Affairs 89, no. 2 (2013): 477-496. 
37
 Torsten Michel, ‗Time to get emotional: Phronetic reflections on the concept of trust in International 
Relations,‘ European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 4 (2012): 870. 
38
 Ibid., 873. 
39
 Torsten Michel, ‗Trust, Rationality and Vulnerability in International Relations,‘ in Amanda Russell 
Beattie and Kate Schick, eds., The Vulnerable Subject: Beyond Rationalism in International Relations 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 87. 
30 
 
it (its correlation with certain enabling conditions)‘.40 Because the authors who advocate 
for a more emotion-driven conception of trust still ask their questions about trust in terms 
of trust as a conscious choice for dealing with uncertainty, the questions ‗already contains 
a rationalist-oriented conception of trust before any research has actually been done.‘41 
Michel argues instead for a more nuanced conception of the term with 
complementary rational and non-rational approaches, proposing a manner of examining 
trust as an ‗inarticulate disposition‘.42 He argues that the common method by which 
scholars of International Relations talk about trust is part of a wider representational bias 
in the discipline that prioritises the conscious and the reflexive side of social activity. 
Michel proposes incorporating a more non-conscious and inarticulate approach to trust 
that has its origins in a ‗logic of practicality‘.43 He contends that by focusing more on the 
practice of trust and combining representational and non-representational approaches to 
the topic, it is possible to come to a more complete and nuanced understanding of the 
nature and characteristics of trust.  
Michel‘s work on trust is influenced by recent work by authors such as Vincent 
Pouliot, who have contributed to the rise of a practice turn in International Relations.
44
 
Pouliot maintains that the pervasive representational bias in social theory inhibits scholars 
from thinking about the importance of practical knowledge and the ‗non-representational 
bedrock on which practices rest.‘45 He argues for the need to investigate the logic of 
practice in the field of diplomacy and builds on Bourdieu‘s sociology to develop a theory 
of practice in security communities.  
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The Wittgensteinian influence on this practice-based approach can be seen in 
Pouliot‘s acknowledgement of Charles Taylor‘s reading of the Wittgensteinian concept of 
rule-following. Taylor describes a non-intellectualist, non-representational take on 
understanding that is ‗always against a background of what is taken for granted, just relied 
on.‘46 He claims that ‗much of our intelligent action in the world, sensitive as it usually is 
to our situation and goals, is carried out unformulated‘, instead it ‗flows from an 
understanding that is largely inarticulate.‘47 Understanding is a process of rule-following 
rather than a process of interpretation. The action one would take when confronted with a 
sign (the example Wittgenstein provides is a sign post with an arrow pointing the way) 
comes from being trained to react in a certain way to this sign. A person will follow the 
arrow sign, not because they interpret the sign as representing a particular meaning that 
comes to mind when seeing it, but because they have learned the ‗custom‘ of following the 
rule associated with it through convention.
48
  
Taylor argues that this rule-following is not however a ‗brute causal link‘, that is 
imposed on the individual who then reacts automatically, but contains a sense that is 
‗embodied and not represented‘ rather than intellectual or mindful.49 This sense, or 
‗practical wisdom‘ as Taylor describes it, is the embodied knowledge of how to act in a 
given situation or when confronted with particular sign. It is the reciprocity between the 
practice and the rule that animates the rule so that the rule ‗lies essentially in the 
practice‘.50 Through this rejection of the representational view of understanding, Taylor 
contends that Wittgenstein ‗helped us break the philosophic thrall of intellectualism‘, a 
beginning that was taken up by social theorists such as Pierre Bourdieu who in turn have 
been adopted by contemporary authors in International Relations.
51
 
While there is doubtless a level of compatibility between the Wittgensteinian 
approach taken here and the turn to practice in the study of trust advocated by Michel (and 
more broadly by Pouliot), Michel nonetheless remains enmeshed in the representational 
view of meaning in how he talks about trust. While recognising some of the limitations of 
talking about trust as it is typically done, he nonetheless continues to work within these 
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limitations by maintaining a representational approach to the meaning of trust, as 
expressed in his wish for a more correct definition of what he terms the ‗very nature of the 
phenomenon‘.52 In a similar manner to this work, he argues that certain assumptions are 
already embedded in the questions that we ask about trust and International Relations, and 
that these assumptions shape and limit the avenues for research. However, he does not go 
forward with this idea to acknowledge that taking this stance would have a wider 
implication for the type of questions one can ask or the way in which one can talk about 
the ‗meaning of trust‘.  
By moving toward this more practice-based approach while retaining the idea of a 
true nature and meaning for trust, Michel retains some of the contradictions he has 
correctly highlighted in the other literature. While the ideas of non-representational 
research in Michel‘s work move away from the picture view of language in some respects, 
it nonetheless remains confined by the typical language of the representational view and 
its need to understand the ‗nature of trust‘.53  
 
Trust in the social science literature 
Each of the previous approaches to trust in International Relations is based on a wider 
foundation of multi-disciplinary trust research and is inspired by established literature on 
trust in philosophy, political science and comparative politics, cognitive and social 
psychology, and organisational and management theory. For example, there has been a 
large amount of literature in US political science on declining levels of trust in 
government using data from large scale government surveys such as the National Election 
Studies (NES) and the General Social Survey (GSS),
54
 or looking at the importance of 
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levels of trust across different countries and the role of trust in democracy promotion.
55
 
Much work on trust has also been done in the area of management and organisational 
studies with a focus on building or maintaining trust both within and between 
organisations and often, though not exclusively, within a broadly rational choice 
approach.
56
 There is also literature on the subject of trust in political and social 
psychology.
57
 The research on trust in International Relations is more recent and thus 
draws heavily from these different branches of study and there is a high level of crossover 
between disciplines in the area. Because of this, the study of trust recommends itself as a 
naturally multi and inter-disciplinary endeavour and there is much encouragement within 
the literature to seek out such approaches in order to discover an overarching or more 
coherent meaning for trust within the social sciences that can then be deconstructed, 
understood and reproduced.
58
 
 It is therefore helpful to incorporate literature from the wider study of trust in 
social science into any review of the topic in International Relations. This is important 
because these multiple ways of conceptualising trust within the social sciences may seem 
very disparate but, across all disciplines, they generally rest on the same basic, 
unexpressed assumption.  This is that the word ‗trust‘ represents a concrete and stable 
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meaning, or set of meanings with a baseline set of necessary and sufficient conditions, and 
so can be defined, understood and agreed upon on an abstract level. That this is possible is 
taken for granted but actually rests on a specific, representational view of language and 
meaning.  
What is meant by a ‗representational‘ view of meaning is that all the accounts of 
trust have talked about trust as a word that represents a particular thing that exists in the 
world. That when one says the word ‗trust‘, it refers to a corresponding, relatively stable 
and independent entity that can be transferred and analysed across differing contexts. This 
type of theorising is described by Staten as ‗connected with the traditional philosophical 
picture of mind and meaning, according to which meanings are object-like unities that 
float about in a homogeneous spiritualised medium called ―mind.‖‘59 This view of 
meaning limits the possible ways that we may be able to talk about trust and international 
politics while placing a constraint on our ability for critique. This particular way of talking 
about trust also has many conceptual and methodological consequences, yet this 
assumption about meaning goes unexamined in all the literature about trust. The following 
section of the chapter will provide a Wittgensteinian challenge to this assumption. 
 
‘A picture held us captive’, Wittgenstein and the meaning of words 
The previous section provided an overview of the research on the topic of trust in 
International Relations and claimed that the current literature rests on the assumption that 
the ‗trust‘ under examination is a word that represents a specific thing in the world whose 
essence can be defined and understood. This seems like a quite simple or obvious 
proposition: words represent things. They are labels that correspond to objects that exist in 
the world. However, this is an incomplete way to think about meaning as well as a source 
of potential methodological confusion that can complicate any research that is 
unquestioningly based on this assumption. This part of the chapter will argue that, by 
admitting the Wittgensteinian approach that for a large class of cases in which we use the 
word meaning, ‗the meaning of a word is its use in the language‘, one can challenge this 
dominant representational idea of a ‗true‘ meaning (or series of meanings) for the word 
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‗trust‘.60 Acknowledging ‗meaning as use‘ entails recognising that the portrayal of 
language encapsulated in the typical approach to trust, while depicting certain elements of 
a system of communication (i.e. naming), does not describe everything that we call 
language. As Wittgenstein contends, this approach is in fact both a description of a 
‗primitive idea‘ of how language works, as well as a description of ‗a language more 
primitive than ours.‘61  
The Philosophical Investigations challenges this ‗primitive‘ idea of meaning by 
providing what Pin-Fat describes as ‗an investigation into the assumptions (the pictures 
which hold us captive) which inform the notion of language and thought as 
representation‘.62 Wittgenstein begins the Philosophical Investigations with a quote from 
Augustine‘s Confessions in which Augustine describes how his elders taught him to speak 
by pointing to objects and naming them: 
Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, 
I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained 
my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.
63
  
Wittgenstein argues that this quote provides a common picture of language within 
which the words that we speak correspond to certain things and so each word has a 
meaning. He proceeds to dismantle this picture of meaning and argues that the portrayal of 
language encapsulated by this quote, while depicting certain elements of a system of 
communication, does not describe everything that we call language but is in fact an over-
simplified idea of how language performs.
64
 Understanding language is not simply a 
question of naming that the representational approach implies. Because all words are not 
nouns and all nouns are not used in the same way, the representational view can only give 
a limited account of language.  
Also, learning a language cannot simply consist of giving names to things, as this 
can only function when one has already mastered language. Wittgenstein explains this 
point through many overlapping examples. By giving an illustration of explaining to 
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someone the ‗King‘ piece in chess, he shows that to point to the piece and state that this is 
a ‗King‘ does not tell the listener anything unless they are already accustomed to the 
conventions of a game.  
In this case we shall say: the words ―this is the King‖ (or ―this is called the 
‗King‘‖) are a definition only if the learner already ‗‗knows what a piece in a game 
is‘‘...We may say: only someone who already knows how to do something with it 
can significantly ask a name.
65
  
The act of naming the ‗King‘ piece only works if those involved have an understanding of 
the wider context of this act, and are already accustomed to the significance of the naming 
process. It is only under these conditions that the naming of the ‗King‘ provides an 
explanation because ‗the place for it was already prepared‘.66 Thus meaning as 
representation only works when located within a background of knowledge. 
In another illustration Wittgenstein gives an example of the colour red.  He asks, 
‗[h]ow is he to know what colour he is to pick out when he hears ―red‖?‘67 The 
representational view of meaning would suggest that an image of the colour ‗red‘ comes 
before the mind of whoever hears this word. But this picture of meaning is both 
insufficient and unnecessary. It is insufficient because, as Colin McGinn explains, ‗the 
picture does not in itself determine the correct use of the associated word [emphasis in 
original]‘.68 It does not tell us how to use this word. For example, if one points to a red 
ball and says ‗red‘ to one who does not know the word, how does one explain that it is the 
colour you name and not the object, or shape, or specific title, without already having a 
prior understanding of these things. It is also unnecessary for understanding as there are 
words for which a picture will not come to mind and there may be many different pictures 
that come to mind for the same words for different people depending on circumstance. So 
one needs to be already familiar with language to understand the purpose of this ostensive 
definition, there must be a level of background understanding within which the word is 
understood and this will vary with context.
69
  
                                                 
65
 Ibid., 31. 
66
 Ibid. 
67
 Ibid., 239 
68
 Colin McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning: An Interpretation and Evaluation (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1984), 7. 
69
 Ibid., 16. 
37 
 
Therefore we do not understand language by learning an inventory of what words 
correspond to ‗in reality‘, but rather through understanding the different contexts where 
words are used in practice in our everyday use of language.  
 
Understanding and rule-following 
Accepting the Wittgensteinian challenge means that meaning does not rest in the relation 
between words and the things that they name but is acquired through the practice of 
following rules that have become connected to the language through repeated use. The 
mastery of language that must come prior to naming is not a type of knowledge but a 
practice, so ‗[t]o understand a language means to be master of a technique.‘70  This is 
because language is actually a host of activities that we perform and not a thing that we 
acquire and that can be studied in isolation from its use. If meaning is not a matter of 
labelling and representation but rather a matter of use, not only is meaning extracted from 
the ways in which a word is used, but understanding becomes the ability to use the word in 
the correct manner, thus meaningfulness is gained in practice and does not reside outside 
of it.
71
 Therefore the meaning of a word cannot be taken out of the context in which it is 
felt and expressed, to be analysed on a universal and purely theoretical level.  
Meaning can thus be described as a set of rules, attached to a specific context and 
followed in practice. These rules are themselves constituted and reconstituted through the 
custom of repeatedly following the rule. This rule-following is not, however, a process of 
interpretation.
72
 As Baker and Hacker explain, Wittgenstein challenges the idea of 
interpretation as ‗the only possible bridge between a rule and the acts that accord with 
it‘.73  When one follows a rule it is not because one ‗interprets‘ the rule in a certain way 
and this interpretation then determines the course of action, if this was the case, one could 
potentially interpret any action as one that follows the rule, as Wittgenstein makes clear: 
‗no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be 
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made out to accord with a rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord 
with the rule, then it can also be made to conflict with it. And so there would be neither 
accord nor conflict here.‘74 Therefore an interpretation cannot provide meaning because 
‗any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets‘.75 The point is not 
that understanding never involves a process of interpretation (in terms of translating from 
one symbol to another) but that it cannot solely do so, for an interpretation must in itself 
lie on something.
76
  
That ‗something‘ is a foundation of practical and unreflective knowledge, where 
understanding is not the ability to interpret what a sign represents but rather the capacity to 
do something in context. In fact Wittgenstein advises to try ‗not to think of understanding 
as a ‗‗mental process‘‘ at all.--For that is the expression which confuses you. But ask 
yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say, ―Now I know 
how to go on,‖ [emphasis in original]‘.77 Understanding a language therefore consists of a 
practice of rule-following that comes prior to interpretation and, as James Tully explains, 
‗must consist in the unmediated ability to ―grasp‖ a sign manifested in actual praxis.‘78 
Wittgenstein thus extinguishes the gap between understanding and use because, as 
McGinn states,  
the intended effect of characterising understanding in this way is to forge a direct 
connexion between understanding and use: understanding is essentially connected 
with use because it precisely is the capacity to do certain things with signs 
[emphasis in original].
79
  
Following a rule is a practice that is unreflective and understanding is in doing rather than 
prior to doing. 
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Language games 
In this way, learning a language can be compared with learning how to play a game; one 
learns the rules of a game through playing it and in the context of understanding the 
activity of playing a game. The term ‗language game‘ is an important one in the 
Philosophical Investigations and one that Wittgenstein uses in multiple, though related, 
ways. Initially, he uses the idea of a ‗language game‘ to describe a language that consists 
only of pointing and naming objects (in this case blocks, pillars slabs and beams) and 
explains that in this ‗primitive‘ language ‗the following process will occur: the learner 
names the objects; that is, he utters the word when the teacher points to the stone.‘80 This 
‗primitive‘ language game is one that Wittgenstein uses in order to make a point about the 
limitations of thinking about meaning as a process of naming and representation. 
However, he then relates this language game to a host of other practices of language that 
he terms as language games. This ‗multiplicity of language games‘, of things that one does 
with language, illustrates how naming is only one activity that can be accomplished with 
language; others he lists include giving orders, speculating, forming or testing a 
hypothesis, guessing riddles, making a joke, translating, thanking or praying.
81
 Each of 
these examples is an activity that contains its own rules and these are not pre-determined 
or fixed but rather, ‗new types of language, new language games, as we may say, come 
into existence and others become obsolete and get forgotten.‘82  
So Wittgenstein uses ‗language games‘ to describe these differing practices, what 
Fierke describes as ‗specific moves with language.‘83 It is through comparison of the 
multiple ways in which we practice language that we can study meaning, through 
understanding differing language games ‗as ―objects of comparison‖ which are meant to 
throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of 
dissimilarities.‘84 In other words, we can understand ‗meaning‘ through an investigation 
the different ways in which language is used in these multiple language games. 
Wittgenstein also describes all of the words that make up our language, and the 
activity in which it is practiced as a language game: ‗I shall also call the whole, consisting 
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of language and the actions into which it is woven, the ―language-game‖.‘85 Here the term 
‗language game‘ once again highlights the importance of practice in the meaning of 
language. The label is used, therefore, in slightly different ways throughout the 
Philosophical Investigations but nonetheless with a specific purpose throughout these 
various uses: to highlight the fact that learning a language is not simply learning the 
meaning of words. The inclusion of the word ‗game‘ repeats to the reader the customary 
and rule-based nature of language; that meaning does not rest in words representing 
things, but in how these words are practiced within the activity of the language game.  
In this work, the term ‗language game‘ refers to a situated way of acting with 
language in which certain rules are commonly understood. For example, a US presidential 
pronouncement on national security or a public admonition of a foreign power, in which 
multiple conventions are expected and understood by the speaker and the audience. This 
term is used here primarily to remind the reader that any utterance is occurring within a 
particular context which involves a specific set of linguistic practices. 
 
Meaning as use and the study of trust 
If one accepts that language is an activity that is best understood through everyday use, for 
a word to be intelligible it does not need a fence placed around its potential set of 
meanings or a minimum requirement of comparability. One does not need to know the 
definition of the word ‗games‘ on a theoretical level to understand that football is a game 
and walking is generally not.
86
 In fact, not knowing the meaning of a word on an abstract 
level has never impeded the use of the word in ordinary speech. Whether something 
qualifies as a ‗game‘ is not a result of any particular qualities of the activity but whether 
the word ‗game‘ is used as a description. As Allan Janik argues, ‗[i]n terms of the example 
of ‗games,‘ not sharing any finite set of properties by virtue of which they are called 
games, common usage decides what a game is.‘87  
                                                 
85
 Ibid. 
86
 Though walking could be made into a game in some manner, which also shows that the characteristics of 
the activity do not lead to the application of the label ‗game‘. 
87
 Allan Janik, ‗Notes on the Natural History of Politics,‘ in Heyes, ed., The Grammar of Politics, 109. 
41 
 
The idea that the word ‗trust‘ can mean one, or two, or even twenty different things 
which all have a minimum baseline of attributes in common and a definite, autonomous 
boundary around them is thus refuted, as meaning does not encompass this sort of 
universality or require these set limits. As Wittgenstein explains: 
Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying 
that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same 
word for all,--but that they are related to one another in  many different ways. And 
it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all 
―language‖ [emphasis in original].88 
Once again Wittgenstein demonstrates this with the example of the word ‗games‘. While 
some games can be described as involving a ball, some by needing skill, luck or some by 
an element of competition, none of these things apply to all the things that we call by the 
name ‗games‘. The activities themselves do not provide an answer; the actual moves 
involved in chess for example could in another context represent a religious ritual and 
there is little in common between the actions of playing a game of solitaire and playing a 
game of tennis. Some games have certain overlapping characteristics, others are similar in 
certain other ways and these create a ‗complicated network of similarities overlapping and 
criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail‘.89 There is 
no set space wherein the meaning of the word ‗game‘ rests but instead a set of what 
Wittgenstein terms ‗family resemblances‘ of intersecting likenesses among all the ways 
the word in question is used. Some uses will resemble each other in one way, some in 
another, with no baseline of necessary characteristics to fulfil the requirement of meaning, 
like a thread spun from the ‗overlapping of many fibres‘.90 As Pitkin observes, the ‗real 
point is not features of games at all, but features of the situations in which we talk about 
games‘, the aim is not to qualify what counts as a game or what are the features of a game, 
but when to use the word ‗game‘.91 
Wittgenstein warns against ignoring the common usage of words and instead 
presenting meaning as a preconceived notion to which we then bend our experiences. 
‗There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all 
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explanation, and description alone must take its place [emphasis in original].‘92 There is 
no deeper essence to language, there is no new understanding to be found through an 
abstract examination of our words below the surface of language so we can only order the 
information that we have and organise what already ‗lies open to view‘.93 As Fierke 
explains, ‗[w]e cannot get behind our language to compare it with that which it 
describes‘.94 This view of meaning disputes the idea of a ‗deeper‘ meaning that is naturally 
more significant than any surface-level meaning. Wittgenstein‘s proposal of ‗meaning as 
use‘ is thus a challenge to the older view of true meaning which, as Pitkin describes, 
‗stresses reference, correspondence, representation...Wittgenstein shows us that this view 
of meaning cannot be correct, and that this view of language is correspondingly 
inadequate and misleading.‘95  
Understanding how language works requires recognising its contextual nature and 
its diversity of meaning. Wittgenstein argues that the search for an essence, or a ‗correct‘ 
meaning is in fact a ‗pursuit of chimeras‘, because the deeper one looks into language and 
the more one removes it from its use, the greater the conflict that then results between the 
language under examination and our ability to understand it.
96
 Therefore, he writes that,  
[t]he more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict 
between it and our requirement...The conflict becomes intolerable...We have got 
on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions 
are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so 
we need friction. Back to the rough ground! [emphasis in original]
97
  
It is on the rough ground of context, experience and the ordinary that we remain safe from 
the excesses of theory and abstraction. 
The Philosophical Investigations thus functions as both a means of limitation and 
of release. The challenge of ‗meaning as use‘ limits the tempting inclination to move both 
above and below ordinary speech. For it is tempting to attempt general explanations, they 
are more impressive than small, context-bound descriptions that make smaller claims. The 
Wittgensteinian approach holds us back from this tendency to create grand theories of 
                                                 
92
 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 109. 
93
 Ibid., 126. 
94
 Fierke, Changing Games, 3. 
95
 Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice, 3. 
96
 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 94. 
97
 Ibid., 107. 
43 
 
meaning, dragging us back down ‗into the muck of language again‘.98 Meaning as use also 
hoists us up from the depths of ‗true‘ meaning and holds us firm on surface level.  
However, the Wittgensteinian approach to language is also a form of release from 
the necessity of finding correct meanings for words. When one is freed from having to 
discover what a word actually means, one is not injured by the ‗bumps that the 
understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language.‘99 
Wittgenstein‘s aim is to free the reader from the picture of language as representation, and 
induce them to question any tendency towards generalisation and the application of the 
scientific method to language. As he explains, 
we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only by presenting the world 
as what it is, as an object of comparison--as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not as a 
preconceived idea to which reality must correspond. (The dogmatism into which 
we fall so easily in doing philosophy.) [emphasis in original]
100
 
This provides a warning to those that would abstract meaning from practice. 
Wittgenstein warns that taking a word in isolation and asking what it means takes it out of 
the activity in which it is bestowed with meaning and thus renders it less meaningful. 
Therefore I can tell someone that I trust them, can read a hotel bill that says ‗we trust you 
have enjoyed your stay‘, or exclaim ‗trust her to do that‘ and the meaning of the word 
‗trust‘ expressed in each utterance, though different in each case, is completely clear to 
anyone who is enmeshed in the practice of our shared language game. It is only when one 
takes the word out of this practice to ask ‗what is trust?‘ or ‗what does it mean to say the 
word ―trust‖?‘ that its meaning becomes in any way unclear. This is because the 
representational view of language that is implied by the posing of this question does not 
provide us with a complete ability to understand how and where language is actually at 
work. ‗The confusions which occupy us‘ Wittgenstein states, ‗arise when language is like 
an engine idling, not when it is doing work.‘101  
The common assumption that language is a representation of reality is a restrictive 
force, it causes us to think that we are able to outline the nature of a thing, to explain the 
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meaning of a word, because words stand for certain things in ‗reality‘ when indeed we are 
simply recreating our own vision of that meaning.  
One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing‘s nature over and over again, 
and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it.  
A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our 
language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably [emphasis in 
original].
102
  
It is the acceptance of this ‗picture‘ of language that is problematic in the current form of 
the study of trust in International Relations. By implicitly accepting that one can find a 
meaning for the word ‗trust‘ in its representational sense, it becomes tempting to view the 
notional meaning that one sets around the word ‗trust‘ as somehow correct or real.  
It is important to emphasise the part of this quote that describes how the picture 
‗lay in our language‘, and how language ‗seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.‘ The 
assumptions lie in the forms of language that are used to talk about meaning and in this 
case the meaning of trust. For it is entirely possible that some (or perhaps all) of the 
scholars who write about trust in the social sciences would not explicitly ascribe to the 
picture of meaning as a mirror of reality, or think about meaning as representation when 
asked. But that does not matter, for they talk about trust as if they do. The assumptions lie 
in the language and they have repeated them. Speaking about trust as if the word is 
representing a thing in the world that has an essence may simply be a function of not 
thinking about the consequences of the way we talk about certain words, one is just 
following the conventions of speech and specifically of the language of the social 
sciences. However, it is this unquestioning acceptance of the consequences of the pictures 
implicit in our language that can be problematic.  
Studying a concept such as trust with an uncritically representational approach to 
meaning can induce hypostatisation of the concept, giving presence to a meaning that has 
merely been placed around a word in order to fulfil a certain course of study, and then 
promoting a view of this construct as a viable object of study in itself. One can begin to 
believe, or at least express the idea that one is studying the ‗nature‘ of trust rather than the 
frame through which one is looking at the word ‗trust‘. This hypostatisation can lead to 
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several problematic methodological tendencies within the current study of trust that are 
outlined in the following section. 
 
Some problems attendant to the representational view of trust 
The general inclination to hypostatise one‘s meaning for trust that is evident in the exiting 
literature leads to certain problematic tendencies. There are three main tendencies that will 
be discussed in this section: the urge to define trust, the exclusion of intent in its study and 
the bestowing of agency on one‘s description of trust. These tendencies often result in the 
adoption of three common descriptive fallacies in the existing research, which this chapter 
will then explain. 
 
The need for definition 
The first tendency to be seen in the current literature is the persistent urge to define trust. 
This is the main misapprehension, and the source from which most of the other problems 
materialise. Talking about the word ‗trust‘ as a tool of understanding in the study of 
International Relations or as playing a role in international politics, requires it to have 
certain characteristics. These include a stability of meaning across time and space. Trust is 
thus assigned a constancy of meaning and a universal nature which it is possible to grasp if 
one is only observant or analytical enough and so the inevitable ensuing question will be 
‗what is trust?‘ or, ―what does trust mean?‖  
Whether they would expressly state it or not, researchers in the field discuss trust 
as a thing whose true nature and meaning can be accessed. The most common approach is 
that trust is something that needs to be defined and explained and that in so doing, it is 
possible to make trust generally operational. As a result, many scholars have offered up a 
definition of trust, and many more have dismissed these as lacking and subsequently 
proffered their own, superior definitions. However, the idea of ‗the‘ definition of trust and 
the resulting criticism that ‗that is not trust because it is not how I think about trust‘, is 
perhaps an unhelpful one. This elevation of one‘s own meaning for trust, with its attendant 
proclivity toward the imposition of the idea of more or less legitimate expressions of the 
46 
 
term, is prevalent within the literature and can be illustrated by the following quote from 
Russell Hardin about public surveys and trust. 
As an aside, note that surveys can evoke prima facie implausible responses. Self-
reported trust in President George W. Bush rose dramatically after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001. The administration had demonstrably failed badly 
and yet now people claimed to trust it more than before (Economist, June 8, 2002, 
pp.27-8). It seems likely that the best way to read these weird results is to suppose 
that they are a patriotic move to rally round the flag, not an assessment of the 
trustworthiness of the regime.
103
 
This dismissal of the feelings of a nation as ‗implausible‘ and ‗weird‘ is typical of a 
approach to definition in trust research that assumes the author‘s definition is universally 
applicable and the natural definition of the term, and is therefore what people should be 
speaking of when they use the word ‗trust‘. In fact, these survey results are only 
anomalous if one accepts that the only way to think about trust is as Russell Hardin 
describes it; as knowledge-based cooperation based on an assessment of trustworthiness 
due to the perceived presence of encapsulated interests. Hardin dismisses the common use 
of the word ‗trust‘ as ‗of little theoretical interest‘ instead he imposes his conception of 
trust onto every use of the term and judges its correctness accordingly.
104
 This is indicative 
of an attitude that separates the meaning of trust from the ways in which people actually 
use the word. 
Many similar examples can be found within the trust literature, even in cases 
where the author ostensibly rejects the typical approaches to studying trust. While 
acknowledging the challenges of abstract definition, Michel still falls into the trap of 
declaring what should and should not be contained in any explanation of trust. For 
example, he complains that one consequence of the assumptions that remain in the 
emotionally-driven accounts of trust is the ‗rather blurred differentiation of various closely 
related phenomena, all of which run commonly under the notion of ―trust‖‘, and he argues 
that ‗the phenomenon of trust has yet to be separated from related yet qualitatively 
different phenomena such as reliance.‘105  
The critique of the quest for the ‗correct‘ definition of trust contained in this thesis 
does not, however, mean that anyone can describe trust as they please within the academic 
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literature without fear of criticism. Each conception should be fit for its purpose and can 
therefore be critiqued on its merits, but with the awareness that this is but one frame 
through which to describe trust. The trust that one person speaks of may not be the trust 
spoken of by another, but both share equal claims to validity. It is unproductive to critique 
another‘s conception or expression of trust therefore, purely for not fitting with one‘s own 
conception of the term because there will be no meaning that can encompass the multiple 
ways in which the word ‗trust‘ is used in different language games, ‗[a]gain and again a 
use of a word emerges that seems not to be compatible with the concept that other uses 
have led us to form. We say: but that isn‘t how it is!‘106 This can lead into an unproductive 
discussion over the correct meaning for concepts that reduces debate to the mere 
production of thesis and antithesis, ‗so we battle back and forth-like the tone of an 
argument between 2 small children. ―Es ist doch nicht es-aber es ist doch so.‖‘107  
 
The neglect of intent 
The second, related tendency of the literature on trust is that scholars often fail to give 
adequate recognition to the issue of intent in their own work and do not acknowledge that 
the purpose of their study may induce them to think about trust in a way that will naturally 
shape their conception of the term. Instead there is a general wish for a more unified 
approach to the topic, including a unified understanding of the word. This wish is often 
repeated throughout the literature and acknowledged as a priority. Roderick Kramer 
echoes a generally-repeated grievance when he states that 
while empirical evidence continues to accumulate at a rapid rate, there has been a 
dearth of studies using overarching concepts and multiple level measures that 
might help bridge the increasingly diverse conceptions of trust represented by 
economic, sociological, and social psychological perspectives.
108
  
Lewis and Weigert also complain that, 
[a]lthough these groups of [social science] researchers have sometimes borrowed 
from each other‘s theory and methods, no general paradigm of trust has emerged 
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from their work. Indeed a survey of the massive number of empirical studies 
conducted by these groups fails to reveal even a common working definition of 
trust.
109
  
Hoffman is more positive about the level of scholarly conformity on the term, stating that 
while ‗no current single definition serves as a focal point for research...substantial 
agreement exists about the elements any definition should include or imply.‘110 Following 
on from this, Guido Möllering expresses his desire for ‗a restored, richer understanding of 
trust‘s nature‘.111  
Scholars have thus considered and promoted trust as a potentially unifying factor 
throughout disparate disciplines that could warrant its own area of study and as an issue 
that benefits from a multi-disciplinary or inter-disciplinary approach.
112
 Taking that 
approach carries the assumption that there exists a core baseline of meaning that can be 
attributed to the various things that are labelled as trust, a common thread of shared 
meaning in each use, even though this may not be the case. The challenge of meaning as 
use suggests that this type of approach to the topic could be less useful than is generally 
suggested, or at least needs to be carefully considered. In fact, this thesis argues that it is 
partly this manner of thinking about trust that can be a source of many of the multiple 
challenges in its study.  
Why one uses a word influences how one uses it. The reason for using a word 
shapes its meaning because, as Fierke states, the ‗process of articulating the question and 
naming the object of explanation establishes the parameters of the context prior to the 
analysis itself‘.113 This is something that has not often been considered by those writing on 
trust but the purpose of one‘s study of a concept such as trust should not be separated from 
the meaning one gives to this concept. Being a more or less trusting person is a different 
thing to how a polity may trust in political systems or institutions, or how states cooperate 
under anarchy, conflating or trying to place these things along a continuum or within a 
hierarchy of importance creates methodological challenges. 
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To claim to be practicing the ‗study of trust‘ at all is in itself a misleading manner 
in which to approach the subject that is guilty of ignoring the important question of intent. 
There is no actual subject of study for trust; one is studying how trust can relate to 
international cooperation, management strategies, the mechanisms of complex social 
institutions, psychological dispositions and countless other things. Because of this, the 
idea of creating a coherent and universal conception of trust to apply across disciplines is 
problematic. This problem does not lie in the difficulties of creating what Kramer 
describes as ‗overarching concepts‘ of trust, the problem lies in the fact that such an effort 
is regarded as either possible or constructive.
114
 There is no general vision of what trust is, 
there are only the multiple uses of trust as it pertains to certain topics. The question that 
should be at the forefront of each analysis of a study of trust is therefore ‗with what intent 
is trust being examined in this research?‘ followed by ‗what do I mean here by trust?‘ 
Acknowledging that there is no single way in which to study trust but instead many ways 
in which to address the topic depending on the motivation for study means changing the 
received wisdom the manner in which the word ‗trust‘ is generally talked about in the 
literature. 
There are many examples in the literature, from various disciplines, of scholars 
discussing conceptions of trust with no acknowledgement of intent. For example, Lewis 
and Weigert develop a sociological version of trust because they assert that ‗while there is 
a large quantity of research on trust by experimental psychologists and political scientists‘ 
this research ‗appears theoretically unintegrated and incomplete from the standpoint of a 
sociology of trust‘ and that they ‗typically conceptualize trust as a psychological event 
within the individual rather than as an intersubjective or systemic social reality.‘115 This is 
despite the fact that it seems perfectly reasonable that psychologists would conceptualise 
trust as a psychological event. Rathbun criticises rationalists for their reliance on ‗strategic 
trust‘ and exclusion of the concept of ‗generalized trust‘ based on social psychology.116 
However similar to criticising an experimental psychologist for not including a 
sociological base, criticising a game theorist for not focusing on emotion or social 
psychology is a little beside the point. That is simply not what they do. It is not surprising 
that the psychologist speaks of trust as a personal characteristic, the sociologist speaks of 
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trust as a social phenomenon or the economist speaks of trust as a rational choice enabling 
cooperation for profit. This is what trust is to each of them and so their conception of trust 
is, for them, correct.  
 
Giving agency to trust 
Another tendency that results from the consensus on the representational view of meaning 
is the granting of agency to one‘s conception of trust. The temptation to hypostatise one‘s 
meaning for trust that is embedded in the representational view of meaning brings with it 
the temptation to bestow on this concept the ability to act. Trust not only exists but has 
agency. For example, Uslaner states that trust ‗brings us all sorts of good things‘, ‗has 
consequences‘ and ‗has powerful effects on business and cultural group involvement as 
well as on charitable contributions and volunteering.‘117 Luhmann asserts that ‗trust is a 
solution for specific problems of risk‘118 while Mercer attributes to it the ability to solve 
‗collective action problems‘.119 Möllering declares that trust‘s function ‗manifests itself at 
all levels of society‘120 while Lewis and Weigert say that trust ‗allows social interactions 
to proceed‘.121 Booth and Wheeler ask whether it is possible for trust to ‗overcome 
uncertainty and conquer interstate anarchy?‘122 Others speak of a ‗role‘ for trust. Wheeler 
discusses the ‗role it [trust] could play in transforming adversarial relationships‘,123 
Ruzicka and Wheeler describe the ‗crucial role‘ played by trust and trustworthiness in 
upholding the nuclear non-proliferation regime,
124
 while Kramer describes the role of trust 
in ‗reducing transaction costs‘.125  
The granting of agency to trust is implicit even in the works of those authors who 
would claim to avoid this tendency. Rathbun argues for the promotion of a psychological 
approach to the topic with the admission of the more or less trusting personality as a focus 
of study within trust research in International Relations. He nonetheless speaks of the 
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notion of generalised trust as if it has the ability to act independently and to influence 
situations. Rathbun states that generalised trust ‗helps states initiate cooperation...begins a 
reciprocity circle...allows states to cooperate with new partners [and]...broadens the 
community circle, extending trust to others [emphasis in original].‘ Trust also ‗leaves an 
impact on the design of international organizations.‘126  
The idea of the agency of trust that is implicit in the language of much of the 
literature then leads to a set of complex issues about how and where this agency is 
enacted. This raises many questions about the level of analysis for trust that are not 
answered within the current research. This is especially important in the study of trust in 
International Relations where there is a considerable lack of clarity on the topic. Authors 
generally fail to clarify whether they are speaking about individuals, states or other group 
actors, and often move between these levels without any comment. There is little 
consideration of whether the trust they define would be the same thing at the individual or 
institutional level or how this trust would be transferred between the two; would trust 
between two leaders or diplomats influence wider state relations and if so, how? Instead, 
states are imparted with the capability of trusting without due consideration of how this 
would work, or an acknowledgement of any issues that are raised by treating the state as 
an actor that can trust.  
This carelessness regarding levels of analysis is evident throughout the literature. 
For example, Michel asserts that ‗IR is mainly concerned with the nature and emergence 
of trustful relations between agents in the international realm‘ and so discusses trust with 
this in mind, yet he fails to address what the consequences might be of different types of 
actor.
127
 While Kydd acknowledges that trust could have different features and 
ramifications at domestic and international levels due to the imperatives of anarchy, he 
does not address the issue of transferring how trust might be felt at an individual versus at 
state level. In his account of the end of the Cold War, Kydd moves between individuals as 
agents to states as agents in the context of trust. In his initial explanation of trust he 
contends that ‗[s]tates that trust each other sufficiently can cooperate; states that do not 
may end up in conflict.‘128 This implies that he takes the state as his unit of analysis. 
                                                 
126
 Rathbun, Trust in International Cooperation, 3. 
127
 Michel, ‗Time to get emotional,‘ 5. 
128
 Kydd, Trust and Mistrust, 3. 
52 
 
However, within his case studies he speaks of ‗Reagan‘s image of Gorbachev‘ and 
‗Gorbachev‘s image of Reagan‘.129 There is also a lack of clarity on the object of trust, 
whether the trust built through costly signals is focused on the individual, in the role they 
inhabit or in the institution of the state.  
Larson also switches between levels of analysis without explanation of how this 
would work. Many of her statements are concerned with the leaders of states, which is 
consistent for a scholar taking an approach based on cognitive psychology, so she makes 
assertions such as ‗US and Soviet leaders passed up opportunities to cooperate on arms 
control and on Germany largely because of mutual mistrust‘130 and ‗American leaders 
fundamentally distrusted the Soviets because they were communists.‘131 However, she 
also refers to states as trusting or distrustful actors, for example, ‗if two states acutely 
distrust each other, a single cooperative action may not be enough to elicit a reciprocal 
response‘,132 or ‗states may not be able to reach an agreement if they distrust each 
other.‘133 Larson fails to address how these levels of analysis might be different or related. 
She asserts that, 
[c]ognitive psychology holds that the labels people give to events, persons and 
things shape their interpretation of information and influences their response. This 
is no less true of international relations. Whether states view another‘s action as 
cooperative, hostile or neutral depends on how they construe its motives.
134
 
It is unclear here exactly how this transference occurs. Is Larson claiming that 
cognitive psychology can be applied to the anthropomorphised body of a state as person, 
or is it the leader and individuals within that state‘s bureaucracy that are the referents? In a 
subject that has been over-theorised to a large extent, this is an area that has been largely 
ignored in much of the literature and where much has been accepted without question.
135
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Three descriptive fallacies of the trust literature 
Taking an implicitly representational approach to language also influences the methods of 
explanation that are both available and required for those who study trust. When trust is 
hypostatised as a thing that can be defined and operationalised in the literature, this way of 
conducting research then requires a specific and definite type of description that may be at 
odds with the many ways in which the word is actually used. Because of this tension, 
scholars have struggled to talk about trust and have often resorted to the common 
employment of three fallacious descriptive devices. These are: false analogies, multiple 
typologies and negative description. These devices are often unhelpful and promote fuzzy 
thinking on the topic, and their use suitably demonstrates the difficulty of trying to capture 
a meaning for trust that is separate from its use. 
 
False analogies 
There are many examples of the use of false analogies in the literature on trust. For 
example Uslaner, when writing about broad, knowledge-based trust in society, suggests 
that it is analogous to the following relationship between two people, Jane and Bill: 
If Jane and Bill did not know each other, they would have no basis for trusting each 
other. Moreover, a single encounter will not suffice to develop trust. Jane and Bill 
have to interact over time to develop reputations for keeping their word. And, even 
when they get to know each other better, their mutual trust will be limited to what 
they know about each other. Jane and Bill may feel comfortable loaning each other 
$20. They know from experience that each will pay the other back. But Bill won‘t 
trust Jane to paint his house and Jane will not trust Bill to repair her roof-since 
neither has any knowledge of the other‘s talents in this area.136 
Hoffman uses an example of hiring a babysitter in order to show how trust and self-
interest can be compatible concepts: 
Parents, exhausted and at their wits end from caring for their newborn for six 
weeks without a break ask their neighbour‘s responsible teenage son to babysit for 
a couple of hours on a Saturday night. Their request is, of course, driven by their 
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own self interest...But are we to conclude that because these two parents are driven 
by a self-interested desire to see a movie they have not entrusted the care of their 
child to their neighbour? Clearly this example involves both trust and self-
interest.
137
  
Both of these analogies highlight typical features of the problematic way in which 
trust is described. In the first, Jane and Bill live in a space apparently untouched by social 
norms, mutual acquaintances, previous experience and all the other complex mechanisms 
of society whose absence makes this analogy unhelpful. In the second, Hoffman, whose 
intent is to study cooperation between states, uses an analogy that is qualitatively different 
from the international realm. Hiring a babysitter or entering into multilateral international 
security agreements are simply not the same thing. Making the two somehow equivalent 
may be a useful pedagogical tool in certain circumstances but is also liable to create 
confusion and make false equivalencies to make its point.
138
 
These are just a couple of examples of a widely-used trope within the literature. 
Luhmann and Hardin both also use the analogy of hiring a babysitter; Luhmann also uses 
an example of buying a used car. Michel uses an analogy of a married couple monitoring 
each other‘s conversations, and there are many more examples.139 These analogies are not 
always helpful because they are clumsy ways to think about something that is more 
complex than the analogy can possibly admit. Perhaps in order to study trust or how 
people trust for certain purposes it is necessary to simplify the concept to a number of 
basic mechanisms or heuristics that are suitable for comparison or analysis. However, the 
fact that this is a simplification often goes unacknowledged by trust researchers. The 
problem is thus not with the use of analogy but with the presentation of the analogy in 
these cases as an explanatory rather than merely an illustrative device. How we think 
about people, decisions and institutions is more complicated than this descriptive device 
admits, and while simple analogies can be useful tools of explanation, the lack of 
awareness of intent and context in their use in these cases make them less effective. While 
critics of rational choice approaches make the valid point that rational theories of trust 
treat people as interchangeable, this fallacy, which is used across all theoretical 
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approaches to the subject, makes situations interchangeable in the same reductive 
manner.
140
 
 
The ubiquitous typology 
The second descriptive fallacy within the literature on trust is the common use of a 
typology. Unable to adequately explain the concept, authors often attempt to define it by 
dividing it into many different types. Uslaner divides trust into the categories of 
‗moralistic‘ and ‗strategic‘ trust and further subdivides these two categories into 
‗generalized‘ and ‗particularized‘ trust.141 Seligman separates trust into the categories of 
‗abstract‘, ‗functional‘ and ‗personal‘,142 while Zucker differentiates between ‗process-
based‘, ‗characteristic-based‘  and ‗institutional-based‘ trust.143 Lewicki and Bunker use 
the similar distinctions of ‗calculus-based‘, ‗knowledge-based‘ and ‗identification-based‘ 
trust.
144
 Booth and Wheeler divide trust not into separate categories, but along a 
continuum which travels from ‗functional cooperation [emphasis in original]‘ at one end 
to ‗interpersonal bonding [emphasis in original]‘ at the other.145 Lewis and Weigert divide 
degrees of trust into nine types based on the amount of emotionality and rationality 
involved in the bond. This ranges from ‗rational prediction‘ to ‗faith‘ and includes such 
types as ‗ideological trust‘, ‗emotional trust‘, ‗probable anticipation‘ and ‗mundane, 
routine trust‘.146 Möllering describes Cummings and Bromiley‘s ‗Organizational Trust 
Inventory‘ of various bases of trust that ‗started off with 273 items, were gradually 
reduced to sixty-two items and ultimately twelve items through statistical processing.‘147  
While categorisations can be useful analytical tools, this enthusiasm for typologies 
in the study of trust does not induce clarity but instead is an outcome of the assumptions 
about the purpose of definition resulting from the representational approach to meaning. 
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While purporting to define trust, scholars are often left categorising it in opposition to 
other variants of itself and so current trust research appears to continue to split trust into 
ever-growing typologies. These typologies do not offer an explanation of trust but instead 
explain types of trust with reference to other types of trust, resulting in a self-referential 
and ultimately circular explanation. 
 
Negative definition 
The use of typologies to create categories of trust to place in opposition to each other is 
related to the final descriptive fallacy, the negative definition. This device is also 
widespread in the literature on trust and is used to explain the nature of trust to the reader 
by being quite certain about what trust is not. Luhmann asserts with certainty that trust is 
not familiarity nor is it confidence, and that it is neither fully rational nor fully non-
rational.
148
 Similarly, Lewis and Weigert assert that trust is not faith or prediction or 
‗merely expectation‘.149 Mayer et al contend that trust is not ‗taking a risk‘ and is not 
predictability.
150
 Hoffman also argues that trust is not predictability.
151
 Larson 
differentiates between trust and expectation while Vincent Keating and Jan Ruzicka claim 
that trust is not the same as confidence.
152
 Hardin asserts that trust is ‗not behavioural‘ and 
Michel argues that trust is not reliance.
153
 The common tendency towards negative 
definition as explanation brings to mind an old joke about the sculptor of a large and 
particularly impressive statue of an elephant who, when asked by admirers how he had 
accomplished such an accurate and convincing portrayal of the beast, replied that he had 
simply taken a large block of stone and knocked off all the parts that did not look like an 
elephant. This, it appears, is often the tactic of those who are trying to explain the notion 
of trust; knock off all the parts that are not trust and one will be left with an explanation. 
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The use of these three descriptive fallacies tends both to simplify and complicate 
the study of trust in ways that are not helpful. They simplify it by comparing complex 
feelings and social dynamics to imaginary situations to make their point, as if they were 
analogous. They also complicate it by introducing vast typologies and categories in which 
trust is dissected and by bringing in many other concepts in opposition to trust in order to 
explain the word. Those who study trust bemoan the complicated and contradictory 
approaches to the topic, but it is just an unavoidable symptom of the hypostatisation of a 
concept that follows on from the unquestioned representational approach to meaning that 
is prevalent in the literature. 
 
Don’t think, but look! A grammatical approach to trust 
The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have 
the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the 
forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of our language 
-Ludwig Wittgenstein 
154
 
 
Taking an alternative approach to meaning in the study of trust and International Relations 
provides a valuable means of critique of the literature and the ability to question certain 
presuppositions inherent in its present form. The idea that in taking a word away from its 
use one is removing the meaning attached to it, is one reason that a Wittgensteinian 
approach to language and meaning can illuminate the difficulties inherent in the question 
‗what is trust?‘ or ‗what does trust mean?‘ that is the inclination embedded in most 
literature on the topic. This challenge to meaning presents, as Pin-Fat asserts, ‗an 
insurmountable problem for any form of explanation (including explanations in 
International Relations) that rests on the ―discovery‖ of a property that is common to all 
instances of phenomena under investigation.‘155 The search for this property demanded by 
the question ‗what is trust?‘ implicit in the current literature on the topic places a notional 
theoretical boundary around the word that does not exist in the ordinary way the word is 
used. This does not mean that there are no limits to the way in which the word ‗trust‘ can 
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be used; of course this is not the case. It means that the possibilities of the word‘s use are 
not created by a theoretical minimum requirement of necessary and sufficient conditions 
that are applied from the outside, but are instead created and maintained in practice, in 
understanding the word through use.  
While the question of meaning and representation has not been discussed to any 
extent in any of the social sciences literature on the study of trust, several scholars have 
already brought a Wittgensteinian challenge to traditional ways of understanding and 
conducting inquiry into the literature on International Relations and political theory. The 
following section will show how this work fits with and differs from this existing body of 
literature. 
 
Wittgenstein in social science literature 
Several writers have already argued that the Wittgensteinian approach can provide a 
challenge to the traditionally dominant pictures of the discipline of International Relations 
that hold us captive to particular views of how international politics can be understood. 
Many authors have, both implicitly and explicitly, brought a Wittgensteinian challenge to 
traditional, positivist theories of politics, social theory and International Relations.
156
 
An early attempt to adapt Wittgenstein to political thinking is in Hanna Pitkin‘s 
Wittgenstein and Justice, which attempted to bring the insights of later Wittgenstein to 
bear on politics and social theory, contending that the focus that Wittgenstein places on 
language can expose certain assumptions. She argues that, if language is seen as an 
activity, this can allow us to investigate the ‗nature of political discourse, and of the 
political.‘157 A Wittgensteinian contribution to political theory would therefore be ‗simply 
an awareness of concepts, a sensitivity to the theorist‘s use of language‘.158 Pitkin 
concludes that, regarding a positive contribution to developing political theory, although 
one could not have a Wittgensteinian political theory in a traditional sense, it was possible 
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to perhaps advance ‗a Wittgensteinian way of theorizing about the political‘.159 Other 
authors have adapted aspects of Wittgenstein‘s work in order to assist their investigations 
of the political struggles for meaning. William Connolly has disputed the idea of language 
as a neutral medium in which politics takes place, showing how contests over language are 
in themselves political in a Wittgensteinian challenge to political science.
160
 Chantal 
Mouffe has argued that the Wittgensteinian approach could provide a new way of thinking 
about the political and democratic theory that departs from rationalist approaches.
161
 
James Tully has used Wittgenstein to argue against the entrenched idea that political life 
can only be free if grounded in some form of critical reflection, using Wittgenstein‘s idea 
of language games to illustrate how ‗justification and interpretation are activities or 
practices of thought‘ [emphasis in original].162 Further literature also exists on 
Wittgenstein as a social theorist of practice, a claim supported by the recent literature on 
the practice turn in International Relations as discussed earlier in the chapter.
163
 However, 
as John Gunnell has contended, it has been ‗notoriously difficult to link Ludwig 
Wittgenstein‘s work to the agendas of academic political theory‘ as the later Wittgenstein 
‗subverts the search for the universality of both politics and political inquiry.‘164 It is, 
however, Wittgenstein‘s avowedly a-political nature that Allan Janik claims ‗constitutes 
his importance for political philosophy‘. Because rules are contestable; speaking is, by 
nature, political.
165
 
While the specific adaption of Wittgenstein in International Relations has also been 
part of a broader ‗turn to language‘ that has challenged the traditional approaches to 
International Relations that have in the past characterised language as epiphenomenal and 
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have separated action from language,
166
 the idea of language as an activity with its 
rejection of the representational view of language and reality has been adapted by several 
International Relations scholars who have explicitly adopted various aspects of a 
Wittgensteinian approach to meaning. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith incorporate 
Wittgenstein‘s idea of the ‗language game‘ into their distinction between ‗explaining‘ and 
‗understanding‘ in International Relations. Because action is social, meaning is conferred 
by the sense given by the rules of the ‗game,‘ in this case the rules of the game of 
international relations. As they state: ‗the rules of any ‗‗game‘‘ create an arena and give 
sense to what is said and done in it‘.167  
Within a broad social constructivist framework, works in International Relations by 
Nicholas Onuf and Friedrich Kratochwil put forward an agenda that acknowledged the 
importance of language and that took, at least in part, a Wittgensteinian approach. In a 
wide-ranging 1989 work that incorporated much literature on sociology and the 
philosophy of language, Onuf used the framework of ‗rules‘ and ‗rule‘ to argue for the 
importance of language for a reconstruction of IR theory.
168
 In the same year, Kratochwil 
argued for a ‗fundamental reorientation‘ of the International Relations research agenda to 
understand the inherent link between language and the social world, proposing that 
language, as a ‗rule-governed activity‘ could ‗provide us with a point of departure for our 
inquiry into the functions of norms in social life.‘169 These influential works provided a 
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foundation for much social constructivist theory ultimately grounded in a Wittgensteinian 
approach to language as rule-bound.  
Karin Fierke has also argued for the relevance and importance of Wittgenstein in 
contemporary International Relations debates in several works.
170
 In the 1998 book 
Changing Games, Changing Strategies: Critical Investigations in Security, Fierke adapts 
Wittgenstein‘s concept of ‗language games‘ to conduct an exploration into the relationship 
between the manner in which actors both make use of and are constrained by language.
171
 
Fierke examines the concept of international change through Wittgenstein‘s ideas of 
language games and rule-following and applies this to a study of the end of the Cold War 
and its immediate aftermath. She claims that the language we use shapes our space to 
manoeuvre politically and so the concept of ‗language games‘, particularly the language 
game of metaphor, provides a new manner in which one can describe the process of 
change in international politics. Fierke thus challenges ‗the realist argument regarding the 
distinction between appearance and reality‘ as she demonstrates how the issue is ‗less one 
of appearance and reality than the contest between language games that provide 
conflicting frameworks for reasoning and action in the world.‘172 
Gavan Duffy, Brian K. Friederking and Seth A. Tucker have also adapted the idea 
of ‗language games‘ in order to incorporate contextual factors in game theory modelling of 
interaction in a ‗dialogical analysis‘ of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) 
Treaty, arguing that the dialogical analysis supports the argument of the influence of the 
‗new thinking‘ of Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev.173 However, while they have adapted 
the Wittgensteinian notion of the language game, they place it into a method of game 
theory modelling that retains an essentially positivist approach.  
There have also been recent Wittgensteinian inspired interventions into debates on 
the meaning of other complex words in International Relations. Shane Mulligan has 
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conducted a conceptual history of the use of the concept of legitimacy in international 
affairs through an incorporation of Wittgenstein‘s idea of language games to understand 
the continuity and change in the use of legitimacy in the study and practice of international 
politics.
174
 Jonathan Havercroft uses Wittgenstein‘s discussion of changing aspects to 
argue that political philosophers should not try to gain an explanation of liberty but should 
instead view liberty as an ‗aspectival concept‘.175  
Véronique Pin-Fat proposes a grammatical ‗reading‘ for her investigation of 
universality and ethics in world politics.
176
 This is based on Wittgenstein‘s idea of a 
grammatical investigation as an alternative to traditional theories of ethics. She proposes a 
reading of ethics in world politics that remains on the service rather than trying to reveal a 
deeper and universal nature or truth. This grammatical reading also does not make an 
ontological distinction between theory and practice but views language as action.
177
 Pin-
Fat advocates Wittgenstein‘s ‗look and see‘ approach against the metaphysical temptation 
to search for depth and the universal in the consideration of ethics in world politics.  
This research on trust and international politics adds to the existing literature 
advocating for the recognition of Wittgenstein in debates over meaning and International 
Relations by focusing on the dilemmas of definition and explanation that are relevant to 
much of the existing work on big words such as ‗trust‘ in International Relations. While 
some of the previous work on Wittgenstein in the social sciences has focused on 
incorporating Wittgensteinian thought into a way of theorising about the social world, this 
study uses the Philosophical Investigations primarily as a challenge to the traditional 
theories of meaning held in the literature on trust and international politics and a means of 
critique of positivist inquiry into trust, it limits its purpose to the locus of the challenge to 
the dominant way thinking about where the meaning of words resides. Through use of the 
Wittgensteinian language of description, it advocates a form of inquiry into the use of 
words in international politics that locates meaning in use. This study uses the 
Philosophical Investigations as a means of highlighting the assumptions about meaning 
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and representation in the existing literature and a methodological tool of reminder about 
the limitations inherent in the forms of our language.  
While this critique does not advocate the abandonment of the word ‗trust‘ as a tool 
of analysis, it does require an acceptance of the locations and limitations of meaning. It 
challenges the very possibility and usefulness of universal definition, and the effectiveness 
of attempting to gain consensus on what any concept means. This is not only the case for 
the trust but many other ‗big‘ words whose meaning is much debated in International 
Relations such as ‗fear‘, ‗legitimacy‘ or ‗liberty‘, all of which have resisted definition and 
have therefore been discussed as somehow problematic within the literature. However it is 
not the fact that these words resist definition that is the problem, that is simply how 
language works, the problem arises when scholars do not recognise this and so attempt to 
find the ‗meaning of‘ these words. As Jens Bartelson argues, 
[d]efining a term means making stipulations about its meaning and reference 
within a given context of employment and according to given criteria; but since 
both contexts and criteria multiply across time and space, any concept is able to 
soak up a multitude of different connotations throughout its usage in different 
contexts and for different purposes, which in turn makes a clear-cut definition seem 
all the more urgent, provoking yet another attempt at definition that reproduces the 
initial ambiguity. Hence, ambiguity is an unintended and cumulated consequence 
of the quest for clarification that has been so dear to the social sciences.
178
  
Any attempt to isolate meaning through definition will thus merely be an 
interpretation from one language game into another. This is not to say that it is not good 
scholarly practice to define one‘s terms in certain conditions, but simply that this should 
include the consciousness that one‘s definition is limited by one‘s intent and coloured by 
one‘s disciplinary and methodological background. It is important to be aware of the 
temptation to hypostatise a notional boundary that has merely been placed around a 
boundary-less concept in order to fulfil a certain purpose.  
For it is those arguments that implicitly rest on the tacit ability to gain the essence 
of a term that will likely be problematic, rather than any inherent difficulties with 
particular words themselves. Before we begin a conversation by asking 'what does trust 
mean?' we should first question the assumptions about how meaning works that go into the 
form of the question and ask ourselves if this is really the most efficient way 
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of approaching the topic. We should query whether current debates over 'what is the 
meaning of‘ trust begin at an unchallenged consensus about how words get 
and maintain their meaning, and if they fall prey to the universalist temptation of ignoring 
the ‗rough ground‘ of context, practice and the everyday. 
A definition of trust that locates its nature or essence is not necessary for 
understanding but, as this chapter has demonstrated, can in fact be counterproductive and 
confusing. The aim of this research therefore is to avoid the pitfalls that go along with 
basing a study on a representative approach to the meaning of trust by changing the focus 
of the study away from the ‗meaning of trust‘ or the ‗role of trust‘ in international politics, 
to how we talk about trust in international politics (in both its study and its practice). This 
is done by inverting the nature of the investigation into meaning. Rather than thinking that 
one cannot understand the meaning of a sentence like ‗I can trust you‘ until one defines 
the word ‗trust‘ thus working from a previous definition towards a meaning, here the 
assumption is that the opposite dynamic is at work, and one must understand the function 
of the sentence before one can understand the meaning of the word.  
This research therefore proposes a study of trust that examines the very act of the 
labelling of trust within its specific historical and social language games. In this way, 
instead of succumbing to the urge to determine the correct use of a word such as trust, and 
thus falling into the philosophical trap of a subsequent hypostatisation of this 
determination, this project can recognise that, as Quentin Skinner claims, all attempts to 
‗legislate about the correct use of normative vocabularies must be regarded as equally 
ideological in nature‘ and investigate these attempts critically.179 This will be 
accomplished through the Wittgensteinian notion of a grammatical investigation that will 
look at the possibilities for talking about trust in International Relations.
180
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The grammatical investigation: proposing a method of description 
It is the lack of acknowledgment of and engagement with questions of meaning in the 
primarily rationalist literature on trust in the International Relations literature that has 
prompted this alternative approach to the study of trust. Current accounts of trust and 
international politics have presupposed a thing called ‗trust‘ that is represented by the use 
of the word ‗trust‘ and exists in reality. This ‗trust‘ can therefore be identified or measured 
according to the parameters and definitions outlined by the researcher in order to tell a 
truth about the world. As shown earlier in the chapter, this dynamic operates in all the 
current literature, even that which purports to move beyond a rational choice model. This 
research proposes an alternative logic of inquiry into ‗trust‘, building on the existing 
literature that has brought the Wittgensteinian challenge to traditional accounts of meaning 
into the study of International Relations and the social sciences. This section will outline 
this alternative, grammatical method of investigating trust in International Relations. This 
is a method of description based the Wittgensteinian notion of grammar and the ethos of 
‗look and see‘. 
 
Wittgenstein and grammar 
Wittgenstein describes grammar as the range of potential for a thing: grammar ‗tells us 
what kind of object anything is.‘181 It is grammar that gives us a word‘s ‗essence‘ not 
some metaphysical connection between word and object.
182
 Knowing the grammar of an 
object means knowing how to act. Fierke gives the example of International Relations as a 
grammar on which basis ‗any practitioner...knows ―how to go on‖ in constructing an 
argument or acting in the world.‘183 Grammar, as Pin-Fat explains ‗controls what is 
possible in the world by regulating the kinds of statements one can make about the 
world.‘184 The grammar of trust then would include all the ways in which the word ‗trust‘ 
can be used, one can lose trust, gain trust, abuse trust, deserve trust, be trustworthy or 
entrust for example. It also includes how these uses relate to other concepts and how they 
are similar or are different. So, for example, losing trust is different to losing one‘s keys 
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and gaining trust has a different meaning to gaining weight.
185
 Undertaking a grammatical 
investigation will thus look at the meaning for trust given within this range of possibilities 
and how it might overlap with other grammars; the grammar of nuclear weapons or arms 
control for example. This approach is fundamentally that of Wittgenstein‘s advice to ‗look 
and see‘, which he outlines with regard to the meaning of ‗game‘: 
Consider for example the proceedings that we call ―games‖...What is common to 
them all?--Don‘t say: ‗There must be something common, or they would not be 
called ―games‖‘--but look and see whether there is anything common to all.--For if 
you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, 
relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don‘t think, but look! 
[emphasis in original]
186
 
Wittgenstein is worth quoting at length here to illustrate this difference between the typical 
approach of attempting to penetrate a phenomenon, for example trust, and conducting a 
grammatical investigation of the use of trust. He claims that the misleading picture of 
words as representing things leads us to 
feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena: our investigation, however, is directed 
not towards phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the ‗‗possibilities‘‘ of 
phenomena. We remind ourselves, that is to say, of the kind of statement that we 
make about phenomena...Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an 
investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. 
Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by 
certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language 
[emphasis in original].
187
 
By keeping this in mind one can avoid the need to uncover something that one thinks is 
hidden: 
But now it may come to look as if there were something like a final analysis of our 
forms of language, and so a single completely resolved form of every expression. 
That is, as if our usual forms of expression were, essentially, unanalysed; as if there 
were something hidden in them that had to be brought to light. When this is done 
the expression is completely clarified and our problem solved [emphasis in 
original].
188
 
This unhelpful notion that there is a final or correct form of understanding our language 
then influences how we ask questions about language and the world. 
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This finds expression in questions as to the essence of language, of propositions, of 
thought.--For if we too in these investigations are trying to understand the essence 
of language--its function, its structure,--yet this is not what those questions have in 
view. For they see the essence, not something that already lies open to view and 
that becomes surveyable by a rearrangement, but something that lies beneath the 
surface. Something that lies within, which we see when we look into the thing, and 
which an analysis digs out [emphasis in original].
189
 
A grammatical investigation of trust in International Relations should thus problematise 
the picture of a role for trust in the international system, looking at ‗the kind of statement 
that we can make [emphasis in original]‘ about trust rather than digging down to find some 
hidden meaning or truth below the surface of the language.
190
  
Research that takes this approach to meaning as its core has the ability to be truly 
critical. While some scholars have interpreted Wittgenstein‘s rule-following to imply an 
essentially conservative leaning to the idea of language games and meaning as use, it is 
possible to see space for critique and for change within this approach.
191
 Firstly because 
the ‗rules‘ of the language games in which we engage are taken from our shared ‗play‘, 
they are not imposed on us from above but rather a general description of what we do in 
practice.
192
 Secondly, as Pitkin explains, ‗the same ordinary language that allows the 
expression of various common-sense beliefs also allows their negation, their questioning, 
their doubting.‘193 The grammatical approach to meaning allows us to challenge the 
pictures of the world. As Pin-Fat describes, it ‗opens space for us to ask, though not yet 
answer, how it is that rules appear ‗natural‘ as a representation of ‗how things are‘; how 
‗reality‘ is constituted and its effects.‘194 Fierke has described the Wittgensteinian 
approach as the ‗application of a method‘ of ‗critical description‘195 that is indeed 
‗implicitly critical, insofar as it demonstrates the power of language, its social 
underpinning and its ability to constrain and bewitch.‘196 
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The point of the grammatical investigation is thus to stay on the surface of 
language. It rejects the idea of the possibility of a more true meaning for trust than what 
we mean when we say the word ‗trust‘. This investigation of trust will, therefore, ‗look 
and see‘ the meaning given to trust in context rather than imposing a meaning of trust onto 
the situation under study, thereby providing a critical description of the particular ways in 
which the word ‗trust‘ was used, and the different political contexts in which the meaning 
of the word ‗trust‘ was shaped. Rather than talking about what trust is, it will look at how 
the word ‗trust‘ was used in context, replacing the application of a certain abstracted 
meaning for trust with a grammatical search for meaning within each particular trust 
language game. If the examination of trust as ‗playing a role‘ in international politics that 
is dominant in the trust literature is a picture of the world, the Wittgensteinian grammatical 
investigation will rather ‗investigate how the application of the picture goes [emphasis in 
original].‘197 The following section will outline how this will be accomplished. 
 
Description as method 
Wittgenstein‘s exhortation to ‗do away with all explanation [emphasis in original]‘, and 
that ‗description alone must take its place‘, is a warning of the implications of an approach 
to philosophy that privileges the methods of science and of covering-law explanations in 
the understanding of language.
198
 While he states that philosophy can only ‗describe‘ 
language, Wittgenstein is offering a caution against attempts to delve beneath the surface 
of language when looking for the meaning for a word.
199
 By placing ‗explanation‘ and 
‗description‘ in opposition to each other, he provides a reminder that any search for a true 
meaning that goes beyond the singular to make statements about the universal or the 
abstract will be misunderstanding the nature of philosophical problems, which can be 
solved by ‗looking into the workings of our language‘ and arranging the information that 
we already know.
200
 Therefore, ‗description‘ is a way of addressing a problem that takes 
its cue from the specific context and the situation under study that could, in fact, 
incorporate different or multiple methods in practice. Description thus invites a plurality of 
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possible methods while retaining a non-positivist methodology based on context, 
interpretation and meaning as use.
201
 
The following two chapters will conduct a particular method of description and 
carry out a study of the public use of the word ‗trust‘ by two US Cold War presidents in 
relation to nuclear arms and arms control during the Cold War. By doing so it will put 
forward a non-positivist line of enquiry that relies on interpretation and an openness to 
difference in meaning. It will accomplish this through a description of the use of trust by 
President Richard M. Nixon and President Ronald Reagan regarding nuclear weapons and 
nuclear arms control with the Soviet Union. These examples were chosen for investigation 
as much of the literature on trust in International Relations focuses on the Cold War, 
particularly on the issue of nuclear weapons as its case and tries to ‗explain‘ certain action 
or lack of action through using a particular definition of trust as a causal factor.
202
 As was 
outlined in the introduction, the consequences of the nuclear revolution place certain, 
fundamental imperatives on the conduct of politics and the international, and therefore 
result in a particular significance on any meaning for trust. The Cold War and specifically 
the area of nuclear weapons are also apposite topics for any research that examines 
language, as public diplomacy and propaganda was such an important feature of the era.
203
 
The two presidents under study in the following chapters were chosen as both were Cold 
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War presidents; both were also Republicans and thus spoke of national security and the 
Soviet Union in a different way to a Democratic president. Both were also regarded as 
staunch anti-communists and hardliners regarding the Soviet Union throughout their 
political careers before assuming office. However, the two presidents undertook major 
nuclear arms control efforts with the Soviet Union which resulted in significant arms 
control agreements.  
The chapters are primarily based on an examination of archival documents from 
the Nixon and Reagan administrations collected in the Nixon Presidential Library and the 
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, as well as the collected public speeches given by the 
presidents contained in the Public Papers of the Presidents and the public statements from 
the Department of State in the Department of State Bulletin.
204
  
The method of description undertaken in this research involved adopting a 
Wittgensteinian ‗look and see‘ approach to these primary documents. Instead of 
predetermining a meaning for trust with an associated set of criteria for which to search in 
an examination of the archival evidence, this research did not approach the primary 
sources with any predetermined narrative or hypothesis to test. Instead, the grammatical 
investigation involved a systematic reading of the documents regarding nuclear arms 
programmes and arms control with the Soviet Union, as well as the documents regarding 
their public presentation and communication strategies, to assess if members of the 
administration talked about trust at all and if so, how. The presidential statements using 
the word ‗trust‘ were examined for the way in which the word was used, the audience, 
context of the speech, and the other words in the speech used with trust and in relation to 
trust in order to create a ‗grammar of trust‘ for each president. For example, chapter two 
will show how President Nixon used the word ‗trust‘ in relation to words such as 
‗responsibility‘, ‗intelligence‘, ‗judgement‘, ‗facts‘ and ‗information‘. Nixon associated 
these words with trust and thus situated his meaning within this set of other concepts, 
giving a grammar for the word ‗trust‘ that was specific to his use in context.  
To understand the grammar of trust within its personal, social and political context, 
public statements in speeches, press conferences and interviews were cross referenced 
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with the internal White House dialogue on communication, media and the presentation of 
policy from the corresponding times. This involved an examination of documents from 
both those responsible for policy-making and those responsible for communications, 
though this difference in practice was virtually nonexistent and policy and its 
communication were, more often than not as will be shown in the historical chapters, 
occurring at the same time and mutually influencing. To further situate the presidential 
grammar of trust in its historical context, the study also uses contemporary newspaper 
articles and memoirs of administration officials as well as secondary literature on the 
topics. Importantly, however, this does not involves using these texts as a source of post-
hoc explanations or retrospective analyses of the meaning or role of trust by the actors 
involved at the time, but rather as the historical scene setting within which the contextual 
meaning was created.
205
 Through this, the historical studies put forward a method of 
description that is contingent, contextual and interpretive, and does not rely on a 
representational account of meaning, as seen in previous studies of trust in International 
Relations. 
It should be noted here that this method does not involve the proposition of an 
alternative, Wittgensteinian theory of meaning or language to that which is seen in the 
existing literature. Wittgenstein‘s purpose in the Philosophical Investigations is 
principally a negative one. His goal is not to develop a theory of meaning to replace the 
one that he diagnoses as so problematic in the activity of philosophy but, as Baker and 
Hacker describe, to ‗show the absurdity of thinking that our concepts are, in some deep 
sense, correct [emphasis in original].‘206 There is no Wittgensteinian theory of language 
that can be applied, no general prescription; his goal is merely to uproot the existing 
problematic tendencies of how we think about language and understanding.
207
 This is 
indicative of his view that philosophy is not a body of work but an activity and is reflected 
in the form of the Philosophical Investigations which has little linear trajectory but is a 
series of examples and stories that return to make several interlocking points to be kept in 
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mind before undertaking philosophical work. The point is to keep the reader thinking and 
questioning the common explanations for how language works, rather than to provide an 
alternative explanation.
208
 The purpose is therefore, as McGinn describes, a ‗therapeutic‘ 
one, his contribution to an account of language is mainly ‗to act as an antidote to mistaken 
or misleading conceptions of meaning.‘209   
It is thus perhaps better to think of the descriptive methodology adopted here as an 
admission or a reminder of the limitations that inform our descriptions. Pitkin speaks of a 
‗kind of self-knowledge‘ that ‗[h]owever much we struggle to define the essence of a 
concept, or to defend the essence we think we have found, we cannot escape our tacit 
knowledge of how words are actually used.‘210 The methodology of description is thus an 
attempt to read with the ‗self-knowledge‘ of the implications of one‘s attitude to meaning. 
It is an admonition against the struggle to overcome the inconsistencies and contradictions 
of meaning and a reminder that these very inconsistencies and contradictions are the rough 
ground on which language works. This type of reading is described by Pitkin as a shift in 
attention,  
not just from the world to concepts, but from concepts to the corresponding words, 
and from a quest for the essence of their meaning to the mere description...of how 
they are actually used in contexts where they are most at home.
211
  
With regard to the study of ‗trust‘ in international politics, the point that this study 
will demonstrate through this grammatical description is that the terms that we use to talk 
about the world will necessarily frame what we can and cannot ask. Therefore asking how 
these terms, such as the idea of the ‗role of trust‘, come about and are used can offer an 
alternative and more critical account than accepting the validity of these terms and thus 
their boundaries. There may be no reason to demand the dismantling of the pictures of 
trust as ‗acting‘ or ‗playing a role‘ within International Relations, but merely a need to 
acknowledge that these are particular pictures of the world so that we can attempt to 
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understand the implications and limitations of the frames. As Wittgenstein states, ‗[t]he 
picture is there. And I am not disputing its validity in any particular case.–Only I also want 
to understand the application of the picture.‘212  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on trust in International Relations and has situated 
this work within a wider body of research on trust in the social sciences. While the 
existing literature takes many forms: rational choice studies, research based on social and 
cognitive psychology and work on emotions in politics, this chapter has argued that as a 
whole, the literature is notable for relying on a specific assumption about words that views 
meaning as representation. This is the foundation for a research agenda in International 
Relations which talks about trust as an internal motivating source for action and which 
therefore requires trust to possess general characteristics that can be understood, defined 
and operationalised with the tools of social science. The literature thus frames 
understanding trust as a process of ‗discovering‘ what thing is represented by the label 
trust.  
The chapter has argued that this way of talking about trust is not the only or natural 
one, but that it is predicated on a particular approach to meaning as representation that has 
an impact on the direction of the subsequent research. The chapter has also claimed that 
accepting this specific approach to understanding actually places certain methodological 
and semantic imperatives onto the work. By accepting that trust has ‗a meaning‘ in its 
representational sense, the ensuing question must be ‗what does trust mean?‘ By 
privileging this approach to understanding, scholars are left with the need to explain trust, 
which can result in a search for a correct or unified understanding of trust in abstract. This 
approach to meaning places an imaginary boundary around trust through the imperatives 
for definition and then holds up this definition as an object of study in itself. This leads to 
the hypostatisation of one‘s definition of trust as something with universal characteristics 
that both ‗is‘ and ‗does‘. The chapter has shown that this results in certain problematic 
tendencies in the current literature and the common use of three descriptive fallacies: false 
analogies, multiple typologies and negative description.  
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As a challenge to this dominant method of talking about trust in International 
Relations, the chapter introduced the Wittgensteinian approach of ‗meaning as use‘ and 
through this, contended that words cannot be understood in abstract but should be 
investigated on the rough ground of their everyday use. The chapter ended by proposing 
an alternative methodology for talking about trust in International Relations, through a 
grammatical investigation that would stay on the surface of language and look at the use of 
the word ‗trust‘ in its context rather than imposing a definition of trust onto a situation.  
This work is thus an exercise in acknowledging the picture that we have put in 
place in conducting the study of trust and an attempt to avoid the tendency towards talking 
about meaning as representation. The attempt exists as a challenge to the study of trust 
within both the International Relations and general social science literature, as well as a 
challenge to the wider pictures about meaning that are implicit in how we write about 
certain words in the study of International Relations in general.  
This chapter has provided a conceptual challenge to the consensus on language and 
meaning in the current literature on trust. The following two chapters will provide an 
empirical challenge to this body of research that will reinforce the conceptual challenge. It 
will accomplish this by undertaking a grammatical investigation of trust in international 
politics. This investigation will describe the meaning of trust in each situation by looking 
and seeing how the word ‗trust‘ is being used back on the ‗rough ground‘ of everyday 
speech. Through conducting a grammatical description of the use of trust by two US Cold 
War Presidents, the following chapters will provide an ostensive example to support the 
Wittgensteinian argument that premising study of a word such as trust on the assumption 
that all cases of trust share a common thread of meaning risks ignoring the specifics of 
meaning that could contribute to our understanding of international politics. 
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                                              2 
 
‘Trust me, I’m the president’, Richard Nixon and the battle for 
Safeguard 
 
Nixon himself, as is well known, in terms of his personal traits is a very petty and 
distrustful man with a huge ego...Every step or response to the President by us is viewed at 
the White House through a magnifying glass to see if there might be some sneaky trick 
here or a wish to ―deceive or demean‖ the President personally. In short, Nixon measures 
everything by his own yardstick. 
- Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin 1 
 
 
Introduction  
This chapter conducts a grammatical investigation of President Richard Nixon‘s use of 
trust regarding nuclear arms and nuclear missile defence during his first term in office. It 
will contend that Nixon‘s use of trust within the public debate on deployment of the 
Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system was a product of the political and social 
background within which it was used. It will illustrate how Nixon‘s specific use of trust in 
the debate on missile defence was shaped by his political persona and approach to 
governance and foreign policy, the contemporary political climate and the unique demands 
on politics of the nuclear revolution, and therefore will show how a meaning for trust in 
international politics can be understood in context and through use. 
Nixon‘s grammar of trust included such words as ‗responsibility‘, ‗intelligence‘, 
‗facts‘, ‗information‘ and ‗judgement‘ and was founded on the idea of ‗trust the president‘. 
Nixon‘s use of trust had little to do with character or values but was instead based on the 
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idealisation of information and facts, an acceptance of presidential responsibility (and thus 
prerogatives in decision-making), and conformity to Nixon‘s judgement as the president. 
He spoke often of trust and foreign policy in relation to the word ‗responsibility‘ and with 
particular reference to his great responsibility for the safety of the nation as president. This 
use of trust reflected the administration‘s wider political language that attempted to 
portray Nixon as a great world leader who should be trusted with the responsibility of 
decision-making on US security. The chapter will first show how Nixon‘s use of trust in 
this way was related to his authoritarian approach to governance. Nixon attempted to 
centralise foreign policy decision-making within a small group of intimates and often 
ignored the traditional means of legitimating his decisions through the courting of 
Congress, instead attempting to validate his foreign policy choices by direct appeals to the 
public.
2
 The chapter will examine how Nixon articulated the broader idea of deference to 
his presidential authority through the language of trust in the president. 
The chapter will then illustrate how Nixon‘s use of trust took place in and was 
therefore shaped by an era in which there was scepticism in authority figures and a wide 
atmosphere of dissent. At the end of the 1960s the United States was in the midst of a 
moment of national crisis. Domestic issues of civil rights and the economy, and the 
Vietnam War divided the country and led to a ‗credibility gap‘ in the government and 
traditional sources of authority, and an eruption of counter-cultural protest.
3
 The US 
Congress was also beginning to question the Cold War consensus that had existed since 
the end of World War II and Nixon‘s public use of trust reflected this.4  
Nixon‘s trust as ‗trust the president‘ was also a reflection of his response to the 
imperatives of politics and national security in a nuclear age. The chapter will describe 
how Nixonian trust can be understood through Nixon‘s approach to nuclear weapons and 
specifically to the loss of the strategic superiority the US enjoyed in the early years of the 
Cold War. ‗Trust the president‘, with its grammar of trust as judgement and responsibility 
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was part of Nixon‘s response to the necessities of leadership in an age of nuclear 
vulnerability. 
The chapter will then provide an example of how Nixon used this particular 
meaning for trust in the public battle over passage of ABM deployment through a 
recalcitrant Senate early in his first term. On reaching office, Nixon had inherited an ABM 
system that was already controversial and contested. Protests from local anti-ABM groups 
at the proposed development sites had achieved national prominence and gained support 
from high profile scientists, anti-war protestors and Congress. The chapter will argue that 
Nixon viewed the passage of the Safeguard ABM programme through Congress as vital, 
not just for its strategic impact, but also as a symbol of his grasp on foreign policy 
decision-making and his domestic political capital. Nixon also viewed the deployment of 
ABM as an important component of the SALT negotiating process, which itself was a 
crucial part of Nixon‘s wider geopolitical goals and, as he was unable to end the war in 
Vietnam in his first years in office, an increasingly important justification for the ‗great 
statesman‘ image he wanted to project. He therefore placed great significance on the 
authorisation of ABM in Congress.  
However, by allowing domestic political imperatives to govern decision-making 
on ABM development, both in terms of the nature of the system and the public 
justifications he provided for its development, Nixon further undermined the system‘s 
coherence and thus weakened any arguments the administration could make for ABM 
based on its technical and strategic merits. This left the White House with limited avenues 
of justification for ABM deployment and the chapter will show how Nixon began to talk 
about trust as ‗trust the president‘ in order to shut down public debate on the issue. 
The chapter will finally demonstrate how the grammatical investigation into trust 
in this example reveals the irony at the heart of how Nixon talked about trust within the 
Safeguard debate. Nixon‘s argument that the public should simply ‗trust the president‘ to 
make the correct decision regarding ABM was based on the idea that the president should 
be trusted because, as president, he could make more informed, rational strategic 
judgements in the nation‘s interests than they could. However, the chapter will show that it 
was the illogic of Nixon‘s decisions on ABM, often based on political expediency and 
personal pride, that in fact led to the conditions that would eventually make the ‗trust the 
president‘ argument necessary.  
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President Nixon’s grammar of trust 
In the 1960 presidential election between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon, a 
Democratic Party campaign poster depicted the Republican candidate Nixon peering up 
from under heavy brows with an unflattering smile and famously posed the question 
‗Would YOU buy a used car from this man?‘ This poster asked voters to ask themselves 
whether they thought Richard Nixon was personally trustworthy, and gambled on voters 
answering ‗no‘. As Nixon ultimately lost the 1960 election, though only by a small 
margin, it would appear that the Democrats were right to gamble on this response.  
Today, the idea that Nixon was not a man to be trusted is even more deeply 
ingrained. The popular image of the President – the schemer, user of back channel talks, 
creator of enemies lists and recorder of incriminating conversations – is one of someone 
who was not only untrustworthy but also untrusting. On multiple occasions he declared his 
distrust of even his closest foreign policy aides, including Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs, commonly known as the National Security Advisor (NSA), 
Henry Kissinger (‗I don‘t trust Henry, but I can use him‘),5 Secretary of State William 
Rogers, and Head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) delegation Gerard Smith, (‗he‘s a small player 
and I don‘t trust him‘).6 Further, Richard ‗Tricky Dick‘ Nixon became a victim of his own 
distrust when he was forced to resign in disgrace over the Watergate scandal, the ultimate 
episode in presidential dishonour.
7
 
However, despite this subsequent perception, during the 1968 election Nixon had 
campaigned on the basis of reducing the so called ‗credibility gap‘ in government, and 
restoring confidence in the White House‘s ability to conduct foreign policy and 
specifically to honourably extricate the United States from the Vietnam War. Also, despite 
the enduring public perception of untrustworthiness and mistrust generally associated with 
President Nixon, the Nixon administration, after a series of questionable decisions and 
unexpected domestic opposition, turned to a particular use of trust in order to talk to a 
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 Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, At the Center of Decision (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
1990), 297.  
6
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7
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sceptical public about the Safeguard ABM system and gain its passage through Congress. 
Nixon‘s language of trust in this context was based on the idea that the public and 
Congress should stop questioning his decisions and simply ‗trust the president‘ to make 
the correct choices in matters in which he had superior judgement and more information 
than they. Nixon‘s grammar of trust included such words as ‗responsibility‘, ‗intelligence‘, 
‗facts‘, ‗information‘ and ‗judgement‘. Nixon spoke often of foreign policy with regards to 
the word ‗responsibility‘, a word he regularly used in his public speech.8 This use of trust 
was an indication of the administration‘s attempt to depict Nixon as the great world leader 
therefore could be trusted at home with the great responsibility of decision-making on US 
national security. Nixon‘s trust was thus based on the elevation of knowledge and facts, an 
acceptance of presidential responsibility for decision-making and the acceptance of 
Nixon‘s decisions as the president. 
The following sections will show how this particular grammar of trust was shaped 
by Nixon‘s political persona and approach to foreign policy, US political culture, the 
contemporary political context and the unique demands on politics of the nuclear 
revolution.  
 
Trust and leadership in the Nixon presidency 
Nixon was driven by the idea of being a great foreign policy president and his use of trust 
thus occurred within a wider attempt to centralise foreign policy decision-making in the 
executive office. On reaching office in 1969, the new president was determined to reshape 
the foreign and defence policy apparatus and transform the structure of decision-making in 
these areas.
9
 Partly this attempt was because of the nature of the two men at the head of 
foreign policy – Nixon and his NSA Kissinger – whose personalities, as much of the 
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literature describes, made them natural conspirators.
10
 However, the type of policies they 
were attempting to implement also required a high level of centralised decision-making 
and flexibility. According to Melanson, détente and the policy of linkage in US relations 
with the Soviet Union ‗placed a premium on speed, dexterity, and manipulation.‘11 
Acquiring the power to achieve this amount of presidential autonomy to make policy may 
well have been a difficult task at any time but was particularly challenging at this point, as 
Nixon was attempting to consolidate power in a period of resistance to current authority 
and reassertion of congressional power. It was also particularly difficult for a man like 
Nixon, who often alienated those he was trying persuade and so arguably accelerated the 
demise of consensus within government.   
The new president was, nevertheless, determined to reshape the foreign and 
defence policy apparatus and transform the structure of decision-making in these areas.
12
 
This was initially accomplished through the restoration of power to the National Security 
Council (NSC). The NSC had fallen in status over recent administrations as various 
presidents had preferred to conduct decision-making through less formal channels.
13
 
Nixon decided to change this and to reinstate the NSC as the prime decision-making body 
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on national security issues within his administration, headed by his newly-installed NSA, 
Henry Kissinger. On 20 January, the day of his inauguration, President Nixon ordered 
National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM) 1 and 2. NSDM 1 established the 
process of foreign policy research and decision-making that would be followed in the 
Nixon White House. NSDMs were officially recognised as the conduit through which the 
president would issue orders on national security, and National Security Study 
Memoranda (NSSMs) would be used to direct the research studies that were to be 
undertaken on national security issues and used as the basis of any decisions.
14
 NSDM 2 
established the NSC as the ‗principal forum for consideration of policy issues requiring 
Presidential determination.‘15 
These two NSDMs ensured that the locus of national security agenda-setting, 
information dissemination and decision-making was placed firmly within the NSC and 
therefore the White House. Directives for action would come through the NSC and 
Kissinger, under the direction of the president, would set the NSC agenda. By managing 
the focus of studies conducted by various security agencies through the NSSM protocol, 
the NSC (under Kissinger‘s direction) would also dictate the policy priorities and 
perspectives of the administration towards national security issues, in the process 
sidelining the operational role and influence of the Secretary of State. In this way, Nixon 
did not attempt to legitimate his foreign policy decisions within the structure of 
government but instead, as Melanson describes, attempted to ‗circumvent existing 
structures by creating a tightly controlled, highly centralised, and loyal foreign policy 
apparatus...to construct a loyal new minority within the White House to outmanoeuvre his 
enemies in the governmental old majority.‘16  
Nixon thus felt the need to capitalise domestically on any foreign policy successes 
to help him to consolidate his control over foreign policy. One way in which the 
administration attempted this was through pushing an image of Nixon as a strong world 
leader that could be trusted to make the difficult but right decisions. This was a dominant 
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theme in the White House internal correspondence, as Nixon was intent on being 
recognised as a powerful figure in world politics. Nixon hoped that this would all 
contribute to what Special Counsel to the President Charles Colson described to White 
House Chief of Staff Bob Haldeman as ‗[t]he process of instilling in the minds of people, 
the true image of the President as a world leader‘, an image of ‗strength and dignity‘.17 In 
order to reinforce this message, the White House provided a team of speakers from the 
Cabinet and Congress, such as then Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity 
(OEO) Donald Rumsfeld, Vice President Spiro Agnew, Senator Bob Dole (R-Kan), 
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development George Romney and many others with 
speeches about Nixon that reinforced the ‗world leader‘ theme.18  
This strategy can be seen throughout Nixon‘s first term. In a diary entry on 2 
January 1971, Haldeman noted that the president wanted to focus on foreign policy public 
relations as ‗our strongest point‘ and that he had the potential to become ‗the world leader 
[emphasis in original]‘, especially after the recent death of former French President 
Charles de Gaulle.
19
 The administration also used this idea in its plans for the 1972 
presidential election campaign. In a memorandum to Haldeman, Colson stated that the 
image of President Nixon as ‗one of the great world leaders of this century‘ and a ‗doer‘ 
president, ‗can have a potent political effect and rubs off into the ―trust‖ point which can 
be a crucial issue in the campaign‘.20 The framing of the 1972 Moscow Summit meeting, 
at which the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons were signed, 
was also conducted in a manner intended to reinforce this perception of Nixon as what 
Colson again described as ‗the serious role of world leader‘ leading up to the election.21 
The political function of the image of Nixon as a strong world leader was 
acknowledged in a Haldeman ‗Talking Paper‘ that argued that,  
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[t]he other building area of overall long range importance is that of strong 
leadership of the President...We now have [a] very sound basis for working on the 
―man you can trust‖ theme, ―major world leader‖ and the whole concept of ―bold 
leadership.‖ 
The key reason for making this connection, Haldeman emphasised, was that ‗it establishes 
the authority of the president‘.22 Nixon‘s political message was thus one that focused on 
ideas of strong leadership, and Nixonian trust was strongly linked to authority and the 
responsibility of the office of the president. The White House message was that the 
American public should trust the president because he was a strong leader and ‗man you 
can trust‘. Nixon‘s grammar of trust was therefore connected to the image of strong and 
bold leadership, a serious man who could credibly inhabit the role of global statesman. 
 
The contemporary political context  
Nixon‘s public use of the language of trust was also shaped by the contemporary US 
political context. The newly installed Nixon administration was attempting to consolidate 
its hold on foreign policy-making within the context of a broader national crisis of 
credibility in government. As Jussi Hanhim ki writes, ‗Nixon and Kissinger could hardly 
have entered high public office at a time when American foreign policy was under greater 
criticism at home and abroad.‘23 In recent years the many psychological blows of the Tet 
Offensive, the assassinations of Robert Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., 
demonstrations and riots in urban areas and on college campuses and the chaos of the 1968 
Democratic Party Convention in Chicago had contributed to a demoralised society that 
was increasingly torn by both foreign and domestic issues.
24
 Moreover, the Soviet Union 
was closing the gap in strategic weaponry and the Nixon administration was unable to 
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maintain US strategic superiority through the usual means of increased defence spending 
on nuclear weapons because of the public‘s anti-military mood.25 
The general atmosphere of protest and anti-militarism was reflected in the actions 
of Congress, which also began to reassert itself and to question the decisions of the 
executive branch with regards to foreign policy. The Cold War consensus that had 
sustained foreign policy making for the past two decades was collapsing and, as Henry 
Kissinger noted, the Nixon administration now ‗faced not only the dislocations of a war 
but the need to articulate a new foreign policy for a new era.‘26 Nixon‘s use of trust in his 
rhetoric thus did not speak of trust with regard to personal trustworthiness but rather to 
trust Nixon as ‗The President‘. As illustrated earlier, there were historical problems with 
attempting to portray Nixon as personally trustworthy, and talking of personal trust to a 
public in the midst of domestic conflict and Vietnam would have been challenging. 
However, the administration was still able to make use of trust by associating it, not with 
Nixon himself as a person but with ‗Nixon the President‘. The White House did not argue 
that Americans should trust their president because of his trustworthy nature; it declared 
that he should be trusted simply because he was the president. Nixon thus located the basis 
of his request for trust on a longstanding tradition of American deference to the office of 
the president, and situated himself within a legacy of historical trust in the institution that 
preceded and would hopefully supplant the contemporary crisis of credibility in current 
authorities.  
In an era when the American people were divided and disillusioned and talking 
about trust with regards to current leaders and institutions was problematic, Nixon 
connected himself - as president - to the memories of past presidents such as President 
Woodrow Wilson, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and President Kennedy. By doing so, 
he de-contextualised the meaning of trusting the office of the president from contemporary 
political debates and located it in an earlier American history and political culture. 
This is apparent in several public White House communications that use the word 
‗trust‘ and  in which the word ‗Nixon‘ is notably absent, the exhortation is not to trust 
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‗President Nixon‘ but to trust ‗the President‘ as an office in itself.27 An acknowledgement 
of this can be seen in a public relations strategy memorandum from speechwriter Ken 
Khachigian to speechwriter Patrick Buchanan before the 1972 election. In the 
memorandum Khachigian proposed once again to leverage the institutionalised trust in the 
office of the president. 
Whether or not they do, my guess is that the American public wants to trust their 
President [emphasis in original]. Thus, we must once again make use of — in the 
Nixon presence — the commodity which we monopolise in the campaign — the 
Presidency. 
In order to do so he suggested that 
[v]irtually every minute of airtime we purchase for serious RN statements should 
be televised in the White House – the Oval Office, the Lincoln sitting room, the 
Roosevelt room, the Cabinet room. Every effort must be made to identify the 
White House with Richard Nixon.
28
   
Nixon‘s attempt to access the historical legacy of defence to the institution with 
reference to the past was also evident in a highly publicised speech he gave from the Oval 
Office on 30 April 1970 to announce the incursion of American troops into Cambodia. In 
this address Nixon noted that 
[i]n this room, Woodrow Wilson made the great decisions which led to victory in 
World War I. Franklin Roosevelt made the decisions which led to our victory in 
World War II. Dwight D. Eisenhower made decisions which ended the war in 
Korea and avoided war in the Middle East. John F. Kennedy, in his finest hour, 
made the great decision which removed Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba and the 
Western Hemisphere. 
He then added that, 
between those decisions and this decision there is a difference that is very 
fundamental. In those decisions, the American people were not assailed by 
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counsels of doubt and defeat from some of the most widely known opinion leaders 
of the Nation.
29
  
Nixon thus linked his appeal for trust to the decisions of a chain of past presidents who 
had to make similar difficult choices, and in doing so attempted to frame his own actions 
as president with reference to the historical legacy of past heroic actions and gain 
credibility from the association. The appeal was also based on the premise that decisions 
made in the White House had a particular quality that came from their location at the 
centre of American politics. Nixon suggested that, by being made within the Oval Office, 
the idea being proposed was deserving of the public‘s unquestioning acceptance, or as Hal 
Bochin described it ‗the idea that the location where a decision was made should count for 
more than its quality.‘30  
By doing this, Nixon hoped to reach out to the ordinary American, who he felt 
wanted to support their president‘s decisions and actions. In this respect Nixon‘s talk of 
trust is redolent of his famous ‗Silent Majority‘ speech on the War in Vietnam in which he 
reached out to the wider population of America that he judged were quietly supportive of 
his actions on Vietnam but drowned out by the vocal protests of an engaged minority, the 
‗youth‘ as Nixon described them, and a partisan media. In this speech, Nixon attempted to 
bypass these opponents and made a request for support ‗to you, the great silent majority of 
my fellow Americans‘.31 
At a time when public perception of presidential authority and integrity was at a 
low, it may seem paradoxical that Nixon would use this type of request to presidential 
authority but it was an evocation of a time before the contemporary domestic division, 
before the war in Vietnam and indeed in part before some of his audience were born, to a 
legacy of the power of the office that would supersede current unrest. Nixonian trust as 
authority, responsibility and leadership was thus both influenced by and a means of 
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negotiating through the contemporary political context and Nixon‘s place in US political 
culture. 
 
Nixonian trust and the nuclear revolution 
Nixon‘s grammar of trust was also shaped by his particular response to the nuclear era and 
his perception of the imperatives placed by nuclear weapons on security and foreign 
policy. Nixon‘s (and Kissinger‘s) view of the international in the era of nuclear weapons 
placed a particular imperative on the administration‘s use of the word ‗trust‘ in public 
speech which reflected their wider view of the international as a realm of ‗Realpolitik‘.  
While Nixon‘s priority in office was always foreign policy, both Nixon and 
Kissinger were sceptical of the merits of arms control, and at the time all foreign policy 
was overshadowed by the war in Vietnam as well as the situation in the Middle East.
32
 
Nixon, though acknowledging the significance of nuclear weapons as ‗extraordinarily 
important‘ according to Francis Gavin, saw them as operating within a broader game of 
power politics and that therefore ‗they did not fundamentally alter more powerful political 
forces.‘33 ‗History makes it clear that wars result not so much from arms, or even from 
arms races‘, Nixon declared in February 1969, but rather ‗from underlying political 
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differences and political problems.‘34 In a briefing to Congress in June 1972, Kissinger 
asserted that the president ‗was convinced that agreements dealing with questions of 
armaments in isolation do not in fact produce lasting inhibitions on military competition 
because they contribute little to the kind of stability that makes crises less likely.‘35 In fact, 
as Gavin suggests, neither Nixon nor Kissinger ‗saw the nuclear arms race as the cause or 
key factor in the Cold War with the Soviet Union...geopolitical competition, and not the 
arms race, remained the core driver of international politics.‘36  
However, Nixon and Kissinger were both aware that the domestic environment 
was such that the level of spending needed to regain strategic superiority was impossible 
and were concerned that if no movement on bilateral arms control was made with the 
Soviet Union, Congress could impose unilateral arms control measures by cutting 
spending.
37
 The Soviet Union had been closing the gap in strategic weaponry and the 
Nixon administration was unable to maintain traditional US strategic superiority through 
increased defence spending on nuclear weapons because of the public mood of anti-
military spending.
38
 Nixon regretted the loss in strategic superiority that the US had 
enjoyed in the past and often referred with envy to the five to one lead in strategic 
weaponry that President Kennedy had possessed during the Cuban Missile Crisis., 
According to Gavin, Nixon ‗wanted a return to nuclear superiority, but because of 
domestic politics and the world situation, it was simply not on the cards.‘39   
Both Nixon and Kissinger also had little time for nuclear arms control as a goal in 
itself. They instead regarded any arms control as useful mainly as a means to greater 
geopolitical ends, as part of their strategy of linkage. Nuclear arms control issues would in 
time become highly important to Nixon to bolster his domestic prestige and legacy, but at 
the time of the ABM debate he did not consider the issue as being important in itself. 
Therefore the details of debates over ABM radars or interceptors, the minutiae that were 
the lifeblood of arms control professionals, were dismissed as essentially immaterial.  
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Nixon privately declared: ‗I don‘t give a damn about SALT; I just couldn‘t care less‘.40 
This is not to say that Nixon did not care about SALT in any respect, but that in his eyes 
its importance was connected to achieving other foreign policy goals and as a mean to 
open up the ‗era of negotiation‘ that he had promised in his inaugural address.41 The arms 
control debate was not just about arms control itself, its strategic or technical merits, but 
what it could achieve as a tool in international geopolitics and, importantly, what it 
represented in the domestic struggle for authority and partisan political gains.
42
  
For Nixon, therefore, talking about trust in an age of nuclear vulnerability and in 
relation to nuclear weapons was to talk about power, and his use of trust is therefore best 
understood within this context. Nixon‘s response to the imperatives of nuclear governance 
was expressed in his use of trust as related to responsibility. In a time in which the 
president had the ultimate responsibility for decisions on the security and very existence of 
the United States, Nixonian trust was partly a request for acknowledgement of that 
responsibility and the presidential prerogatives in decision-making that this would entail. 
This is clear in the statement Nixon made when announcing the deployment plan for the 
Safeguard ABM system in March 1969 where he affirmed that the ‗gravest responsibility 
which I bear as President of the United States is for the security of the Nation. Our nuclear 
forces defend not only ourselves but our allies as well.‘43 
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The following section of the chapter will analyse a particular example of Nixon‘s 
public speech on trust and nuclear weapons and provide an example of the rhetorical 
relationship between the president‘s meaning for trust, the contemporary political climate 
and Nixon‘s conception of the conduct of international politics in a nuclear age. It will 
illustrate how Nixon turned to a specific use of trust that can best be understood through 
locating it within this particular context. This will be conducted through an analysis of the 
decisions on the deployment of the Safeguard ABM programme and subsequent public 
battle for passage of the programme through Congress in Nixon‘s first term. 
 
Nixon’s use of trust in the Safeguard debate 
On inauguration in 1969, Nixon inherited the Johnson administration‘s plans for the 
deployment of an ABM system called Sentinel, which by this time was already a 
controversial issue. The origins of Sentinel were contested and characterised by a lack of 
scientific discussion at decision-making level and the regular dismissal of expert technical 
opinion in favour of political expediency.
44
 In 1961, the newly inaugurated President John 
F. Kennedy and his Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara decided against deploying the 
ABM system after receiving advice from the President‘s Science Advisory Committee 
(PSAC) and ARPA.
45
 As ABM testing continued during the early and mid 1960s and the 
technology improved, McNamara, advised by these groups who argued that the 
technology was incomplete and that an ABM system would be destabilising, continued to 
counsel President Kennedy, and later President Johnson, against deployment.
46
 During 
these years, President Johnson generally deferred to his Secretary of Defense on this issue 
and remained largely uninvolved in the decision-making process on ABM.
47
  
However, by 1966 pressure was increasing on the President from the Joint Chiefs 
and from hawks in Congress to reconsider deployment. This was reinforced by the 
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knowledge gained by American spy satellites that the Soviet Union was building its own 
ABM system ‗Galosh‘ around Moscow, as well as updating air defence systems around 
Tallinn.
48
 This fact, combined with the ongoing improvements in technology during 
research and development testing, provided ABM advocates in Congress and the Joint 
Chiefs with a powerful argument for deployment and ABM became an increasingly 
political issue within the administration.
49
 In 1967 Johnson was still considering running 
for re-election and he was concerned by the idea of an ‗ABM gap‘ similar to the infamous 
‗missile gap‘ of the late 1950s, being used against him by a Republican opponent.50  
While McNamara, the State Department and the President‘s science advisors in 
PSAC remained resolutely against the idea of ABM, President Johnson began to be 
swayed by the political claims for deployment and eventually overruled McNamara‘s 
objections pending the outcome of planned talks with the Soviet Union. When Johnson‘s 
meeting with Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in Glassboro in June of 1967 failed to create 
any promise of successful talks on this issue, McNamara had to reluctantly admit he had 
lost the battle and began to prepare for the requisition of funds and plans for deployment 
of a US ABM system.
51
   
The White House announced initial details of the light ABM system on 1 
November 1967. This deployment plan included ten sites protecting mainly metropolitan 
areas including Boston, New York, Chicago, Seattle and Detroit.
52
 Army survey teams 
began searching for suitable sites at these cities immediately and construction began at the 
first site at Sharpner‘s Pond in Boston at the end of 1968. Throughout this period, the 
Army Corps engineers held public hearings in a number of the proposed site cities. As 
residents became aware of the nearby locations of ABM systems, opposition slowly began 
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to grow and was amplified by protests from local congressman and journalistic comment 
about ‗bombs in the backyard‘.53 
 This increasing public awareness was reinforced by the protests of the anti-ABM 
scientific community, which began to coordinate with local resident communities.
54
 
Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass) sent a letter of protest to Nixon‘s new Secretary of 
Defense, Melvin Laird, urging a freeze on ABM deployment, and a first debate was held 
in Congress on the topic on 31 January, eleven days after the inauguration of President 
Nixon.
55 
The general atmosphere of protest and anti-militarism of the late 1960s inspired 
and enabled anti-ABM scientists, activists and local politicians.
56
 Scientists organised a 
one-day stoppage of research on 4 March to protest against what they termed as 
government misuse of technology. This began in the faculty of the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT) but spread to other organisations and was conducted in a total of 
thirty universities.
57
 The accompanying statement released by members of the MIT faculty 
asserted that the actions of the government in Vietnam had ‗shaken our confidence in its 
ability to make wise and humane decisions‘ and they therefore called on scientists and 
engineers throughout the country to ‗express our determined opposition to ill-advised and 
hazardous projects such as the ABM system‘.58  
On 28 February the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Disarmament 
announced that it would hold a series of public hearings on the issue of ABM.
59
 Then, on 7 
March, the Committee released a bipartisan report urging the White House to delay 
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deployment of the system until after initiating arms control talks with the Soviet Union.
60
 
High-profile public opponents of the system such as Senator J. William Fulbright (D-AR), 
Senator John Cooper (R-KY) and Senator Albert Gore (D-TN), argued repeatedly in 
Senate hearings and in media appearances that the system would have a destabilising 
effect, be technologically unfeasible and that it was politically motivated.
61
 The weapons 
system would require a majority vote in the Senate (it was expected to pass the House of 
Representatives without difficulty) and anti-ABM senators were claiming a bipartisan 
majority would vote against it.
62
 These objections to the system from senators were not 
only based on strategic or foreign policy issues, but also supported by arguments from 
local groups. These groups claimed that the ABM sites near cities would be unsightly, 
restrict television access, and depress property prices and local commercial development.
63
  
While he had originally decided to continue President Johnson‘s Sentinel 
programme without change, on reaching office Nixon soon recognised that this would not 
be politically advantageous, and so instead decided to reassess the current deployment 
plans. On 6 February, Secretary Laird announced that he was halting the Sentinel ABM 
programme pending a review by the Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard and the 
Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E). This review was conducted, not 
to address the administration‘s strategic and technical concerns on the current programme, 
but, according to Henry Kissinger, ‗in order to pull the teeth of public criticism‘ and to 
‗make us appear thoughtful.‘64 In fact, in private discussions the Nixon administration 
remained largely positive about ABM deployment and did not recognise the need for a 
review of current deployment plans based on strategic concerns. At an NSC meeting on 19 
February there was a general consensus on the advantages of continuing with an ABM 
deployment of some sort. Members agreed that ‗stable deterrence‘ would necessitate both 
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the maintenance of US advantage in Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and 
deploying ABM to counter Soviet ICBMs. The advantage of ABM as a potential 
bargaining tool for future arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union was also 
discussed and agreed upon. The new Director of the ACDA, Gerard Smith, was a lone 
voice of dissent, but Nixon dismissed his concerns as well as the technical objections of 
scientists with the declaration that ‗[t]he intellectual community is getting hysterical about 
ABM.‘65  
Nixon understood, however, that due to the current political context, the Sentinel 
system as proposed by McNamara would be unlikely to pass the Senate, and that even a 
modified system would encounter great political difficulties. The combination of public 
protest and Congress‘ reassertion of its rights to challenge the president on foreign policy 
led Nixon and Kissinger to view the ABM programme as not just strategically important 
but also politically significant in two key ways. Firstly, as Kissinger described, ABM was 
‗a symbol of a basic schism‘ in the country.66 The administration viewed the contest over 
ABM as reflecting deeper, national political currents. In Bob Haldeman‘s diaries, he 
described ABM as the ‗first crisis‘ of Nixon‘s presidency, one which had politically 
‗explosive potential‘ and therefore needed to be carefully managed.67 Secondly, Nixon 
also viewed the ABM as a litmus test of his power over foreign policy decision-making 
within government. According to Robert Dallek, for Nixon personally, ABM was less 
about the system itself and more a measure of his ability to ‗dominate the Congress‘. By 
forcing through the ABM programme, Nixon would show ‗that he and not Congress 
would be making the big foreign policy decisions.‘68  
Bryce Harlow, Nixon‘s Assistant for Congressional Relations, outlined the 
political climate on ABM in a memorandum for the president which stated that, 
[c]areful analysis of the immediate situation in the Senate strongly indicates: 1) the 
ABM system advanced by LBJ has no chance whatsoever; 2) even a modified 
system can now only be passed with maximum effort, including all out Presidential 
participation.
69
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Thus the impetus for review of the system and the final findings of that review were 
shaped by the fact that the administration viewed the importance of ABM as symbolic 
rather than strategic and the success of ABM as a measure of the administration‘s potential 
to regain control of foreign policy in a time of resistance. 
 
From Sentinel to Safeguard 
In early March of 1969, President Nixon received and approved the review report from 
Deputy Secretary Packard and DDR&E, which recommended that the administration 
continue with a modified ABM deployment. On 14 March, Nixon announced his decision 
to the nation, commencing with an acknowledgment of how controversial the issue had 
become: 
Last year a program, the Sentinel antiballistic missile program, was adopted. That 
program, as all listeners on television and radio and readers of newspapers know, 
has been the subject of very strong debate and controversy over the past few 
months. 
The president then outlined his plans for deployment of a ‗substantially modified‘ version 
described as a ‗Safeguard program‘ which he stated would have three aims: 
It is a safeguard against any attack by the Chinese Communists that we can foresee 
over the next ten years. 
It is a safeguard of our deterrent system, which is increasingly vulnerable due to 
the advances that have been made by the Soviet Union since the year 1967 when 
the Sentinel program was first laid out. 
It is a safeguard against any irrational or accidental attack that might occur of less 
than massive magnitude which might be launched from the Soviet Union.
 70 
 
He further explained that the new Safeguard programme would no longer focus on 
thin area defence but that instead the emphasis would be on protecting the second-strike 
capability of the United States by defending more offensive missile sites thereby 
maintaining the US deterrent. He justified the move away from area defence as the result 
of the limitations of any missile defence system‘s technical capability to provide complete 
protection, as well as the provocative and destabilising nature of city defence which could 
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encourage the Soviet Union to believe in the credibility of US first strike intentions.
71
 
Later that day, Packard announced the details of the initial Safeguard deployment. This 
would consist of up to twelve sites in phased deployment with a larger number of these 
sites protecting US Minuteman installations. The first two sites to begin construction in 
phase I of the deployment, which the initial request for funds from Congress would cover, 
would be located around the Malmstrom and Grand Forks missile bases in Montana and 
North Dakota. Further missile sites as well as limited area defence were to begin in later 
deployment phases that would be under a system of annual administrative and 
Congressional review.
72
  
After announcing plans for the newly renamed Safeguard ABM system, the 
administration began to prepare for the public battle to secure its passage through 
Congress that year. This would be the first of several annual debates on the topic and the 
most contentious. By the end of 1969, the administration would undergo within the Senate 
what Robert David Johnson has described as ‗the most exhaustive attack in U.S. history 
against a weapons system, and one of the longest debates on any issue in the postwar 
era.‘73  
 
The inconsistencies of the first Safeguard debate 
The central problem of the Safeguard deployment that Nixon proposed in 1969 was that 
the many justifications he offered for its deployment were not wholly consistent either 
with each other, or with the nature of the planned system. This was due to the fact that the 
proposed programme was a product of compromises between competing vested 
administration interests and sops to outside political pressures.
74
 This led to a deployment 
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plan that was beset with contradictions. The irony of Safeguard was that by allowing the 
system‘s design to be influenced by political rather than strategic aims, the Nixon White 
House ended up with one whose inherent strategic contradictions made it politically 
vulnerable. In his memoirs Kissinger admitted that the move away from area defence was  
a purely political decision; it was designed to reassure arms control advocates 
fearful lest a heavy defense of our population would appear threatening to the 
Soviets. Our dilemma was that we could sell an ABM program to the Congress 
apparently only by depriving it of military effectiveness against our principal 
adversary.
75
 
In Nixon‘s memoirs he described the ABM opposition through the framing of 
public and elite perceptions of the Vietnam War. While he acknowledged that there were 
some legitimate technical objections to the ABM that influenced some moderates and 
conservatives, he claimed that the Vietnam War had ‗soured the debate‘ and ‗convinced 
the liberals that America suffered from too belligerent a posture and made them 
determined to curb our military spending.‘76 At a Cabinet meeting on 20 March, Nixon 
reiterated the necessity of having ABM as part of the requirement for military superiority 
to create a strong base for negotiations with the Soviet Union. He dismissed the 
‗intellectuals‘ and their objections to ABM stating that, ‗[i]t‘s only us nonintellectuals who 
understand what the game is all about‘.77 However, this framing was not completely 
accurate. Much of the opposition to ABM deployment was bipartisan in nature and based 
on genuine technological, domestic and strategic issues with the proposed system and its 
ostensible rationalisations.  
Kissinger also let the administration off the hook for the failings of Safeguard in 
his depiction of the ABM battle by painting a picture of a White House with limited 
options, fighting against a highly partisan, politically motivated opposition. He dismissed 
the different challenges to the Nixon Safeguard system as ‗various, passionate and not 
necessarily consistent.‘78 In his retelling of the events, he cast the story in a partisan light, 
and conferred leading opposition roles solely on prominent Democrats such as Senator 
Edward Kennedy, Hubert Humphrey and Senator Albert Gore (D-Tenn).
79
 Kissinger gave 
                                                 
75
 Kissinger, White House Years, 208.  
76
 Nixon, RN, 416. 
77
 This is reported in Haldeman‘s diary on Thursday 20 March, 1969, Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, 42.  
78
 Kissinger, White House Years, 206. 
79
 Ibid., 206-8, Nixon in his memoirs also speaks of the ‗powerful liberal forces [in the Senate] headed by 
Teddy Kennedy‘. Nixon, RN, 417. 
98 
 
no mention to any Republican opponent of the programme, although there were several. 
One of the leading and earliest challengers to ABM in the Senate was Senator John 
Cooper, a Republican from Kentucky, and Republican Senators Jacob Javits (New York), 
Charles Percy (Illinois), Senator Edward Brooke (Massachusetts) and Senator Clifford 
Case (New Jersey), among several others joined him. Also, one of Safeguard and ABM‘s 
staunchest public supporters was the hawkish Senator Henry ‗Scoop‘ Jackson, a Democrat 
from Washington. While it would be naive to say that party politics played no part in the 
ABM debate, both support for and opposition to the Safeguard programme was reasonably 
bi-partisan in nature, certainly more than Kissinger‘s account would have one believe.  
Paul Nitze, the highly influential author of NSC-68 who would become a member 
of the US delegation to the SALT talks, took a less partisan tone but also believed that the 
opposition was not at all based on the merits of the system itself.
80
 He later stated, 
[t]he more I looked into it the more I believed that the basis of the anti-ABM 
campaign was to be found in the country‘s disenchantment with the Vietnam War, 
in the widespread alienation from the government of former supporters of the 
nuclear defense program, and in the desire of many to wish away the problems of 
national security.
81
 
While criticisms of the new Safeguard programme certainly occurred within a political 
context that amplified and gave them wider meaning, this did not mean that the criticisms 
were in themselves unfounded, and that there were not valid questions to be asked about 
what Gerard Smith labelled as Safeguard‘s ‗questionable fitness for its mission.‘82 As 
already illustrated in this chapter, the war in Vietnam was indeed a factor in shaping 
public attitudes towards Safeguard and military spending in general – the MIT scientists 
had acknowledged this fact in their statement released on 4 March – but this did not mean 
that all criticism of the system was entirely politically motivated. Wrapped up in the 
doubtless important political trappings of the contest, Nixon nonetheless declined to 
address the actual criticisms that were also part of the debate. 
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One of these criticisms concerned the lack of scientific consultation and the White 
House‘s dismissal of any contrary technical opinion on the subject. This lack of scientific 
discussion was an ongoing feature of the ABM programme. Johnson‘s eventual decision to 
deploy the Sentinel ABM system was taken against the advice of his scientific advisors, 
and PSAC were not invited to have any input into the Nixon Pentagon review that 
produced the amended Safeguard plan in 1969.  
Packard and others at the Department of Defense (DOD) sought little technical 
expertise from the various scientific advisory bodies to the administration. The Doty 
Group, an informal body of advisors to the NSC made up of scientists and arms control 
experts, were shocked when Nixon announced the new plan for Safeguard in March before 
they had a chance to voice their opinions.
83
 According to Richard Garwin, a member of 
the group from the IBM Corporation; ‗[t]hey announced it without having done the 
responsible thing: asking experts in the government about it.‘84 This became publicly 
known after the Washington Post released a news story to accompany its coverage of the 
President‘s speech based on an administration leak that White House scientific advisors 
had been kept out of the decision-making process.
85
 
In his memoirs, President Nixon made much of the fact that the administration was 
unable to publicly acknowledge one of its main reasons for deployment of Safeguard; its 
value as a bargaining chip in future arms control talks with the Soviet Union. He described 
the situation as like ‗fighting with one hand tied behind our back because we could not 
publicly explain the bargaining chip rationale for the ABM‘.86 Yet while the 
administration could not officially use this rationale for Safeguard with the public 
(although it was acknowledged in media reporting on the subject), they were able to utilise 
this argument with Congressional leaders who remained unconvinced. The logic of this 
strategy to sell ABM was also undermined by the rationale of ABM as a protection against 
third party limited attack. If the system was necessary in part to protect against a future 
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Chinese ICBM capability, as the Nixon administration argued publicly, then it would 
surely be highly imprudent to bargain it away in bilateral arms control negotiations with 
the Soviet Union.
87
  
 
The politics of Safeguard 
Despite these concerns, Nixon approached the battle to pass the phase I Safeguard ABM 
system through the Senate as a purely partisan political one. According to Chief of Staff, 
Haldeman, the White House viewed the ABM debate as a potential ‗first battle of ‘72, vs. 
Teddy Kennedy, and we must win [emphasis in original].‘88 In Haldeman and Kissinger‘s 
estimation it was necessary to succeed on Safeguard to ‗get reelected‘.89 Nixon was 
convinced that the national media was biased in both the tone of its coverage on the issue 
and what he described as the ‗approximately 10 to 1 ratio [against us] that the networks 
are following in their news coverage of the ABM debate‘ and he urged the White House 
Director of Communications, Herb Klein to force the networks to include more ‗pro-ABM 
people‘ on their shows to present the administration‘s view.90  
The pro-ABM public relations campaign became what Klein described as ‗one of 
the most elaborate organisations the executive branch of government has seen in support 
of a major issue.‘91 Secretary Laird, on the advice of Harlow, set up a ‗quick reaction 
system‘ to respond to any points brought up within the Senate hearings.92 An ABM 
working group established within the White House met on a weekly basis and released 
several publications. The administration also organised a group to be run by William J. 
Casey, Nixon supporter and later Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the 
Citizen‘s Committee for Peace and Security, which would disseminate White House pro-
ABM material.
93
 Paul Nitze, Dean Acheson and Albert Wohlstetter also joined together to 
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support the administration‘s efforts and formed the ‗Committee to Maintain a Prudent 
Defense Policy‘ and these two groups worked together to disseminate pro-ABM 
publications and provide witnesses before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 
support of ABM authorisation.
94
 All through this period, Harlow and Kenneth BeLieu 
(another Nixon Congressional assistant responsible for ABM passage) continued to lobby 
members of the Senate to gain the required majority to authorise Safeguard in a Senate 
vote.  
The administration also began to try to use the threat of a Soviet first strike to scare 
the public into support for ABM. In televised testimony to the Senate Disarmament 
Committee on 20 March, Secretary of Defense Laird pressed for the development of 
Safeguard as a matter of urgency as he declared that the Soviet Union was attempting to 
build a missile force that could eliminate the United State‘s missile capability with a single 
blow. He stated further that the threat could only be countered with an ABM system.
95
 
This reading of the Soviet intent was disputed by a review called ‗Soviet Strategic Attack 
Forces‘ that was concurrently being conducted by CIA and DIA heads for the National 
Intelligence Estimate. This review concluded that it was ‗highly unlikely that they [the 
Soviet Union] will attempt within the period of this estimate to achieve a first-strike 
capability.‘96  
Internal communications show that the idea of utilising the Soviet Union‘s 
supposed intent to gain first strike capability was part of a more general White House 
strategy to use the idea of fear within the ABM debate. In a memorandum to the president 
on 19 March, Patrick Buchanan, a Nixon speechwriter and communications advisor 
suggested ‗[w]hy not have Laird tell the nation how the Soviets have built up their troops 
in Europe....how they are building their own Polaris system, how many rockets are now 
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aimed at the United States...The media would have to cover it.‘97 He then went on to state 
that,  
[y]es it would scare the American people some perhaps...[but] it would give us the 
ABM and it would throw Edward Kennedy into the posture of a naive young 
Senator who would leave America naked in a hostile world of powerful 
enemies...We‘ve got the megaphone now, we‘ve got the data, let‘s use it 
judiciously for our own purposes, just as they used it for theirs.
98
  
A follow-up memorandum from John Ehrlichman, Counsel and Assistant to the President 
for Domestic Affairs praised the idea as ‗excellent‘ and recommended action on the 
proposal.
99
 
Senator J. William Fulbright publicly criticised Laird‘s attempt to sell ABM 
through suggestions that the Soviets sought a first strike capability as ‗the technique of 
fear‘ and anti-ABM advocates argued that such an idea was not based on any new 
intelligence.
100
 The discrepancy between the assertions of the Secretary of Defense to the 
Senate Committees and the opinion of the intelligence community became a matter of 
public debate, losing the administration further credibility on the issue. As Robert Hunter 
argued at the time, even if the public and Congress could accept Secretary Laird‘s claim 
that the Soviet Union was intent on achieving a knockout first strike capability, this 
justification was not consistent with the administration‘s accompanying argument that 
ABM was necessary as a bargaining chip in future SALT negotiations. 
It is difficult to understand how a nation like the Soviet Union, supposedly bent on 
achieving an ability to destroy the United States with impunity, would be prepared 
to enter into any serious negotiations on halting the arms race.
101
  
By the end of April the administration felt that its ABM campaign was ‗running 
out of steam‘.102 The televised Senate hearings and effective public relations campaigning 
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by anti-ABM scientists in the preceding months had succeeded in placing doubts in the 
public‘s minds over the technological effectiveness of the Safeguard system.103  
As the public battle continued into the early summer months, Nixon became more 
publicly combative on the issue.
104
 By this time, Nixon had recognised that the 
administration was in a precarious situation and passage of the Safeguard system through 
Congress was looking far from certain, with media reports describing the Senate vote that 
would occur at some point during the summer as too close to call.
105
 In a memorandum to 
Kissinger, Harlow and BeLieu, Alexander Butterfield stated that, as per his conversations 
with the President following the recent press conference and the associated media 
coverage, ‗[f]rom here on we should play a hard line publicly....and a very very careful 
explanatory line privately [emphasis in original].‘106  
 
A pyrrhic victory: the Senate finally votes on phase I of Safeguard 
As the Senate debated the Safeguard system throughout July, neither the White House nor 
the opposition could be sure of the outcome on any floor vote.
107
 ABM finally came to the 
Senate floor on 6 August 1969 when votes took place on three amendments on Safeguard 
attached to the military authorisation bill that would have halted progress on the system to 
varying extents. A decent majority rejected an initial amendment banning all progress on 
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ABM, including research and development. The second vote was on an amendment that 
would ban Safeguard but allow some other missile defence research to continue. It 
resulted in a 50-50 vote and the tie was broken against the amendment by Vice President 
Spiro Agnew. The final vote was conducted on the Cooper-Hart amendment, which 
proposed merely to delay the Safeguard programme for a year and this was rejected by a 
vote of 49-51.
108
 This outcome was the smallest possible margin of victory for the 
administration. The Safeguard system would begin phase I of deployment as planned, but 
much had been altered in the process of the debate on authorisation. 
While Nixon had prevailed in the Senate vote, it had come at a price for the public 
perception of the technological and strategic viability of the planned Safeguard system. 
The anti-ABM scientists‘ public campaign had significantly undermined the 
administration‘s initial justifications for the ABM system and purely technological 
arguments could no longer be made in favour of Safeguard because of these scientists‘ 
effective campaigning in the media and in public Senate testimony. The White House and 
pro-ABM campaigners had been forced to change their justifications for Safeguard by the 
end of the 1969 encounter. In his closing speech before the August Senate vote, pro-ABM 
Senator Henry Jackson actually attempted to move the debate away from the question of 
whether or not the system was technologically workable, arguing that, ‗[w]e don‘t settle an 
issue like the ABM by claiming it won‘t work...trying to make one‘s case by the method 
of scientific authority won‘t wash‘. He went on to argue that, ‗if we can walk on the moon, 
we can make the Safeguard program work.‘ Jackson then made the case for the necessity 
for Safeguard as a bargaining chip with the Soviet Union saying that he was,  
confident President Nixon is going to be in a better position to negotiate with the 
Soviets on nuclear arms control when the Senate has voted to give him the 
authority to move ahead with phase I of Safeguard.
109
 
This was a very different set of arguments from those advanced by the White House in 
March when Safeguard was first announced, and the implicit appeal for trust was the first 
sign of the administration‘s subsequent turn to an explicit request for the public to cease 
questioning the administration and simply trust the president on the issue. 
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The prolonged battle over phase I of Safeguard also had another consequence for 
the White House. Because the initial fight had damaged the credibility of the programme 
to such a great extent and because the vote had been so close, Nixon was forced to become 
more publicly involved than he would have chosen. This is why the battle of 1969 was a 
pyrrhic victory for the administration; Nixon won the Senate authorisation vote and 
defeated the proposed amendments, but at great cost to the public‘s perception of the 
operational viability of the programme and using considerable presidential political 
capital. Phase II would not be fought on the virtues of the system, so Nixon would need to 
find another way to convince a sceptical public and Congress of the merits of Safeguard. 
The following section of the chapter will show how, bereft of scientific or strategically 
accepted bases on which to sell further deployment of Safeguard, and continuing to view 
the debate through the lens of domestic politics, the Nixon administration turned to the use 
of a particular meaning for trust in order to argue for acceptance of phase II of Safeguard 
deployment. 
 
‗Damned if we do and damned if we don‘t.‘ The second phase of the Safeguard battle 
The White House was eager to use the Safeguard phase I victory to enhance Nixon‘s 
prestige and in the process to pre-empt any damaging implications of the close vote. In a 
memorandum from the president to Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Kissinger the day after the 
Senate vote, Nixon was insistent on turning the vote into a personal and political triumph: 
The ABM vote is a major victory and I want the three of you to discuss it with 
Harlow in terms of getting out the true story as to Presidential influence and the 
―Nixon Style‖ in dealing with the Congress...point out that RN made the decision 
to tackle ABM head on against the advice of most of his major advisors, including 
particularly the State Department...point out that the President was in constant 
charge of the PR aspects of the ABM fight... 
The final paragraph of the memorandum reinforced the importance of this endeavour: ‗I 
cannot emphasise the importance of getting this story broadly circulated...This is the top 
priority project and I want everybody enlisted to carry it out.‘ Nixon felt that this was 
106 
 
particularly important as he thought that the press might turn the narrow margin of victory 
into what he described as ‗another one of those sour grape stories.‘110  
However, cementing the tie between the president‘s prestige and the success of 
ABM was perhaps not the most farsighted of strategies, as the phased nature of the 
Safeguard deployment meant that the system had to be reviewed annually and any further 
deployment phases approved by Congress. This meant that Nixon would be forced to 
replay the Safeguard confrontation in 1970 and in subsequent years if he wanted to 
implement further phases of the system to reach the ultimate goal of twelve ABM sites. 
There was, in fact, little time to celebrate the Senate victory of 1969 and as the end of the 
year approached, the administration began to decide how it would go forward with the 
phased system. In a news conference on 30 January 1970, Nixon announced that after 
conducting an administration review, he intended to go ahead with the implementation of 
phase II of Safeguard deployment and that Secretary Laird would announce details ‗in 
about 30 days‘.111 Describing it as ‗[t]he minimum we can and must do, both in cost and in 
system development, to fulfil the President‘s national security objectives‘, on 24 February 
Secretary Laird announced a plan that would authorise deployment for one further site for 
Minuteman protection at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri and preliminary preparation 
for a further four sites, including one for Washington DC.
112
  
The administration was aware of the political challenges that implementing phase 
II would entail. In a memorandum to the president in January, Kissinger wrote that 
whatever the deployment plan would involve, ‗we must be prepared to deal with a variety 
of criticisms, some of which we did not face last year in so sharp a form‘, as he believed 
that ‗it is likely that we will have another bloody fight on the Hill.‘113 The memorandum 
illustrated the administration‘s difficulty implementing and justifying phase II of 
Safeguard after the close congressional battle and intense technical criticism of the 
previous year. It outlined some ‗troublesome‘ issues raised by a Department of Defense 
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study regarding the continuance of Safeguard if primarily focused on defending 
Minuteman bases. This study acknowledged that there existed a ‗serious technical 
argument‘ the Soviets could overwhelm the planned Sprint radar components by launching 
additional attacking missiles, and that questions could therefore be raised about the ability 
of Safeguard as conceived to adequately protect the US retaliatory capability. The 
memorandum admitted that these concerns,  
at the very least, provide ammunition to those who will argue that the Minuteman 
defense element of Safeguard may be obsolete by the time they are operational and 
that even the Defense Department no longer has confidence in Safeguard as a 
significant protection of the deterrent. 
However, Kissinger further recognised that, despite these qualms, they might have 
to maintain their focus on Minuteman site defence in phase II of deployment because 
changing the aims and justifications for Safeguard would leave them open to criticisms of 
inconsistency in their rationale for the system: ‗If we don‘t add a further Minuteman site, 
and emphasise the area defence rationale, we will be criticised for inconsistency with 
DOD‘s arguments last year.‘114  
The PSAC Strategic Military Panel also continued to warn of the technical 
limitations of the system and advised the president to search for alternative means for 
protecting Minuteman bases. NSC staff member Laurence E. Lynn informed Kissinger 
that the PSAC report ‗suggests that on the merit, there are strong technical arguments 
against any further deployment of the Safeguard components for Minuteman defense‘, and 
that ‗[i]f -- or rather when -- that fact leaks, it could significantly strengthen the 
opposition's arguments not only against expanding the system, but even against the Phase I 
decision.‘115 
The White House was therefore in a difficult situation with regard to phase II 
deployment as once again strategic viability clashed with political expediency. 
Safeguard‘s capacity to achieve its stated purpose had been publicly undermined 
throughout the past year, but changing that purpose would also lead to criticisms of 
inconsistency that would further damage the administration‘s credibility on the issue. 
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Kissinger‘s memorandum summed this up succinctly by acknowledging that, with respect 
to deciding whether or not to focus phase II of their Safeguard deployment on Minuteman 
defence, ‗we may well be damned if we do and damned if we don‘t.‘116  
 
The contradictions of phase II 
Nixon‘s political dilemma was reflected in the apparent contradictions between the nature 
of his announcement of phase II of Safeguard on 30 January and the subsequent budget 
request made by Secretary Laird. In his initial announcement Nixon, most likely basing his 
speech on the DoD report, emphasised the Chinese threat as the driving force behind the 
design of further deployment. He stated that ‗our decision involves area defense‘, which 
he described as ‗absolutely essential as against any minor power, a power, for example, 
like Communist China.‘117 As Kissinger had anticipated in his memorandum, the apparent 
change in focus away from protecting Minuteman bases from a Soviet attack towards area 
defence and the Chinese threat subsequently provoked much opposition in Congress and 
accusations of duplicity and inconsistency, setting off what the New York Times described 
at the time as ‗another bruising, divisive ABM debate in the Senate‘.118 Senate Majority 
Leader Mike Mansfield (D-MA) launched an attack on this apparent incoherence, 
declaring that in the previous year the president had stated that the previous area defence 
system was, 
being abandoned because it could not be made to work to defend cities against a 
hypothetical attack of Soviet warheads and because he [the president] could not 
―buy‖ the contention of its value for that purpose against a hypothetical attack of 
Chinese warheads. Yet, this year it is proposed that Safeguard be extended to 
include defense of cities against precisely such an attack from Chinese sources.
119
  
Laird‘s budget request on 24 February moved the immediate focus away from the 
Chinese-oriented area defence that had raised such strong objections. The authorisation 
request would instead add a further Minuteman site, with only preliminary land acquisition 
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plans for any area defence.
120
 Furthermore, subsequent statements on the system either 
underplayed or completely ignored any justifications based on future Chinese or other 
third-party threats. This would suggest that Nixon ultimately made the decision that a 
Minuteman missile defence, Soviet-focused system would be less politically problematic 
to sell than a Chinese-focused area defence system and that he was continuing to base 
decisions about ABM on their domestic political usefulness. 
At the same time Bell Telephone Laboratories, the principal contractor for the 
Safeguard system, expressed its reluctance to continue working on the ABM project. Lynn 
informed Kissinger that Bell had announced its wish to stop working on Safeguard after 
implementation of phase II, citing ‗an unwillingness to continue to be associated with a 
programme which cannot technically perform the missions the Government claims it will 
accomplish.‘121 Again, Nixon and Kissinger perceived this opposition to the Safeguard 
system as politically motivated and dismissed the technical objections to the system. In a 
memorandum to the president, Kissinger doubted the strength of Bell‘s technical 
arguments and speculated that the real reason for the objections was that Bell was 
reluctant to carry on working on such a controversial programme. However, he described 
the impact of these critiques from Bell, ‗whatever their validity or sincerity‘, as 
‗potentially devastating‘. In a handwritten note on the memo, the president also expressed 
his doubts over the sincerity of Bell‘s stated technological objections: ‗My guess is that 
the real reasons are their scientists and P.R [emphasis in original]‘.122  
Nixon was thus pushed into a corner on the issue of Safeguard. His credibility had 
been seriously damaged by the public accusations of incoherence and cynicism on the 
issue. Furthermore, the compromises he had made in the attempt to make the programme 
politically successful had left him with limited counter-arguments to make to these 
criticisms based on the coherence and actual strategic merits of the system. By 1970, 
public opinion was also moving further away from Safeguard; while a small majority had 
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been in favour of deployment of phase I in 1969, as the programme continued a majority 
of the public opposed expanding the programme further.
123
 Opponents of ABM also made 
objections to a Safeguard system that was oriented to thwart a Soviet missile attack on the 
grounds that it would stall progress and undermine US credibility at the next SALT round 
in Vienna in April. The first session of SALT I had begun in Helsinki in November of 
1969 and had ended with an agreement to resume talks in April of the following year.
124
 
Critics of Safeguard (including Gerard Smith) argued that further planned deployment of 
ABM systems would undermine the upcoming round two SALT negotiations.
125
  
 
‗Trust me, I’m the president,’ Nixon talks about trust 
Understanding that any combination of strategic and technological justification for 
Safeguard would be problematic in some way, the White House attempted to circumvent 
these problems in the phase II debate by choosing to focus not on what Safeguard could 
actually do, but on what it represented. A memorandum to the president on the Safeguard 
support effort reported that in meetings with Congressional leaders, presidential aides 
were placing ‗[c]ontinuing emphasis on the importance of Safeguard both to negotiating 
success at SALT, as part of a SALT agreement, and as a definite necessity in the event of 
failure of SALT.‘126  In a public relations document entitled ‗ABM-the key to ending the 
arms race,‘ the military benefits of Safeguard were underplayed. The document described 
ABM as ‗the castle in the chess game‘, and asserted that ‗[i]ts significance far transcends 
either its effectiveness as a weapon system, as a deterrent or as a means of protection for 
our cities. It is the essential and indispensible ingredient to arms control, de-facto or de-
jure.‘127 As Thomas Halsted, National Director for the Council for a Livable World wrote, 
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‗the administration was really no longer arguing for Safeguard at all, but rather for its 
prerogatives in military and diplomatic decision making.‘128  
With such limited avenues of explanation to try to convince Congress and the 
public of the merits of Safeguard, the White House began to talk about trusting in the 
president to sell the planned expansion of the programme. Two days after Secretary 
Laird‘s announcement of the phase II proposal, Alexander Haig, Deputy Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs, wrote to Lynn to say that the president had 
developed key themes to accompany ABM information that he wanted all administration 
speakers on the topic to use. The primary theme proposed by the president to sell 
Safeguard was that of trust. The memorandum stated, ‗[w]e should put our trust in the 
President. He alone has the facts, the intelligence upon which a sound decision should be 
made.‘129  
The second theme expanded on this idea of trusting the president‘s judgment, 
presenting the argument that it was ‗inconceivable that the President would spend $900 
million at this point in time if the system were not needed‘.130 In this manner, Nixon had 
moved away from trying to convince a sceptical public and Congress that Safeguard was 
useful and viable, but instead was trying to convince them to trust in his judgment as 
president that it was necessary. The White House also drafted a letter from the president to 
send in response to any correspondence and to solicit support. This letter is quite 
remarkable in its almost total lack of effort to try and convince the reader of the merits of 
the proposed programme. Its line of reasoning rests completely on the thesis that readers 
should simply trust the president to make the right decision rather than trying to come to a 
decision on the issue themselves.  
It should be emphasized that we must put our trust in the President, to whom we 
have given the responsibility for insuring the security of this nation. The President 
has all the intelligence information and relevant facts upon which to base a sound 
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decision. The President has weighed the arguments for and against this program 
and concluded that it is essential to the national security.  
In making budget decision of this magnitude the President has been faced with 
agonizing choices as to how to most effectively allocate funds for vital competing 
programs. It is inconceivable that the President would decide to spend money on 
this program at a time when so many other urgent national needs exist unless he 
were convinced that there was no other alternative.
131
 
While the letter did advance the argument that a Soviet build up of strategic arms required 
a US response, in proposing Safeguard as the solution to this problem it portrayed it 
merely as a less escalatory response than that of an offensive weapons build-up. It 
minimised the import and scope of the system, representing it as more of the result of a 
necessity for ongoing research to deal with the imperatives of technological development, 
rather than a system that effectively served a strategic purpose:  
The Soviets already have an ABM system and have boasted of its effectiveness. It 
is only logical that we have a modest system in being so that we can also determine 
the reliability of our own program. In this age of rapid technological change it is 
only with an ongoing development and test program that we can assure an effective 
system.
132
  
The use of the language of unquestioning trust in the president to justify phase II of 
Safeguard deployment is also evident in a further letter that was drafted for Nixon 
supporters to use in advocating support of the programme. The letter described the system, 
not as a technical solution to a strategic problem, but as more of an ongoing research 
project that would be developed through deployment. ‗The Safeguard program will allow 
the US to build an ABM system and test its effectiveness so that we also keep up with 
technological progress in this area.‘ Once again, the main justification for expansion was 
no longer based on the intrinsic worth of Safeguard itself, but on a blatant appeal to simply 
trust the President. 
It is the President to whom we have given the terrible responsibility of insuring the 
safety of this country. We should trust his judgment since he has available all the 
facts, not just about this program, but about how it relates to the rest of our foreign 
and military policies.
133
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In a further document alongside the letter called ‗Themes‘, this strategy was once 
again evident. ‗Even if you have doubts personally about this or that aspect of the 
decision‘, it affirmed ‗once the President chooses, he is entitled to be benefit of the 
doubt.‘134 A further document on the issue, an administration fact sheet entitled ‗Safeguard 
Proposal for 1971‘ repeated the same theme, asserting that it was, 
the President to whom the American people have entrusted the awesome 
responsibility for ensuring the safety and security of the United States. If the 
President, who has before him all available intelligence information and relevant 
facts—not just about the system but about its relationship to our foreign and 
military policies—determines that this program is vital to the national security, 
then that judgment must be respected.
135
  
In June of 1970, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted 11-6 to eliminate the 
funds for land acquisition and construction for the four phase II area-defence sites 
requested by the President from the Military Authorization Bill, but approved the request 
for funds to begin further deployment of Minuteman defence at Whiteman Air Force Base 
in Missouri.
136
 The final judgment on phase II was made by Congress on 12 August when 
the Senate voted by a margin of 47-52 to defeat the Cooper Hart amendment to the 
Authorization Bill, which would have withheld authorisation for the Missouri Safeguard 
site.
137
 This vote was reported at the time to have been heavily influenced by a last minute 
message from Gerard Smith distributed to Senators by BeLieu asserting that expansion 
was ‗crucial to the success of the negotiations‘.138  
Nixon was able to continue, in a somewhat modified fashion, with plans for 
Safeguard deployment for the following year but the challenges to the programme would 
continue to concern the administration until the United States and the Soviet Union signed 
the ABM treaty and the debate became moot. The ABM Treaty limited both the United 
States and the Soviet Union to two sites, one at the national capital and one to protect a 
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missile site.
139
 The treaty was later modified to permit only one site per country and so the 
only US site that ever achieved operational capability was at Grand Forks Air Force Base 
in North Dakota which briefly operated in 1975 before being shut down by Congress.  
 The great Safeguard debate never again hit the controversial heights of 1969 and 
1970 but instead rather fizzled out over the ensuing years because of these other 
developments. However, it is not the ultimate outcome of the battle that is of greatest 
interest to this study. What is of significance in this case is the manner in which Nixon 
chose to contest this battle over Safeguard once his strategic and technological rationales 
were undermined, how he began to talk about trust, and what an assessment of the 
significance of his specific meaning for trust in this context can reveal. The following 
sections will provide a closer examination of these questions.  
 
The ironies of ‘trust the president’ 
Nixon‘s use of the word ‗trust‘ in the Safeguard debate  provides an example of how, in 
the context of the contemporary political climate and the politics of the nuclear age, 
Nixon‘s grammar of trust was one of ‗responsibility‘, ‗knowledge‘, ‗authority‘ and 
‗leadership‘. This is a very particular meaning for trust. Nixon did not speak of trust in 
relations to values, personal attributes or personal relationships but in terms of power and 
position. The message was that one should trust Nixon, not because he was personally 
trustworthy but because he was the president, and in a time of conflict and danger, he had 
the ultimate responsibility for the safety of the nation. This section will illustrate some of 
the ironies within President Nixon‘s specific use of trust in this context and how, if one 
can describe Nixon‘s grammar of trust in the context of use, one can locate this in a 
broader understanding of the politics of the time.  
Nixon talked about trust as based on the idea of superior knowledge. He demanded 
the trust of the public based on the fact that as president he had access to more information 
than them. As the public relations letter on the subject of Safeguard argued, ‗[w]e should 
trust his judgment since he has available all the facts, not just about this program, but 
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about how it relates to the rest of our foreign and military policies‘.140 This can be 
understood within a wider culture of the Nixon White House, the implicit faith in the 
superiority of information and rationality which is further evidenced in the countless 
studies and analyses demanded by Nixon and Kissinger‘s NSC.141 For Nixon and 
Kissinger, increased information meant better judgments. As the president, Nixon had 
access to more information therefore his judgments were naturally superior irrespective of 
any opinions on his personal abilities to make better judgments. The argument was 
therefore that one should trust President Nixon, not because he was in himself trustworthy, 
but because, as president he had the authority and necessary information to make the right 
decisions.  
In using this argument, Nixon presented a meaning for trust built on an imbalance 
of power that was based on his possession of superior knowledge and on deference to the 
office of the president. Talking about trust in this way was an invocation, not only to 
accept this power imbalance, but to acquiesce to the logic that its very existence granted to 
the more powerful actor in the relationship a large degree of discretion in acting. In this 
manner, trust was both the motivation for and legitimation of a continuing conformity to 
the authority of the president‘s actions. Trust, here in its Nixonian public incarnation, was 
invoked as an unquestioning acceptance of President Nixon‘s ability to make decisions on 
behalf of American citizens, based on his innate authority as president and the superior 
knowledge that the office afforded him. This was a somewhat tautological view of trust. 
The Nixon White House was saying ‗it is because I am so powerful that you must trust 
me; and it is in the act of trusting me that you must enable my power‘ or put more simply 
‗you must trust me because you have to trust me‘. The great irony of this was that, as this 
chapter has illustrated, on many occasions the decisions of the president were in fact not 
being made based on grand strategic calculations or greater technical knowledge but on 
political calculations, prejudice and often feelings of personal pride and vanity.
142
 An 
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ongoing feature of the ABM debate was the exclusion of critical scientific voices from the 
decision-making process.
143
 Nixon also refused to engage with reports from within his 
own administration, from PSAC, from defence contractors such as Bell Telephone 
Laboratories and from the CIA if they contradicted his judgements on the issue.  
The contrast between Nixon‘s use of trust to portray himself as a rational 
calculating actor and his actual actions can be seen in his attitude and responses to the 
media and public criticism. The idea of the deference due to the office of president 
informed the administration‘s response to opposition and Nixon took any criticism of his 
policies personally and often responded irrationally.
144
 The infamous ‗enemies list‘ is 
perhaps the most prominent example of this but in fact this way of thinking pervaded the 
administration‘s approach to governing and politics throughout his time in office. This 
sense of victimisation is clear in his description of himself as ‗one of the most hated‘ 
presidents, and the many comparisons he would make between his unfavourable treatment 
by the media and the treatment given to other presidents in the past.
145
 He often decried 
the ability of the press to understand foreign policy, describing them variously as 
‗clowns‘,146 the ‗hostile press‘,147 and as writing from a ‗biased viewpoint‘.148 A 
Haldeman talking paper of 1971 declared that 
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[t]he establishment now, in terms of the intellectual elite, is decadent and its [sic] 
wrong. The reason that the President is hated so by them is because they are afraid 
he might succeed, and therefore, beat them.
149
  
Nixon was convinced that mainstream press and network news were actively hostile to his 
presidency and intent on undermining him. He claimed that he had ‗entered the Presidency 
with less support from the major publications and TV networks than any President in 
history‘.150 He therefore considered all press criticism as based on either a lack of 
understanding or on hostility to his authority and so framed critique as either ignorance or 
enmity.   
In July 1969, for example, Alexander Butterfield sent a memorandum to 
Ehrlichman and Kissinger in response to a news story about the impact of public opinion 
on the president‘s Vietnam decisions. The memorandum stated that the president ‗would 
like you two to get together and see Drummond [the reporter] and make it clear to him that 
he (the President) is less affected by press criticism and popular opinion ―than any 
President in recent memory.‖‘151 Apparently unaware of the irony of responding to such a 
news story by sending his two top aides to see the reporter in question and impress upon 
him how very little he cared about the press‘ opinion, this memorandum is highly 
indicative of the confrontational relationship that Nixon had with the media. Nixon‘s view 
was that the media, (apart from a few ‗friendly‘ conservative news outlets) was not 
providing balanced commentary but rather was a partisan body with an agenda to 
undermine the administration at every opportunity.
152
 This attitude became problematic for 
members of the administration who felt that it was counter-productive and that too much 
time was spent reacting to negative news stories at the president‘s request. In a 
memorandum to Haldeman, for example, Special Assistant to the President Jeb Magruder 
argued that too much focus was being placed on reacting to every negative news story, 
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describing the ‗endless stream of memos pouring down on me, Herb Klein, and various 
others, each one demanding action to counter this or that bit of criticism in the media.‘153  
The way in which Nixon attempted to shut down the debate on Safeguard by 
talking about trust is indicative of a wider approach to communicating his foreign policy 
decisions. Nixon believed that the best manner to communicate the president‘s authority 
was not to engage in a discussion with the press over policy issues, but instead to bypass 
the press as much as possible and go directly to the public, what he described as ‗the 
essence of democracy.
154
 In this manner the president could convey his authority directly 
to the ‗silent majority‘ of the American people without it being mediated through what he 
saw as a biased news media. Nixon therefore conducted fewer press conferences and 
interviews than his predecessors, instead preferring formats that let him speak directly to 
the American public.
155
 
Though Nixon relied on the public‘s support to legitimate foreign policy decision-
making, because of his disdain for both Congress and the media, he rarely made any 
systematic attempt to educate the public but instead often resorted to clichés and sound 
bites. As Melanson argues, ‗Nixon behaved as if ―peace with honour‖ [Nixon‘s slogan 
regarding Vietnam] could be achieved if Congress would only ―shut up‖‘.156 The turn to 
the use of trust was an attempt to speak to the American people directly about ABM, but it 
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was also another example of a message being communicated that was, in its most basic 
form, that his opponents should ‗shut up‘. 
The pressure on Nixon to succeed in the contest over Safeguard deployment also 
came from the role of ABM within the SALT negotiations. SALT was becoming 
increasingly important in terms of justifying the portrayal of Nixon as a great statesman in 
the face of his lack of success in ending the war in Vietnam and increased domestic 
pressures and Congressional push back on national security policy and spending. SALT, 
according to Iwan Morgan, would be ‗the vehicle to open up the ‗‗era of negotiations‘‘ 
that Nixon had promised Americans in his inaugural address‘.157 However, it is another 
irony of this analysis that, once again, the focus on the politics of SALT led to a set of 
agreements that would ultimately become politically vulnerable. The administration was 
more interested in selling the ‗Nixon as world leader‘ narrative domestically than the 
SALT agreements themselves, which meant that a domestic constituency was never 
maintained in favour of the SALT process.
158
 Gerard Smith and Paul Nitze both claimed 
that domestic political considerations undermined the credibility and success of the SALT 
negotiations and the eventual agreements that were produced, and Smith condemned what 
he termed Nixon‘s overwhelming ‗lust for a summit‘.159 Nixon and Kissinger had both 
recognised the importance of a summit in neutralising the public anti-war attacks on Nixon 
at the time. ‗It would defuse people‘, Kissinger declared in conversation with Nixon, ‗they 
can‘t very well attack their President when he is getting ready for a summit meeting‘.160 
 
The ‗madman theory‘ 
Nixon‘s use of trust in the case of the Safeguard ABM debate was predominantly targeted 
at a domestic audience. Nixon did not explicitly use the idea of a need for trust with 
reference to the issue of ABM in the international realm or to nuclear arms control 
negotiations with the Soviet Union in general. In fact, when speaking of the SALT 
process, administration officials only discussed trust in order to deny its role in arms 
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control. Rather, as Arvid Schors has illustrated, they claimed that the developing satellite 
technology enabling the adoption of the National Technical Means (NTM) of verification 
had superseded the need for trust in nuclear arms control.
161
  
Indeed, while endeavouring domestically to portray himself as a rational, 
competent and responsible actor in whom the American public should place their trust, 
internationally he attempted to send signals to antagonists that he was quite the opposite. 
Nixon‘s ‗madman theory‘ involved the threat of excessive, even nuclear, aggression as a 
coercive tactic towards the Soviet Union and North Vietnam. It was a bluff, and thus its 
success would require leaders in Moscow and Hanoi to believe that Nixon was an 
irrational and unpredictable actor, an unhinged anti-communist whose fanaticism 
overpowered his sense of consequences in the use of massive force. He explained the 
theory to Haldeman: 
I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I‘ve 
reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war [emphasis in original]. 
We‘ll just slip the word to them that, ―for God‘s sake, you know Nixon is obsessed 
about Communism. We can‘t restrain him when he‘s angry--and he has his hand on 
the nuclear button.‖162 
Nixon tried to communicate this through action including increasing US nuclear readiness 
in the autumn of 1969 as a message to the Soviet Union that he was willing to ‗use 
extreme force to bring the Vietnam conflict to an end‘.163 According to Klein ‗one of the 
assets he [Nixon] coveted was that the international opposition was never quite certain 
how he would react.‘164 In this way, Nixon‘s international persona, at least with his 
opponents, was deliberately untrustworthy and irrational. It is another irony of this 
analysis that, while portraying himself as a trustworthy leader domestically, Nixon was 
simultaneously signalling that he was an unpredictable and untrustworthy partner in the 
international realm. 
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Conclusion 
Through a grammatical investigation of trust and nuclear arms during the Nixon 
administration, this chapter has shown how President Nixon talked about trust in a 
particular way in order to accomplish certain political goals. It has also shown that, 
because Nixon‘s meaning for trust was located within a wider political and historical 
context, Nixon‘s trust had little to do with character, values or personal relationships, and 
was instead based on the idealisation of knowledge and facts, an acknowledgement of 
responsibility and power, and compliance with Nixon‘s authority as the president. The 
grammar of trust in this context was reflective of the administration‘s wider political 
language, which talked about Nixon as a great world leader and was connected to other 
words such as ‗responsibility‘, ‗intelligence‘, ‗facts‘, ‗information‘ and ‗judgement‘. This 
grammar of trust was shaped by Nixon‘s approach to governance in the realm of foreign 
policy and national security, US political culture, the current political climate and his 
response to the demands of foreign policy and national security in a nuclear era. 
The chapter illustrated this through an analysis of the political battle over 
deployment of the Safeguard ABM system in Nixon‘s first years in office. Nixon had 
inherited an ABM deployment programme that was already the subject of contestation and 
which, due to the conflicted nature of its origins, contained certain inbuilt inconsistencies 
and flaws. When an active and high-profile anti-ABM scientific community joined with 
local groups and politicians concerned about missiles in their communities, this caught the 
attention of a divided public that was tired of the Vietnam War, and a Congress that were 
increasingly wary of defence spending and questioning the Cold War consensus and the 
traditional presidential prerogatives on foreign policy decision-making.  
On reaching the White House, Nixon further damaged the strategic and technical 
coherence of the proposed ABM system. His administration‘s operational compromises 
and multiple, often contradictory, rationales for deployment of the amended and newly 
christened Safeguard system further undermined its credibility. By allowing political 
concerns to influence not only the public justification for deployment but also the nature 
of the system itself, Nixon‘s decisions weakened the technical and strategic arguments for 
Safeguard.  
Unable to answer the technological, strategic and political questions about the 
planned deployment, Nixon‘s ultimate response was to try to stop people from asking 
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questions at all. Nixon instead began to talk about ABM in terms of trust. This 
grammatical investigation has shown that regarding ABM and the wider issue of nuclear 
arms and arms control, the Nixon administration used a very specific meaning for the 
word ‗trust‘. This meaning for trust was located in its use and thus best understood with 
reference to its place, its speaker and its function. The irony in this use of trust was that the 
focus on knowledge, judgement and facts in this Nixonian trust was undermined by the 
fact that the type of ABM deployment Nixon was trying to justify contained several 
strategic and technical contradictions that were a result of ignoring scientific advice and 
instead basing decisions on domestic political manoeuvring. Indeed, by attempting to 
move his request for trust out of the current political context and attach it instead to a 
timeless tradition of trust in presidential authority, Nixon himself was endeavouring to 
dehistoricise his public meaning for trust in the very way that this thesis has identified as 
problematic in the International Relations trust literature.  
The following chapter will show how President Reagan‘s grammar of trust, though 
dissimilar to Nixon‘s, was also shaped by US political culture, the contemporary political 
context and the political imperatives of the nuclear revolution, and therefore how trust in 
the Reagan era is also best understood in context and through use. 
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3 
 
‘Trust the people,’ Reagan, trust and nuclear arms control 
 
Trust is a key. Everyone trusts Mr. Reagan as a person. He is so obviously sincere. 
He believes all those things he says. There is none of the defensiveness in him of a Nixon; 
he is confident and easy. And he has proof that dreams can win over facts, because his own 
dream came true. 
- New York Times, 1985 1 
 
Reagan does not argue for American values; he embodies them...he renews our 
past by resuming it. His approach is not discursive, setting up sequences of time or 
thought, but associative; not a tracking shot but montage. 
- Garry Wills 2 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter conducts a grammatical investigation into President Ronald Reagan's use of 
trust regarding nuclear arms and nuclear arms control during his second term in office. It 
illustrates how the particular meaning for trust used publicly by President Reagan was 
shaped by the contemporary political climate, Reagan‘s particular role in US political 
culture and the imperatives placed on politics by the nuclear revolution. It then argues that 
President Reagan used this particular meaning for trust to describe the process of nuclear 
arms control undertaken in his second term as a narrative of trust and thereby achieve 
specific political goals. The chapter describes how Reagan‘s meaning for trust therefore 
played an important and consistent part in the Reagan administration's public diplomacy 
efforts in the years 1985-1989, providing a means of dealing with the disingenuous nature 
of foreign policy rhetoric in a nuclear era. 
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2
 Garry Wills, Reagan‘s America: Innocents At Home (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 4. 
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The first section of the chapter briefly explains why this research focuses on 
Reagan‘s second term and describes the various inhibiting factors that meant little progress 
on arms control occurred early in the Reagan presidency, as well as how this changed as 
Reagan‘s first term progressed. The chapter then illustrates how Reagan closely associated 
himself with a particular meaning for trust throughout his presidency and how he 
consistently made use of this distinctive meaning for trust in his political vocabulary. This 
particular meaning for trust was founded on nostalgia for American traditional and 
conservative values and was a reflection of the context of the Reagan presidency in a post-
Vietnam and post-Watergate United States as well as within a wider background of 
American political culture. Reagan‘s grammar of trust included words such as ‗freedom‘, 
‗people‘, ‗faith‘, ‗liberty‘ and ‗democracy‘. Reagan used trust, as associated with these 
words in many of his speeches and domestic campaigns, most commonly in variants of the 
phrase 'trust the people'.   
The chapter will then illustrate how Reagan‘s use of trust was also influenced by 
his approach to dealing with politics in a nuclear age. It will show how Reagan portrayed 
the problem of the nuclear age as a problem of trust; connecting his use of trust to his 
specific response to the imperatives of the nuclear revolution on the international realm. 
Reagan expressed this through conceptualising nuclear weapons as the outcome of a lack 
of trust in the international realm rather than the generator of a lack of trust in the 
international realm. As Reagan‘s second term commenced and the United States and the 
Soviet Union began to engage more on issues of nuclear arms control, Reagan began to use 
this connection of trust and the problems of nuclear arms for trust more often in the 
international realm. Reagan was able to talk about the arms control process as a narrative 
of trust and trustworthiness. By talking about trust in relation to traditional American 
values and his meaning for trust as ‗trust the people‘, Reagan attempted to create a 
discourse in which the trustworthiness of the United States as a nuclear power was 
presumed but the trustworthiness of the Soviet Union had to be constantly proven. He then 
adapted this message to address whatever issue was problematic for the United States at 
the time, so that his meaning for trust also became a valuable part of the administration‘s 
public diplomacy efforts.  
This chapter will illustrate how President Reagan first talked about trust in relation 
to the administration‘s highly publicised charges of Soviet noncompliance with previous 
international arms control treaties. As the White House decided whether to continue to 
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abide by the limits of the unratified SALT II treaty during 1985 and 1986, it made use of 
the idea of Soviet untrustworthiness to validate any decision it would make. Reagan 
framed the issue as one of trust and portrayed the Soviet Union as innately untrustworthy 
because of Moscow‘s alleged history of noncompliance with international treaties. When 
this issue receded and the political focus switched to how Washington would publicly deal 
with the positive arms control proposals offered by a new and energetic CPSU General 
Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, Reagan also changed how he talked about trust regarding 
nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union. Reagan began to talk about trust within a wider 
language of freedom and the issue of human rights in the Soviet Union, and used this to 
place Gorbachev's arms control proposals within a broader political context. The chapter 
will show how Reagan described arms control as inextricably linked to trust and 
specifically his version of trust as ‗trust the people‘, alleging that the government of the 
Soviet Union did not trust its people and therefore could not itself be trusted.  
Through these examples, the chapter will describe how President Reagan was able 
to take the idea of ‗trust the people‘ and the inherent trustworthiness of the United States 
that was a central theme of his political speech and use it as a political attribute, both 
domestically and within Congress as well as in the realm of the international public 
diplomacy battle with the Soviet Union. Trust was also a language through which Reagan 
could negotiate between the conflicting concerns of his domestic constituencies, from arms 
control advocates who demanded more cooperation with the Soviet Union, to hard-line 
arms control sceptics. The chapter therefore demonstrates how taking a grammatical 
approach to the study and meaning of trust during this period can illuminate certain 
political dynamics that existed at that time and that might be overlooked by merely 
accepting and explaining the narrative that of this era as one where trust 'played a role'. 
Rather, it argues that the Reagan administration made a decision to talk about arms control 
in relation to a specific and context-bound meaning for trust. 
 
President Reagan’s first term 
Unlike Nixon, Reagan had prominently talked about the trust throughout his political 
career, but it would be 1985 before he began to significantly use the word in relation to 
international arms control with the Soviet Union. This chapter therefore focuses on the 
second term of the Reagan presidency. The following section will briefly explain the 
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reason for this focus and the exclusion of President Reagan‘s first term in office and will 
outline the various pressures that led to a more accommodating stance towards the Soviet 
Union within the Reagan White House and a softening of the president‘s language from 
1984 onwards.  
In Reagan‘s first term there was little forward movement on nuclear arms control, 
or indeed on any aspect of the US-Soviet relationship. Critics on both the left and the right 
argued that the promises of détente of the early 1970s were largely unrealised and the arms 
control process had stalled.
3
 Following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan six months 
after the signing of SALT II, President Carter requested that the Senate suspend its 
consideration of the Treaty.
4
 The acceptance of the Nixonian vision of the Cold War had 
been increasingly challenged from both right and left.
5
 Incoming President Ronald Reagan 
had built his career on a history of strong anti-communist rhetoric and had spent much of 
the presidential campaign attacking President Carter‘s foreign policy, especially his policy 
towards the Soviet Union and weakness on issues such as the Panama Canal, the invasion 
of Afghanistan, the Iranian Hostage crisis and the SALT II Treaty. On reaching office, 
Reagan continued with what Frances Fitzgerald describes as a ‗wave of hyperbole‘ 
regarding the Soviet threat in order to maintain support for his plans for a buildup in 
military spending.
6
 Reagan‘s aggressive rhetoric towards the Soviet Union, most famously 
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encapsulated in the ‗Evil Empire‘ address,7 his administration‘s antipathy towards the idea 
of arms control and belief in the need for a US military build-up were deleterious to any 
progress in nuclear arms control and to US-Soviet relations in general in his first years in 
office.
8
 
Although Reagan certainly had an ideological antipathy towards the Soviet Union, 
there were also political and practical reasons for not pressing for US-Soviet 
rapprochement. Firstly, President Reagan entered office determined to focus on domestic 
issues and especially on the economy; this was where his interest lay and polling showed 
that the number one public concern was the economy, specifically high inflation.
9
 In the 
first year, his administration‘s main priority was thus to manage inflation and institute a 
large tax cut, and domestic issues remained higher on the White House agenda than foreign 
policy throughout the first term.
10
  
Moreover, even if Reagan had wanted to move forward with the US-Soviet 
relationship, it would have been difficult given the bureaucratic obstacles within the 
administration. There was little consensus on foreign policy and even less control over its 
direction in the early years of the Reagan White House.
11
 Reagan lacked a leader within his 
administration to drive policy, which, given his own indifference to international issues at 
the time, would have been necessary to create and maintain a coherent strategy in foreign 
affairs. Conflicts between the State and Defense Departments and between the White 
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House and Congress regarding arms control and the Soviet Union thus remained 
unresolved, and according to Strobe Talbott, this became ‗disruptive and often paralyzing 
in the Reagan administration‘.12 Reagan‘s closest advisors, Chief of Staff James Baker, his 
Deputy Mike Deaver and Counselor Edwin Meese, had little experience in foreign 
policy.
13
 Without direction from the top, the only constants in the first years of the 
administration were the consistently hard-line anti-Soviet rhetoric and focus on the military 
build-up.
14
  
Regardless, moving forward on nuclear arms issues with the Soviet Union may still 
have been a challenge because of various international factors. Firstly, the Soviet Union 
itself lacked stable leadership at the highest levels in the early eighties with a succession of 
aging leaders of varying degrees of obsolescence holding the reins of power. Secondly, any 
movement in US-Soviet relations was also inhibited by several controversial events that 
occurred during the early Reagan period. In November of 1983, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) deployment of INF forces in Europe as per the 1979 dual track 
decision resulted in a Soviet Union walkout of arms control negotiations. Diplomatic 
incidents such as the Soviet shooting down of unarmed South Korean civilian airliner, 
which Soviet authorities mistakenly assumed was a US spy plane, also contributed to the 
acrimonious atmosphere.
15
 For these reasons, the early Reagan years are not of great 
significance for the purpose of this investigation.  
 
Reagan’s second term: a change in approach  
Several converging events and the emergence of political pressures during Reagan‘s first 
term led to a perhaps unlikely and unexpected focus on working with the Soviet Union on 
nuclear arms control issues in Reagan‘s second term and an accompanying use of trust to 
achieve certain political goals within this arena. This came from a combination of domestic 
political challenges, bureaucratic changes and international pressures. 
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Firstly, growing domestic political opposition placed pressure on the administration 
to publicly adopt a more cooperative stance. Anti-nuclear movements in the United States 
and Western Europe, alarmed by the President‘s hostile rhetoric towards the Soviet Union, 
his talk of winning a nuclear war and his increases in defence spending, grew in strength 
during the first years of the Reagan administration. The nuclear freeze movement was of 
particular concern to the administration. The freeze movement developed from a proposal 
by the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies in 1980 that the United States and 
the Soviet Union immediately freeze their levels of nuclear weapons and abandon any 
further testing, production or deployment.
16
 While the campaign eventually lost direction, 
at its high point the freeze movement was a powerful voice in the nuclear weapons debate 
and was a source of unease for the administration.
17
 The Catholic Church, also concerned 
about the rhetoric coming from the White House, joined the freeze movement in its 
opposition to the administration‘s stance on nuclear weapons.18 In internal correspondence, 
the administration acknowledged that the issue of nuclear arms control with the Soviet 
Union was ‗a domestic political issue as well as a foreign policy issue‘, and tried to push 
back on public opinion.
19
 
The White House also began to face opposition from Congress and some resistance 
to increases in US defence spending, including Reagan‘s strategic modernisation plan, 
which was to cost $180 billion over a six-year period.
20
 This opposition coalesced into a 
challenge to the president‘s basing plans for the long-troubled MX missile. Debates over 
how to base this missile pre-dated the Reagan presidency but his various early proposals 
faced resistance in Congress. Congress rejected Reagan‘s multiple MX proposals and in 
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December 1982 the House voted 245-176 in favour of dropping all spending on MX 
missile production from the military budget.
21
 This vote represented a public show of no 
confidence in the Reagan defence spending agenda and administration officials interpreted 
it as a sign that the White House was losing public legitimacy on a strategic policy that, as 
Donald Baucom says, was ‗in disarray‘.22  
Changes within the first Reagan administration also facilitated later movement on 
nuclear arms control issues with the Soviet Union, although there remained differences on 
foreign policy within the administration throughout Reagan‘s two terms. Firstly, George 
Shultz replaced Alexander Haig as Secretary of State in 1982. Shultz was in favour of 
increasing dialogue with Moscow and, importantly, slowly began to get access to Reagan 
to promote this view.
23
 Moreover, when in October 1983 Robert McFarlane became NSA, 
he replaced one of the more hard-line administration members, Bill Clark, thereby giving 
Shultz more direct and frequent access to the president.
24
  
A further pressure on Reagan to engage with the Soviet Union on nuclear issues (or 
at least to be seen to be doing so) came from his campaign for re-election in 1984. Reagan 
was doing well in public polling on domestic and economic issues, and had a job approval 
rating of 53% by early 1984.
25
 However, Reagan‘s bellicose rhetoric throughout his first 
term with regard to the Soviet Union and his apparent inflexibility on nuclear arms control 
were dragging his approval rating down in national surveys. As Reagan‘s pollster and 
friend Richard Wirthlin later wrote,  
[s]ome Americans do become nervous when his rhetoric and positioning become 
more confrontational. The Evil Empire speech, his limited nuclear war statement 
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and his August 1984 comment [a joke about the bombing of Russia beginning in 
five minutes], for example, all have put some Americans‘ teeth on edge.26  
In a memorandum drafted in late September 1983, Wirthlin suggested that ‗a year from 
now the claim that the Reagan administration has maintained the peace would be fortified 
if we could show some progress in negotiating an arms settlement.‘27  
The growing domestic pressures on the US government to negotiate were 
reinforced by pressure from US allies in Western Europe linked to specific nuclear 
weapons issues. In 1979, NATO had decided to deploy US Cruise and Pershing 2 missiles 
on the territory of key NATO states to counter the threat from the Soviet Union‘s SS-20 
intermediate range missiles and strengthen US nuclear reassurance of its West-European 
allies (so-called ‗coupling‘). This was a particularly sensitive issue for those West-
European members of NATO that had agreed to their deployment. Both British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl were worried that 
deployment without at least the show of a more accommodating offer on INF to the Soviet 
Union would result in European protests ‗strong enough‘ as Fitzgerald states, ‗to topple 
West European governments and shake the foundations of NATO.‘28  
The administration also received pushback from Europe on the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI), the Reagan administration‘s plan to place nuclear defences in space. The 
implications of SDI for the effectiveness of the British and French national nuclear 
deterrents, US extended deterrence, and the ABM Treaty, long a cornerstone of the concept 
of a détente that had survived longer in Europe than in the United States, worried European 
leaders.
29
 A White House internal communication acknowledged that ‗[i]n Europe all four 
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political elements, i.e., public opinion, media opinion, parliamentary opinion, and most of 
government opinion are against SDI‘.30  
These specific areas of disquiet were part of a wider European public feeling that 
the United States and Ronald Reagan in particular were simply not interested in pursuing 
arms control with the Soviet Union. Hundreds of thousands of people took part in 
demonstrations against nuclear weapons on the streets of various European and the tone of 
the protests was described by Strobe Talbott as ‗more anti-American than anti-Soviet‘.31 In 
a memorandum to Clark and McFarlane, NSC staffer Mort Allen expressed concern that  
the prevailing view here and abroad that RR is not serious about arms control, 
won‘t compromise, that the policy is in disarray with major splits in the 
administration...the Soviets have stolen the peace initiative from RR and are 
pounding us in the propaganda war. 
A handwritten note on the memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public 
Affairs Bob Sims described it as ‗an excellent review of the problem‘.32 The strength of 
popular feeling in Europe and the thought of losing sympathetic leaders in the United 
Kingdom and West Germany were significant concerns for the administration that even 
eclipsed concerns about US public opinion.
33
  
The White House considered these varying political pressures as important in how 
it would publicly deal with the issue of nuclear arms control and foreign policy as the 
Reagan presidency progressed. Reagan was compelled to negotiate between these concerns 
and to address them publicly as he came towards the end of his first term and continued 
into the second. The following sections of the chapter will show how he attempted this 
partly through talking about these issues with regard to a particular, context bound 
meaning for trust. It will illustrate how Reagan used a specific meaning for trust that was 
intimately bound up in his political persona, the political context and US political culture 
and that had been a longstanding feature of his domestic rhetoric in order to publicly 
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negotiate the demands of foreign policy in a nuclear era and the changing US relationship 
with the Soviet Union.  
 
Trust, US political culture and the American jeremiad 
While there was little movement or accommodation on arms control issues between the 
United States and the Soviet Union in the years before 1985, Reagan had always talked 
about trust throughout his political career. Reagan‘s grammar of trust included words such 
as ‗freedom‘, ‗people‘, ‗liberty‘, ‗democracy‘ and ‗faith‘, and he closely associated himself 
with a particular meaning for trust that was connected to traditional and conservative 
American values. This section of the chapter will outline the meaning for trust that Reagan 
invoked. It will illustrate its place in his general political vocabulary and show how the 
context of Reagan‘s presidency in the political culture and contemporary political context 
of the United States shaped this particular meaning for trust.  
Reagan‘s political strengths of perceived trustworthiness and strong personal values 
informed his meaning for trust, but it was also shaped by the context within which Reagan 
ascended to the presidency. Dilys M. Hill and Phil Williams have described the US 
public‘s perception of the 1970s as ‗a decade in which the United States had lost a war, in 
which the presidency had been discredited and in which there was a general sense of 
malaise and decline.‘34 As with Richard Nixon, this context informed how the president 
was able to make use of the language of trust, and Reagan‘s trust, with its inherent 
confidence, found a receptive audience with the American public. 
Reagan came into office after a period of disillusionment with politicians and the 
political system and a more antagonistic relationship between the White House and the 
media post-Watergate and Vietnam.
35
 By the time of the 1980 presidential election, high 
inflation, unemployment, petrol shortages and perceived foreign policy embarrassments 
such as the ongoing Iranian hostage situation had all contributed to what President Carter 
had (perhaps misguidedly) labelled a ‗crisis of confidence‘ in July of 1979.36 President 
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Carter had made the mistake of speaking about the limits of American power to a public 
that, according to Phil Williams, ‗were simply unwilling to accept that American foreign 
policy had to operate in an age of limits.‘37 It was thus an opportune time for a politician 
who could convincingly speak of optimism, American greatness and trust. Reagan often 
therefore publicly contrasted himself with the leaders ‗back in the late seventies‘ a time 
when ‗we‘d lost respect overseas, and we no longer trusted our leaders to defend peace and 
freedom‘.38  
In contrast to these past leaders, Reagan presented himself as a president who could 
revive traditional American values and dismantle this public perception of stagnation, and 
as a President who simply refused the idea of any limits on American power. His chief 
political selling point was his outsider status, which fit well with the US political ideals of 
liberty and rugged individualism. He had positioned himself in his first political campaign 
for Governor of California as ‗the outsider‘ and, even after two terms in Sacramento and 
two terms in the White House, was able to retain this aura of otherness to Washington and 
to government. Reagan was not just able to relate himself to the American everyman but 
with the idea of America as a whole, as an embodiment of American values and morals. He 
thus presented himself to the US public as both ‗one of us‘ and ‗all of us‘. An example of 
this can be seen in the television coverage of his 1981 inaugural address, the first to be held 
on the west steps of the Capitol looking out onto the National Mall, which was intercut 
with images of the stone monuments to America‘s greatness and unique destiny in the 
world. According to Jamieson, Reagan was able to credibly inhabit the role of ‗national 
narrator‘, and in this role could tell the story of America and make it also the story of 
Ronald Reagan in a way that many others have tried both before and since, though few 
with such success.
39
 
President Reagan‘s presentation of himself as the embodiment of all that was great 
about the United States was enhanced by what Kurt Ritter and David Green described as 
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his ‗pastoral‘ style of speaking.40 His speeches were often about everyday American 
people and traditional values and were told in the form of fables and anecdotes. The 
overarching theme was that of optimism and America‘s destiny. It was a secular jeremiad 
of the American people, who had been chosen to play a unique role in the world and 
therefore possessed unique characteristics. This rhetoric tapped into a deep historical link 
between US political culture and religious language, specifically the ideas of the Puritans 
which ‗derived from this tradition‘, according to Werner Schmidt, ‗a sense of uniqueness, a 
conviction of being a land of manifest destiny, invested with a higher morality than other 
nations and hence bound to its mission.‘41 
Reagan also made use of narratives of damnation and salvation taken from this 
religious tradition. He habitually spoke about the apocalypse and his often biblically 
inspired rhetoric was full of Christian-based images of evil and threats to America.
42
 
However, the overall message was one of optimism. As long as America did not stray too 
far from its traditional ideals as a conservative, Christian nation of free individuals, the end 
would be victory and salvation rather than destruction.
43
 In the struggle of American values 
against those of communism there would only ever be one winner. This preternaturally 
optimistic attitude can be seen in an excerpt from a commencement address that Reagan 
gave at Notre Dame University in May 1981: 
The years ahead are great ones for this country, for the cause of freedom and the 
spread of civilization. The West won't contain communism, it will transcend 
communism. It won't bother to dismiss or denounce it, it will dismiss it as some 
bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written.
44
  
This type of political rhetoric had developed from what was known as ‗The 
Speech‘. This was an address Reagan had given hundreds of times around the country 
during his time as a corporate spokesperson for General Electric (GE), and that had first 
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been exhibited to a national audience during a paid televised broadcast as part of Barry 
Goldwater‘s unsuccessful 1964 presidential campaign.45 This speech warned against the 
dangers of communism, ‗the most evil enemy mankind has known‘, as well as the menace 
of big government‘s mission to interfere with American life and freedoms.46 Reagan linked 
these dangers together as the terrible, twin enemies of America.  
This language was not unusual in US Cold War rhetoric of course, but Reagan was 
a master of the form, with years of practice as an actor and giving the speech to multiple 
audiences for GE. He was able to credibly inhabit the role of the everyday American in 
opposition to the double socialist peril of the Soviet Union and the encroachment of big 
government, what Wills has characterised as the ‗slow invisible tide of socialism [that] was 
engulfing America.‘47 Reagan portrayed himself as a ‗citizen politician‘, the people‘s 
representative in Washington who, as Fitzgerald describes, ‗ran for office to restore 
common sense and common decency to a government which had grown too big, too 
complex and too far removed from the concerns of average Americans.‘48 He had not 
travelled abroad much and had little foreign policy experience, but he used this very 
provincialism as a way to bond with other ordinary Americans.
49
 He reinforced this image 
in the form of his public speech, which was mostly plain and informal and thus emphasised 
the everyman assertions of its content.
50
  
The meaning for trust that Reagan would eventually use to great effect in the 
process of nuclear arms negotiations with the Soviet Union was thus shaped by this 
contemporary post-Vietnam and post-Watergate political context, US political culture with 
its historical links to puritan religious speech and Reagan‘s ability to place himself within 
that culture as ‗the American everyman‘. As president, Reagan‘s speech was primed to 
take advantage of both his association with the American people and perceived good 
character and trustworthiness, and his meaning for trust in public speech was a reflection 
of this. 
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When Reagan spoke of trust it was, therefore, most often in relations to words such 
as ‗freedom‘, ‗people‘, ‗liberty‘, ‗democracy‘ and ‗faith‘. This was Reagan‘s grammar of 
trust, one that was linked to the values of conservative America. Reagan‘s trust was 
therefore a traditionally ‗American‘ concept. His most repeated saying regarding trust was 
not the famous and often repeated ‗trust but verify‘, but rather ‗trust the people‘.51 He 
made prominent use of the idea of ‗trust the people‘ throughout his time in office, and in 
his speeches he often distinguished between the natural trustworthiness of the ordinary 
person and the untrustworthiness and injurious nature of big government. In a typical 
address in 1984, he suggested that ‗the doom-criers will always be with us. And they'll 
always be wrong about America until they realize progress begins with trusting the 
people.‘52 He would declare that it was ‗time to put trust back in the hands of the people‘,53 
and repeatedly claimed that in his administration, ‗[o]ur whole impulse, in all our policies, 
in all of our administration comes down to this: Trust the people. And we do.‘54  
Crucially, in doing this he made two clear distinctions. Firstly, that this idea of 
trusting the people was a uniquely and innately American ideal. This can be seen in several 
of Reagan‘s speeches in which he made statements such as ‗[t]rust the people—this is the 
crucial lesson of history and America's message to the world‘, 55 and ‗America has a secret 
weapon; it‘s called ―trust the people.‖‘56  
Secondly, he implied that the United States had moved away from this American 
ideal in recent years and it would be his role to bring the country back to its promise of 
putting trust in the people. Reagan was different from what Mike Deaver labelled in a 
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campaign memorandum as the ‗four failed presidencies in a row‘ that had preceded him.57 
Unlike more recent leaders who had moved the country away from its destiny, he would 
put the nation back on track to fulfilling the promise of American greatness. This was 
because, as Reagan claimed in a national radio address, what he represented was 
‗leadership that trusts in you and the power of your dreams‘.58 Reagan contrasted this with 
his opponent in the election. On several occasions he told his audiences that Mondale had 
recently spoken of trust, 
‗‗Trust me,‘‘ he said. Well, the last time we trusted his administration, they took 
five—count ‗em—five economic plans and nearly tripled inflation. Now, by 
contrast, we trusted the people, and with just one economic program, we cut 
inflation by two-thirds.
59
  
In another speech, Reagan claimed that the economic problems of the late 1970s were 
‗brought about by government leaders who for too long were afraid to trust the American 
people‘.60 
Reagan did not ask the people to trust him as his opponent had; he simply wanted 
them to trust in themselves. ‗We don't ask the people to trust us‘, he declared at a 
fundraising dinner in 1983, ‗we say trust yourselves, trust your own values, and working 
together, we'll make America great again.‘61 This implied that President Reagan had no 
need to make this request, because he already possessed the trust of the people, implicitly 
and effortlessly. Of course, at its heart Reagan‘s request was for trust, but it was a much 
more subtle and effective one than Walter Mondale‘s ‗trust me‘, or Richard Nixon‘s ‗trust 
the president‘ as discussed in the previous chapter. What Reagan did was associate the idea 
of ‗trust the people‘ as an inherently good and American trait, and then associate himself as 
both the representative of the people (who were naturally trustworthy) and of the American 
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values on which this trust was founded. By accepting any of these connections, voters 
would then find it difficult to separate trusting America and trusting themselves from 
trusting Reagan. 
 
‗Trust the people‘ as a presidential campaign 
A clear example of this strategy can be seen in the Reagan campaign for re-election in 
1984. This campaign was not about policy; it was, as Williams suggests, ‗short on specifics 
and long on fuzzy thematics‘.62 In a campaign memo, aide Richard Darmen suggested this 
approach:  
Paint Reagan as the personification of all that is right with, or heroized by, 
America. Leave [former Vice-President and Democratic presidential candidate 
Walter] Mondale in a position where an attack on Reagan is tantamount to an 
attack on America‘s idealized image of itself-where a vote against Reagan is, in 
some subliminal sense, a vote against a mythic AMERICA.
63
  
The campaign was able to accomplish this because Reagan had long worked to identify 
himself with all that was good about America. The campaign communications placed 
emphasis on the president as ‗a trusted, competent caring leader who gets things done.‘64 A 
document setting out the key themes for the election highlighted that ‗Ronald Reagan has 
restored America‘s faith in itself‘, and ‗Americans today have a leader they can respect and 
admire with trust in his instinct and judgement.‘65  
The Reagan campaign therefore placed a great emphasis on trust. As Ed Rollins, 
National Campaign Director for the Reagan-Bush 1984 campaign, noted, 
[e]very poll I saw in 1983 found that people wanted a leader they could trust. More 
to the point, they already believed Ronald Reagan was the political rarity who lived 
up to that billing. That‘s why we developed a simple campaign theme and made it 
our driving slogan: Leadership you can Trust. It proved remarkably successful; 
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when we asked Reagan voters after the election why they‘d voted for him, 85 
percent said it was because he was a leader they trusted to do the right thing.
66
  
Dick Wirthlin‘s polling, conducted over several months in late 1983, also showed similar 
high numbers of people valued Reagan‘s trustworthiness. When asked if they agreed or 
disagreed with the phrase ‗Ronald Reagan can‘t be trusted to do the right thing under 
pressure [emphasis added]‘ in a series of polls, between 67% to 71% of respondents 
disagreed.
67
 In fact, what worried Gergen, Wirthlin and others about Reagan‘s negatives on 
nuclear weapons and his belligerent position towards the Soviet Union in his first term was 
not that people disagreed with his stance, but that the aggressive rhetoric was causing his 
traditional strengths of leadership and trustworthiness to slip in polling because it was 
tarnishing the Reagan brand.
68
  
 
‘Trust the people’ and the imperatives of nuclear politics 
Reagan linked this particular vision of trust and the problem of nuclear weapons in his 
speech, adapting his meaning for trust as ‗trust the people‘ with its inbuilt ideology to the 
realm of nuclear politics. For Reagan, not only was the problem of the nuclear age a 
problem of trust, but his use of trust was one unique to the age and to his specific response 
to the imperatives of the nuclear revolution in the international realm. Reagan expressed 
this through conceptualising nuclear weapons as the outcome of a lack of trust in the 
international realm rather than the generator of a lack of trust in the international realm. 
The weapons themselves were therefore not the problem; it was the underlying lack of trust 
between states that had created the problem of nuclear weapons and that needed to be 
addressed prior to action on nuclear arms. Nuclear weapons were a result of the inability of 
states to trust each other and this inability was linked to the actions of the Soviet Union. 
What this meant was that the Soviet Union would need to prove that it was 
trustworthy before becoming a partner in arms control, thus placing a set of implicit 
preconditions on any potential action taken on nuclear weapons by the United States. 
Because the word ‗trust‘ for Reagan meant the particular type of trust as an American 
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value, as ‗trust the people‘, for the Soviet Union to be ‗trustworthy‘ it would need to 
demonstrate a particularly American vision of trust. The following sections of the chapter 
will illustrate how the Reagan administration used the language of trust to advance a 
particular understanding of international politics in the nuclear age, and how they used this 
understanding of politics to achieve certain policy goals by linking trust and nuclear 
weapons in a specific manner. 
 
Reagan‘s use of trust regarding nuclear arms 
Throughout Reagan‘s first term, the administration‘s public declarations of its strategy on 
nuclear weapons were often confused and contradictory. The message coming from the 
White House reflected the internal differences on policy, according to Mehan et al, the 
administration ‗had neither a coherent nor a politically viable nuclear weapons 
strategy...the Administration talked about coupling deterrence with fighting and winning a 
nuclear war while claiming nuclear war must never be fought.‘69 Reagan‘s aim was to 
maintain support for his increased defence spending plans, but there was little coherence in 
how he expressed this message. Some of his rhetoric indicated that fighting a nuclear war 
was an option that he did not consider to be unimaginable, yet his introduction of the 
concept of the SDI in a speech on March 23 1983 and the accompanying administration 
statements on strategic defence, completely questioned the morality of the logic of nuclear 
deterrence.
70
 
However, as outlined above, during Reagan‘s second term he began to engage 
further with the Soviet Union on issues of arms control. Reagan also began to increasingly 
emphasise the importance of trust in the international. This emphasis on trust in the 
international connected with Reagan‘s escalating rhetoric in prominent foreign policy 
addresses on the damaging nature of mistrust within the superpower nuclear rivalry. In an 
interview in October 1985, Reagan for the first time used a quote that would become a 
regular feature of his speech regarding the Soviet Union: 
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I have a little thing here that I copied out of an article the other day, and the author 
of the article uttered a very great truth: ‗‗Nations do not distrust each other because 
they are armed. They arm themselves because they distrust each other.‘‘ Well, I 
hope that in the summit maybe we can find ways that we can prove by deed—not 
just words, but by deeds—that there is no need for distrust between us.71  
He then explained that the means to reduce this distrust was through ‗better 
communication, more contact, and close attention to make sure both parties fulfil 
agreements reached.‘72 In another interview before the Geneva Summit in November, 
Reagan again identified the ‗distrust that causes the problems and causes the situation with 
regard to nuclear arms negotiations‘.73 
Reagan thus began to make use of this particular meaning for trust in order to 
achieve political gains in the international realm and specifically in nuclear arms control. 
He used this language of trust in two different but overlapping ways in relation to nuclear 
arms control and the Soviet Union, initially regarding the Soviet Union‘s compliance with 
previous arms control treaties and subsequently regarding its record on human rights. Both 
had the same ultimate goal of maintaining political support for the Reagan administration 
while undermining Soviet legitimacy as a partner in negotiations, but the specific policy 
target changed over time. From 1985 through much of 1986, Reagan most often associated 
trust in the international realm with Soviet compliance, or more specifically Soviet non-
compliance, with existing international treaties. During this period, the White House 
repeatedly accused the Soviet Union of being an untrustworthy partner in arms control 
because of violations of existing agreements. 
As Reagan prepared to meet General Secretary Gorbachev for the first time at the 
Geneva Summit in late November 1985, he began his speech to the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) in October with a recollection of the innocent ‗dreams of trust‘ 
that had ‗been shattered‘ over the past 40 years. Reagan then explained that the existence 
of mistrust was largely due to the many Soviet violations of current international treaties. 
He continued, 
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[a]nd therefore, at Geneva we must review the reasons for the current level of 
mistrust. For example, in 1972 the international community negotiated in good faith 
a ban on biological and toxin weapons; in 1975 we negotiated the Helsinki accords 
on human rights and freedoms; and during the decade just past, the United States 
and the Soviet Union negotiated several agreements on strategic weapons. And yet 
we feel it will be necessary at Geneva to discuss with the Soviet Union what we 
believe are violations of a number of the provisions in all of these agreements.
74
  
In a speech in December after the summit, he once again brought up the idea of 
distrust inhibiting arms control saying, 
as long as we distrust to the point that there are restrictions on whether you can go 
in and verify what the other fellow is doing, then you're going to have to be 
suspicious and believe that those restrictions are based on a desire to not keep the 
agreement.
75
  
In fact, treaty compliance had not been a particularly controversial issue previous to 
the Reagan administration and several compliance issues within the SALT provisions had 
been raised and dealt with throughout the 1970s in the Standing Consultative Commission 
(SCC), the US-Soviet institutional framework set up in 1971 by the SALT provisions to 
deal with these issues.
76
 However, by the mid-1980s the deteriorating political relationship 
meant that compliance issues were no longer dealt with through the SCC framework, 
which had lost its purpose as the United States and the Soviet Union instead made tit-for-
tat accusations in public. This change, claims Joseph Nye, ‗allowed groups opposed to the 
arms control regime to turn these peripheral questions [of alleged Soviet violations] into 
central issues, which were used as a litmus test of Soviet reputation and intentions.‘77 By 
dealing with issues of noncompliance in the public domain rather than through the SCC 
framework, President Reagan could use any alleged violations to justify other actions that 
he might have take to ensure US safety, which included new spending on defence 
programmes.
78
 These actions included the President‘s decisions regarding the policy of 
interim restraint throughout 1985 and 1986, which he placed within a framework of Soviet 
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untrustworthiness and noncompliance with existing arms control treaties. The following 
section will illustrate how Reagan used this connection between his particular, contextual 
trust and nuclear weapons in the public debate over the administration‘s policy of interim 
restraint regarding voluntary adherence to the unratified SALT II Treaty. 
 
Trust and interim restraint 
Although the US Senate had never ratified the SALT II Treaty, in 1980 President Carter 
declared that the United States would abide by the unratified treaty if the Soviet Union 
reciprocated, and then General Secretary of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev concurred with 
this declaration. In May 1982, President Reagan announced that he would maintain the 
policy of interim restraint if the Soviet Union continued to show equal restraint.
79
  
To a certain extent, this policy provided a win-win situation for the Reagan 
administration early in its first term. Abiding by the limitations of the unratified treaty 
provided some high moral ground for an administration that was vulnerable on issues of 
arms control, while not actually being of any detriment to their strategic policy. In a 
memorandum to the President sent on 3 June 1985, McFarlane described US adherence to 
SALT limits up to that date as ‗fairly painless‘, stating that that policy prior to 1985 had 
‗restricted US military systems only marginally and required the dismantling only of 
relatively aging systems such as the Titan ICBM and the older Polaris submarines that had 
reached the end of their useful life.‘ However, the introduction of new Trident submarines 
in September 1985, the addition of new Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM) onto 
existing B-52‘s and the planned MX and Midgetman ICBMs would soon change this 
situation. McFarlane acknowledged that with these proposed additions, continuing the 
policy of restraint into the following year could ‗become militarily more painful‘.80  
More pressing than the military reasons to reconsider the policy of interim restraint 
were growing political incentives. In a National Security Planning Group (NSPG) meeting 
in March 1986, the Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Admiral William J. Crowe 
stated that although they had some military preferences, ‗at the bottom line, the JCS view 
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this decision as a political judgement call.‘81 McFarlane described Congress as ‗sharply 
divided‘ on the issue.82 The White House was under pressure from several conservatives in 
the House and Senate who objected to the policy of adherence, arguing that the Soviet 
Union had not shown the necessary reciprocity. This group had been increasingly vocal in 
their criticism since the 1982 announcement, sending several letters to the president and 
requesting a White House report on Soviet Union compliance with existing arms control 
treaties.
83
 In December 1983 the independent General Advisory Committee on Arms 
Control and Disarmament (GAC) also submitted a classified report on Soviet violations of 
existing arms control treaties. Hard-liners in Congress lobbied for the publication of this 
report, amending the Defense Act of 1984 to require additional publication of an 
unclassified version.
84
  
In response to this pressure, on 23 January 1984 Reagan released a ‗Message to the 
Congress Transmitting a Report and a Fact Sheet on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms 
Control Agreements‘, describing the seven cases of Soviet noncompliance that he 
considered to be a ‗serious problem‘.85 Reagan had also introduced the theme of Soviet 
noncompliance in a speech on US-Soviet relations on 16 January just prior to the release of 
the report. ‗In recent years we've had serious concerns about Soviet compliance with 
agreements and treaties‘, he stated. ‗We must take the Soviet compliance record into 
account, both in the development of our defense program and in our approach to arms 
control.‘86  
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By 1985 conservative Senators were threatening to introduce legislation that would 
stop funding for the destruction of any weapons in order to remain within SALT limits.
87
 
However, bowing to pressure from this right-wing congressional faction by exceeding the 
unratified treaty limits would bring its own political difficulties. There were vocal 
proponents of the interim restraint policy in Congress and the administration was aware of 
the difficulties that abandoning the policy would entail, particularly regarding public 
opinion in Europe. In an NSC meeting on the topic in June 1985, McFarlane acknowledged 
the importance of the ‗intangible political framework vis-a-vis our Allies, the Geneva 
negotiations and with regard to sustaining defense programs in Congress‘.88 As mentioned 
earlier, Western European public opinion was a serious concern for the administration. The 
White House was highly conscious of the delicacy of scrapping the policy of interim 
restraint, and the public damage that could result from any change in its policy. Shultz 
reported back from a meeting with European foreign ministers in June 1985 that all were 
‗worried about the impact dropping SALT constraints would have on the Geneva 
negotiations and, more important [sic] on public attitudes.‘ One foreign minister whose 
name is redacted in the paper added that giving up on SALT II ‗would have a devastating 
effect‘.89 This was also an issue the Reagan administration felt that the Soviet Union were 
keen to use for their advantage in public diplomacy efforts. A memorandum on Soviet 
media commentary and interim restraint declared it to be a ‗constant topic in Soviet 
internal and external propaganda‘.90  
Conscious of this dissent, Reagan decided to delay any decision on interim restraint 
and announced that one aging Poseidon submarine would be dismantled that year, keeping 
the United States within the treaty provisions in the short-term. However, he neglected to 
affirm whether or not the US would continue to abide by the provisions in coming years 
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and after the treaty would have been due to expire in December of 1985.
91
 As was typical 
in the Reagan White House, opinion was divided on the issue with Secretary of Defense 
Caspar Weinberger and other hardliners advocating breaking out of the treaty while Shultz 
advised continuing the current policy.
92
 As a final decision would have to be taken at some 
point, this was in essence a procrastination tactic. Indeed, the New York Times described it 
at the time as ‗the posture of half a leg over the fence‘.93  
The administration recognised the issue of Soviet noncompliance (and therefore 
untrustworthiness) as a useful counterpoint for both the domestic and international debate 
on the subject. Basing the justification for potentially ending the policy of interim restraint 
on the alleged noncompliance of the Soviet Union would portray any failure to adhere to 
SALT limits in a more positive light internationally, while providing an argument for 
increased defence spending on the Hill.
94
 In an NSC meeting in June 1985, Shultz 
acknowledged the potential value of public perceptions of Soviet noncompliance within 
the congressional debate in defence spending. He stated that the administration needed to 
‗figure out how to get mileage out of these types of Soviet violations [the Krasnoyarsk 
radar] in terms of realizing out strategic force modernization program.‘95 McFarlane‘s 
memorandum to the President echoed this sentiment, stating that most agencies had 
proposed using the opportunity of any Soviet violations to seek ‗additional support, 
including possible extra funds, for US military programs from the Congress.‘96  
During late 1985 and early 1986, the administration thus increased its focus on the 
issue of Soviet noncompliance with existing international treaties and linked this to the 
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idea of the need for trust in the superpower relationship.
97
 References to Soviet violations 
of existing agreements and accusations of Soviet cheating increased greatly throughout this 
period. According to Keith Shimko, Weinberger cited Soviet treaty violations four times in 
speeches in the period 1981-1983 and 48 times in the following three years. Weinberger‘s 
public declarations during this time emphasised the ‗long history of Soviet violations‘ and 
claimed that ‗if they want to violate something, they will violate it‘, therefore, ‗you can‘t 
trust [the Soviets] unless you have absolute verification.‘ 98 
Similarly, Shultz made no public mention of any Soviet treaty violations in the 
period before 1984, but 40 in the subsequent three years.
99
 References to Soviet treaty 
violations also peaked in the president‘s speeches at this time, from two mentions in 1984, 
to seven in 1985 and twenty in 1986.
100
 Public relations guidance for agency officials 
during this time included the importance of highlighting the ‗need to establish greater 
mutual trust through strict compliance with international obligations freely taken in our 
many bilateral and multilateral agreements.‘101 
This claim for the importance of trust within the nuclear relationship complemented 
Reagan‘s political language of character, values and faith, while also maintaining a 
positive message that was suited to Reagan‘s political strengths. Distrust existed but it 
could be overcome and a higher goal of world peace was attainable. Reagan highlighted 
the importance of a lack of trust in the US towards the Soviet Union and linked this to the 
issue of compliance with treaties, but the message was not overwhelmingly negative or 
explicitly condemnatory. That was left to other administration officials who were tasked 
with publicly playing the role of bad cop in order to mediate between the demands of 
differing domestic constituencies as the relationship with the Soviet Union evolved.  
The strategy of contrasting Reagan‘s relatively positive rhetoric with harsher 
language from other administration figures can be seen in the original January 1984 speech 
on the issue of Soviet non-compliance prior to the release of the first administration report. 
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His language in this speech, while conceding the problems of Soviet violations, remained 
hopeful and contrasted with the subsequent release of the more hard-line report, what 
Garthoff describes as ‗the ‗juxtaposition of the ―soft‖ speech and the ―hard‖ 
noncompliance report‘ that provided Reagan with a political advantage when dealing with 
conflicting political pressures on the issue.
102
 In fact, Reagan‘s Director of Speechwriting 
Ben Elliott proposed this strategy in a memorandum to Director of Communications 
Patrick Buchanan that outlined a plan for the UNGA speech quoted above. Elliott 
suggested acknowledging that the ‗relationship between U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. is very bad, 
hampered by mistrust and lack of understanding on both sides‘, but that ‗for our part, 
Americans can only feel their suspicions are well-founded.‘ Therefore what was needed 
was a ‗long term program...to lay a foundation of trust between us‘ that would include 
increasing communication, travel and trade. ‗The beauty of this idea‘ concluded Elliot, ‗is 
that it permits the President to go forward with a positive idea...while at the same time 
hitting the Soviets where they are most vulnerable, uncomfortable and defensive.‘103  
While Reagan had managed to defer a final decision on interim restraint for a time, 
he could not avoid it indefinitely and in 1986 the problem presented itself again. The 
United States expected to exceed SALT II limits in May or June of that year when an 
eighth Trident submarine would begin sea trials. Reagan was worried about passing his 
defence budget through Congress and of the possibility of a Senate resolution calling on 
the president to remain within SALT limits, and there had been some press coverage 
criticising the Administration‘s exaggeration and use of Soviet noncompliance for political 
ends.
104
 
In March and April 1986, Reagan held a series of NSPG meetings on the topic 
where all present acknowledged the importance of the emphasis on Soviet noncompliance. 
Admiral Crowe described the situation as ‗a chess game between the Allies, the Soviets, 
etc.‘ adding that he wanted to ensure the president was ‗in the best position to get the 
money he needs on the hill.‘ Crowe reflected that ‗[a]s long as the Soviets are in violation 
we are forced to take whatever steps are needed‘. The Director of the CIA William Casey 
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added ‗we need to get the message out that if there is no compliance then there will be no 
sustained treaty. We are winning because we are calling the Soviets on their 
transgressions.‘ ACDA Director Kenneth Adelman also recognised the success of the focus 
on Soviet violations noting ‗the US can take a measure of pride in that we have called out 
Soviet violations and these are now widely accepted.‘ 105 
Although the administration considered its focus on the issue of noncompliance to 
have been a successful strategy overall, there were still worries in the White House as to 
the consequences of announcing a complete withdrawal from the SALT limits. In a further 
NSPG meeting Meese acknowledged the primary focus of the White House‘s concern, 
stating that ‗[o]ur audience must be congress and the Allies‘. Shultz agreed that a 
‗flamboyant announcement to break numerical SALT limits is unwise. It will hand the 
Soviets a propaganda windfall...such a step will cause us problems with the alliance.‘106 
These concerns led to the equivocal language adopted by the president when he finally 
announced his decision on interim restraint on 27 May. Reagan stated that he had, 
determined that in the future the United States must base decisions regarding its 
strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet 
strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT structure, which has 
been undermined by Soviet noncompliance.
107
  
However, he added that because the US would dismantle two Poseidon submarines, ‗we 
will remain in technical compliance with the terms of the expired SALT II treaty for some 
months‘ and that he continued ‗to hope that the Soviet Union will use this time to take the 
constructive steps necessary to alter the current situation. Should they do so, we will 
certainly take this into account.‘108  
The president‘s statement actually provoked conflicting newspaper reports about 
what the administration had decided to do. The Washington Post ran a story with the 
headline ‗Compliance with SALT Continued‘ while the New York Times led with the story 
of continued adherence in its first edition but changed to a focus on breaking with the 
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treaty in its second.
109
 The confusion was such that, even two weeks later the press were 
still looking for clarification. On 12 June reporters raised the issue with the president again 
after Press Secretary Larry Speakes had declared the treaty ‗dead‘. In response to a reporter 
following up on this quote by asking ‗[w]hy won‘t you say it when your spokesman's been 
saying it very flatly to us. We need it from you. Is it dead or isn‘t it?‘ Reagan eventually 
replied, ‗I think you can trust what Larry Speakes said to you.‘110 This would be as close as 
the president got to a definitive contemporary public pronouncement on a decision that the 
White House did not want heavily publicised.
111
 
By incorporating the administration‘s decision on interim restraint into the wider 
language on trust and the nuclear weapons in the international realm, Reagan had been able 
to frame the debate as a question of Soviet trustworthiness rather than US policy. The 
following chapter section will demonstrate how, as the debate on interim restraint receded, 
the administration changed the focus of their speech on the relationship between trust and 
nuclear weapons in the international realm to focus on the issue of human rights.  
 
Trust, arms control and human rights 
As the administration was quite happy to let the issue of treaty adherence and compliance 
fade into the background at this point, the way in which it talked about trusting the Soviet 
Union became less tied to issues of cheating and noncompliance. Reagan instead began to 
give more prominence to the link between trustworthiness of the Soviet Union and its 
performance on human rights issues. 
Reagan once again linked the problem of trust and the problem of nuclear weapons, 
linking the problem of nuclear trust to questions of human rights. Once again the Soviet 
Union would need to prove that is was trustworthy in order to ameliorate the issue of 
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mistrust in the international realm that was responsible for the problem of nuclear 
weapons. Reagan talked of the concept of human rights in relation to freedom and to his 
meaning for trust as ‗trust the people‘ by frequently repeating variants of the phrase ‗a 
country that distrusts its own people cannot be trusted‘. Through this characterisation 
Reagan portrayed the Soviet Union as inherently untrustworthy because it did not trust its 
own people. If one accepted this description, the onus would always be on the Soviet 
Union to prove its trustworthiness through action, or continue to be responsible for the 
problem of trust that resulted in nuclear weapons. This created a link between any action 
that the US might take (or fail to take) on nuclear arms or arms control and the human 
rights practices of the Soviet Union. Reagan was able to connect the issue of the Soviet 
Union‘s performance on human rights to their trustworthiness as a partner in nuclear arms 
control negotiations and spoke as though there was an intrinsic relationship between these 
two things. This link between arms control and human rights thus became a valuable way 
of answering any accusations of US intransigence in arms control negotiations. 
The strategy of using human rights as a tool of public diplomacy was not a new one 
and contests to claim the moral high ground on the issue of human rights, among other 
issues, had been a feature of the Cold War for many years.
112
 In fact, the issue is more 
usually associated with President Carter than with President Reagan.
113
 Carter attempted to 
move the foreign policy debate away somewhat from the dominant Cold War framework 
by placing the idea of human rights at the centre of his foreign policy. This attempt was not 
successful and all but abandoned by 1979. Still, in the 1980 presidential election, the 
Reagan campaign was able to successfully target Carter‘s approach to human rights as 
inconsistent and naive.
114
 The Reagan White House, in contrast, did not prioritise the issue 
of human rights outside the parameters of the superpower relationship. As Garthoff 
suggests, Reagan ‗drastically reduced attention to human rights matters for the non-
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communist (or, more precisely, the non-Soviet bloc) world‘ and his administration‘s 
‗general hard line against the Soviet system, rather than particular abuses, was equated 
with defense of human rights.‘115 In fact, early in his first term Reagan was criticised by 
several governments in international forums and by NGOs for a lack of seriousness on the 
subject.
116
  
The new administration‘s approach to human rights was influenced by Reagan 
foreign policy advisor (and later Ambassador to the United Nations) Jeane Kirkpatrick‘s 
argument, published in an article for Commentary magazine in 1979, in which she 
criticised the ‗failure of the Carter administration‘s foreign policy‘ and made a distinction 
between friendly and non-friendly states, advocating support for authoritarian regimes if it 
was necessary to combat the larger evil of totalitarianism.
117
 David Carleton and Michael 
Stohl have argued that, by identifying totalitarian regimes as those that supported the 
Soviet Union, the Reagan administration essentially equated human rights with US security 
interests, so its human rights rhetoric was ‗primarily concerned with the abuses of the 
Soviet Union and its allies and with preventing any further Soviet expansion.‘118 The 
Reagan administration thus chose to deal with human rights as a Cold War issue and 
consistently connected any mention of human rights to its relationship with the Soviet 
Union.
119
 ‗By taking a strong stand against the Soviet Union‘, claimed Reagan‘s Assistant 
Secretary of State Elliot Abrams, ‗we are dealing with the human-rights problem wholesale 
rather than retail. The Soviet Union is the center of a Communist system that is the worst 
enemy of human rights.‘120  
The issue of human rights was officially articulated as an element of Reagan‘s four-
part strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union in 1983.
121
 The administration‘s earliest 
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expression of policy towards the Soviet Union, National Security Decision Directive 
(NSDD) 75, included human rights within the ‗Political Action‘ section that stated: 
U.S. policy must have an ideological thrust which clearly affirms the superiority of 
U.S. and Western values of individual dignity and freedom, a free press, free trade 
unions, free enterprise, and political democracy over the repressive features of 
Soviet Communism. We need to review and significantly strengthen U.S. 
instruments of political action including...efforts to highlight Soviet human rights 
violations.
122
  
Within the superpower relationship, the White House recognised the notion of human 
rights as a tool to place international pressure on the Soviet Union and to encourage action 
within Eastern Europe from an early date. As the interaction between the two states 
intensified during Reagan‘s second term, so the issue of human rights grew in prominence 
too.
123
  
President Reagan had therefore been using the idea of human rights as a rhetorical 
tool in the superpower rivalry from the beginning of his first term. However, during his 
second term, as arms control became a more prominent part of his foreign policy, Reagan 
also began to tie his language about human rights concerns to trust and to connect this to 
the ongoing nuclear arms control negotiations. He publicly maintained the argument that 
nuclear weapons were a result of the distrust between nations rather than its cause, but he 
transferred the reason for this distrust away from Soviet noncompliance with existing 
international treaties that had been prominent throughout the interim restraint debate, to the 
actions the Soviet Union took to curtail the human rights of its citizens and impose its will 
on others. According to Reagan, the distrust that existed between the two superpowers in 
the area of arms control could not be alleviated until the Soviet Union changed its practices 
on human rights and halted its imperial ambitions. This was first seen in the 
aforementioned January 1984 speech, which was considered a turning point in Reagan‘s 
rhetoric towards the Soviet Union. In the speech he identified human rights as ‗[a]nother 
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major problem in our relationship with the Soviet Union‘, adding that ‗Soviet practices in 
this area, as much as any other issue, have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over 
our relationship.‘124  
After Mikhail Gorbachev‘s accession to power in March 1985, the Reagan 
administration became more anxious about winning the public relations war, especially in 
Europe and increasingly focused on the issue of Soviet human rights violations to help 
manage this. Gorbachev was proving to be much more adept than his predecessors at 
positively influencing international public opinion and, as Ambassador Max Kampelman 
admitted, ‗[g]one...were the days when the Reagan administration could rely on the Soviets 
to serve as their own worst enemies in public relations.‘125 As arms control talks resumed 
in Geneva in March 1985, the Reagan administration viewed early Soviet proposals purely 
as propaganda efforts. In October 1985, while visiting France, Gorbachev presented a new 
proposal that offered a fifty percent reduction in strategic arms. The Reagan administration 
received this with scepticism, characterising the proposal in one analysis as ‗clearly a 
propaganda attempt to put the ball in the US court.‘126 A memorandum from Shultz to the 
president on the subject described it as ‗one sided and self-serving‘ and ‗obviously 
designed for public appeal‘.127 
 In January 1986, Gorbachev publicly made a radical arms control proposal to 
abolish all nuclear weapons by the year 2000.
128
 At an NSPG meeting in February 1986, 
officials debated how to respond to Gorbachev‘s statement. Once again, they considered it 
to be a public relations ploy. Reagan‘s NSA John Poindexter described it as ‗subtle and 
clever‘ and Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Paul 
Nitze explained the move as driven by a ‗psychological need to recapture the ―high 
ground‖‘, a view which was reiterated by Chief of Staff Howard Baker who also 
acknowledged that ‗the chess game for world opinion was a central element of the present 
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policy debate‘.129 Shultz and Nitze did not consider Gorbachev‘s arms control proposals as 
serious, but rather as a ‗blockbuster‘ case of propaganda.130 In private correspondence with 
Reagan in September 1985, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher characterised 
Gorbachev as a ‗deft operator...playing western public opinion skilfully and for all its 
worth‘, adding ‗[h]is purpose is of course to set opinion in Europe against the United 
States, to give the impression that the Soviet Union is full of initiatives and original ideas 
while the United States is flat footed and unimaginative.‘131  
To contend with Gorbachev‘s diplomatic initiatives, Reagan adopted the tactic of 
placing the Soviet arms control proposals within a wider political context. The official 
public diplomacy strategy on dealing with Soviet proposals advised keeping proposals ‗in 
perspective of broader US/Soviet agenda and US emphasis on four areas of dialogue‘.132 
One way Reagan managed this was by creating a connection between the concepts of arms 
control, human rights and international trust. To refute the perception that the Soviet Union 
was willing to pursue radical arms reductions but that the United States was 
uncompromising, Reagan talked about the Soviet Union as an innately untrustworthy 
partner in arms control, thus undermining the legitimacy of any proposals they might 
make. In an October 1985 memorandum to McFarlane, NSC staffer Rodney McDaniel 
described human rights as ‗really a codeword for Soviet geopolitical world goals which are 
the central threat to peace and stability‘, adding ‗therefore human rights must be much 
more firmly and continually addressed by U.S. spokesmen.‘133  
The president talked about trust as part of the relationship between arms control 
and human rights in his speeches during the run up to the Reykjavik summit in 1986. A 
further NSC memorandum to McFarlane from McDaniel highlighted the opportunity the 
summit would provide for the administration to promote ‗its foreign policy agenda through 
an aggressive public outreach effort.‘ The memorandum further claimed that to place 
pressure on the issue of human rights at that time ‗would automatically increase 
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U.S./Western leverage over the Soviets at any future negotiating forums on any issues.‘134 
The administration continued to place a focus on this after the summit. The White house 
talking points for post-Reykjavik briefings emphasised the message that, 
[r]espect for human rights is as important to peace as arms reductions because 
peace requires trust...A country that breaks faith with its own people cannot be 
trusted to keep faith with foreign powers.
135
 
In a speech to the UNGA in New York in September, Reagan described human 
rights as ‗the indispensable element for peace, freedom, and prosperity‘ and recounted his 
conversation with Gorbachev in their meeting in Geneva the previous year.  
Mr. Gorbachev was blunt, and so was I. We came to realize again the truth of the 
statement: Nations do not mistrust each other because they are armed; they are 
armed because they mistrust each other. And I did not hesitate to tell Mr. 
Gorbachev our view of the source of that mistrust: the Soviet Union‘s record of 
seeking to impose its ideology and rule on others.
136
  
The following month, when addressing the nation on the topic of the Reykjavik Summit, 
Reagan linked the idea of peace to the issue of human rights by quoting President 
Kennedy: ‗And is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights?‘ 
Reagan added that ‗an improvement of the human condition within the Soviet Union is 
indispensable for an improvement in bilateral relations with the United States. For a 
government that will break faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with 
foreign powers.‘ He then linked this improvement to a more positive interpretation of the 
Soviet Union‘s intentions, ‗[w]hen it comes to human rights and judging Soviet intentions, 
we're all from Missouri-you got to show us.‘137 Reagan repeated this point on several 
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occasions during this period and other members of the administration reinforced it in their 
statements.
138
 
During 1987 Gorbachev made several significant concessions on arms control, 
delinking the talks on INF from the negotiations on strategic weapons in February and 
putting forward the INF double zero proposal in July. In May, NSA Frank Carlucci 
expressed his worry that the US was ‗losing the public diplomacy ground to the 
Soviets‘.139 Reagan continued to make the connection between trust and human rights in 
several variants throughout the year, mainly in speeches focused on a European audience. 
In a statement at the Venice Economic Summit Conference on East-West relations in June 
1987 he called for ‗significant and lasting progress in human rights, which is essential to 
building trust between our societies.‘140 The same month, in his famous Brandenburg Gate 
speech in West Berlin, he declared, 
we must remember a crucial fact: East and West do not mistrust each other because 
we are armed; we are armed because we mistrust each other. And our differences 
are not about weapons but about liberty.
141
  
In an address broadcast to the people of Western Europe in November, Reagan declared 
that the United States would, 
closely watch the condition of human rights within the Soviet Union. It is difficult 
to imagine that a government that continues to repress freedom in its own country, 
breaking faith with its own people, can be trusted to keep agreements with 
others.
142
  
After the Washington Summit in December, Reagan continued to talk about trust as 
related to human rights, describing that he had explained to Gorbachev in their 
conversation ‗how difficult it is for the people of the Western democracies to have trust in 
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a government that doesn‘t trust its own people and denies their human rights.‘143 Again, 
this was based on the administration‘s policy to link these issues and its continued 
assertions that ‗a country that represses its population sows mistrust abroad.‘144 In this 
manner the White House could, as Shultz stated in an Oval Office meeting, ‗hold them 
hostage on human rights‘.145 
Reagan‘s connection of the issue of human rights to the concept of the 
trustworthiness (or untrustworthiness) of the Soviet Union was a useful tool of public 
diplomacy. Reagan was able to use it to place international political pressure on Gorbachev 
to extend and deepen any reforms of the Soviet sphere and combat the Soviet leader‘s 
successful public diplomacy effort in Western Europe. This did not mean that any concern 
coming from the Reagan administration on human rights was by definition disingenuous. 
This research does not claim that President Reagan did not have any sincere concern for 
cases of human rights violations that came to his attention. In fact, the White House did 
intervene privately with Soviet representatives in many individual human rights cases, 
most notably to deal with the plight of seven Pentecostal Christians who had taken refuge 
in the US Embassy in Moscow in 1978 and had been living there ever since. President 
Reagan had pushed for their safe passage in his first meeting with Dobrynin in 1983.
146
  
However, there is an interesting contrast between the attempts to quietly resolve 
specific cases such as this and the general public denouncements. Unlike the specific cases 
such as the Pentecostal Christians, in whom Reagan privately took an interest, his speech 
on human rights and trust was not generally linked to any specific changes. Both trust and 
the idea of human rights as expressed in this rhetoric were hazy, feel-good words and both 
were malleable enough concepts to fit a general and flexible purpose. In this way, Reagan 
could tie any issues of arms control to wider political matters and keep the public‘s 
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attention on the human rights problems of the Soviet Union, rather than any perceived 
intractability on the part of the United States on specific arms control issues.  
This was an effective counter to arguments from the Soviet Union that might point 
to specific cases where they had made concessions on human rights.
147
 Framing arms 
control as connected to this general human rights-based distrust also provided a rebuttal to 
any arms control initiatives proposed by the Soviet Union while still portraying the 
President as a leader who was working for peace. Once again, as with the debate on interim 
restraint, this fitted with the US administration public relations policy regarding the Soviet 
Union that represented the President as generally ‗upbeat and hopeful‘ regarding relations 
with the Soviet Union and offered the possibility of peace and arms control, while ‗other 
US officials analyze for the press the reality of the Soviet proposals‘.148 
Because Reagan talked of the concept of human rights in relation to freedom, 
liberty and to trusting the people, by this description the Soviet Union was innately 
untrustworthy because it did not trust its own people. If one accepted this, the obligation 
would always be on the Soviet Union to prove that it was trustworthy. The great benefit of 
this use of trust was that it transcended any specific concessions that the Soviet Union 
might make, for as Reagan declared ‗trust between East and West will flourish not only 
when prisoners are released but when the instruments of repression are dismantled and 
repressive laws and practices are abolished.‘149 Until that time, ‗[h]ow can we help but 
doubt a government that mistrusts its own people and holds them against their will?‘150 
 It was in this manner that Reagan was able to use his meaning for trust to push for 
institutional changes within the Soviet system rather than focus on single issue 
concessions. A Department of State Briefing Paper articulated this strategy with regard to 
US objectives at the Vienna Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
follow up meetings. It advised staff to ‗[k]eep focus on Eastern failures to honor 
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commitments on human rights and human contacts; note progress; insist on much more; 
press for procedural and legal changes to institutionalise progress.‘151 This connection 
between trust, human rights and arms control served as useful rhetoric to justify a broad 
range of policy preferences right up until the end of the Reagan presidency. In April 1988 
Vice President Bush recorded a memorandum of conversation he had conducted with 
important Republican donor, Dwayne Andreas. Andreas had recently had a private 
conversation with Gorbachev during which Gorbachev had expressed an eagerness to meet 
with Bush after he was confirmed as Republican presidential nominee and had complained 
that it was difficult to have ‗a meaningful conversation now with anybody in the [Reagan] 
administration‘ adding, ‗[w]e don‘t get any real conversation anymore. It all starts out and 
ends on human rights.‘152 
 
Trust the technology: Reagan and the Strategic Defense Initiative 
Throughout the period in question, Reagan also made use of the language of trust in 
relation to SDI. He framed the issue of SDI as a choice about trusting the character and 
ingenuity of the American public, once again basing his appeal on a particular meaning for 
trust as ‗trust the people‘. By speaking of the SDI in this manner, Reagan could sell the 
programme as an innately American solution to nuclear vulnerability and the problem of 
trust in the international rather than having to put any trust in the arms control process. 
SDI, which Reagan described as ‗a tribute to the genius of America‘, would actually negate 
the need to trust the Soviet Union or the arms control process; one could trust the power of 
America‘s technical abilities and its determination instead.153 Technology would thus 
release the United States from the obligations of trust in a nuclear age. This rhetorical 
framing of SDI as a manifestation of the possibilities of US technology and the potential of 
American initiative was an effective message. Once again he made the link between his 
policies and the values and qualities of ‗America‘, thereby implying that any criticism of 
the viability of SDI would be a critique of the greatness and potential of the American 
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people, and once again, Reagan‘s use of trust was bound up in the political imperatives of 
the nuclear revolution. 
The Reagan White House was, in differing ways, both united and divided on the 
issue of SDI. President Reagan consistently and regularly professed his faith in SDI and 
expressed his belief that it could be a viable alternative to nuclear deterrence. According to 
Raymond Moore, ‗Reagan‘s infatuation with the Strategic Defense Initiative began early‘ 
and lasted ‗long after it became clear that there were many complications, both political 
and technical, with making SDI operable and deployable.‘154 For Reagan, SDI was the 
means to return the United States to a time before the threat of nuclear annihilation.
155
 This 
worked well with the nostalgic themes that permeated his foreign policy rhetoric.
156
  
This opinion was not largely shared within the administration however, especially 
as the years went on and expectations for the programme diminished. For McFarlane and 
Shultz, SDI was the ultimate bargaining tool with the Soviet Union that could force 
concessions from the Soviets within the nuclear arms control negotiations.
157
 For the more 
hard-line members of foreign policy planning such as Weinberger, SDI was rather a means 
of disrupting the arms control process, of preventing deals from being made that might not 
be favourable to the United States.
158
 This split in the administration has since been 
characterised as the ‗squeezers‘ versus the ‗dealers‘.159 For Reagan‘s political advisors, 
SDI primarily provided a great political message; as Mike Deaver enthused, ‗I wouldn‘t 
know if it worked or didn‘t work. The concept was a great idea [emphasis in original].‘160  
It was this lack of cohesion that led to the inconsistency in the pronouncements by 
both Reagan and other administration officials on the issue. Reagan‘s original speech in 
1983 proposing the idea of SDI was a vision of a system that would completely change the 
nuclear dynamic, providing a total shield to make the US invulnerable from nuclear attack. 
This would thus render deterrence obsolete, and in Reagan‘s words, ‗free the world from 
                                                 
154
 Moore, ‗The Reagan Presidency and Foreign Policy,‘ in Hill et al, eds., The Reagan Presidency: An 
Incomplete Revolution,192. 
155
 Miller et al, The Star Wars Controversy, xv; Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 264. 
156
 See Williams who described Reagan‘s foreign policy as ‗based on nostalgia‘. In Williams, ‗The limits of 
American power,‘ 575. 
157
 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 264; Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue, 256. 
158
 Garthoff, Policy Versus the Law, 10. 
159
 Williams, ‗The limits of American power,‘ 585. 
160
 Hertsgaard, On Bended Knee, 283. 
163 
 
the threat of nuclear war‘.161 This was Reagan‘s dominant theme in speaking about SDI, 
however at certain points he also spoke of the programme as if it were focused on simply 
enhancing deterrence. In response to a question in a press conference in February 1985 for 
example, he stated that he wanted, 
a defense that simply says that if somebody starts pushing the button on those 
weapons, we‘ve got a good chance of keeping all or at least the bulk of them from 
getting to the target. Because, even if it‘s around missile sites, that‘s the type of 
weapon anymore in which there‘s no way to restrain that from killing any number 
of people.
162
 
This implied that SDI would work within the parameters of current nuclear deterrence 
rather than changing the nature of the nuclear relationship. Yet, the following month he 
contradicted this again, stating that SDI should ‗never be misconstrued as just another 
method of protecting missile silos‘.163 Reagan‘s rhetoric on SDI was thus at times 
contradictory and often at odds with actual administration policy. Any policy discussion of 
the practicalities of SDI only ever considered the programme to be an addition to 
deterrence, never a replacement. But while this is evident in the policy documents, Reagan 
continued until late in his second term to talk about SDI as an absolute shield, in what 
Miller et al depict as a ‗surreal public dialogue‘.164 SDI was therefore a programme whose 
public image was completely at odds with its actual parameters. As George Shultz said in 
response to the initial 1983 announcement, ‗the idea and the rhetoric don‘t fit together‘.165 
Although there were differing views on the purpose and limitations of SDI, the 
White House was nonetheless united in a belief in its importance and made great efforts to 
ensure that the programme continued as part of the administration‘s public diplomacy 
considerations. In May 1985, Reagan issued NSDD 172 on Presenting the Strategic 
Defense Initiative which recognised that assuring ‗public, allied and congressional support 
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is key to any hope of realising the military and arms control potential of this initiative.‘166 
The administration was concerned about the perceived compatibility of SDI research with 
the provisions of the ABM Treaty and the public reception of the programme. McFarlane 
had acknowledged this early in 1985 when he declared SDI to be ‗the single most 
important proposal of the President‘s second term; he must win on it‘.167 The White House 
was also aware that the Soviet Union was targeting the SDI programme in Western 
European public diplomacy efforts and so worried about the Soviet use of SDI ‗as a major 
tool in their attempts to split the U.S. from its allies‘.168 In 1986, to combat this, the ACDA 
released a publication titled ‗The Soviet Propaganda Campaign against SDI‘.169  
Reagan did not initially link SDI directly to his use of trust. Throughout 1985 and 
early 1986, the White House failed to tie the issue of Soviet noncompliance, and 
subsequent untrustworthiness, to a justification for SDI or for any new interpretation of the 
ABM Treaty. By 1985 the administration‘s interpretation of the ABM treaty and what level 
of research and development it would allow on SDI had become a political issue. A review 
that supported a revised interpretation of the provisions of the treaty, which would have 
allowed for wider opportunities for SDI research while remaining in compliance, had been 
commissioned by the Secretary of Defense and had been much debated within the White 
House.
170
  
In October 1985, on the television show ‗Meet the Press‘ McFarlane had indicated, 
(possibly without the president‘s knowledge) that the Reagan administration had, in 
accordance with this review, reinterpreted the provision of the ABM treaty that would 
impact on potential SDI research.
171
 Two days after the interview the White House 
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confirmed that this was the official view,
172
 this was later codified in NSDD 192.
173
 This 
led to public and congressional debate regarding what was permitted under the treaty and 
SDI research‘s compatibility with the obligations therein.174 The push for a less limiting 
interpretation of the ABM treaty stemmed from the concern that Gorbachev would ask for 
some guarantee at the Geneva summit with Reagan that the United States would limit work 
on their SDI programme.
175
 This was a concern from more the ‗hawkish‘ elements of the 
administration, particularly from the Department of Defense, and a letter from Weinberger 
to Reagan was leaked (possibly by Weinberger himself) that urged Reagan not to agree to 
any type of limitation on SDI research.
176
 
As the reinterpretation of the ABM treaty and the limitations of SDI research 
continued to be an area of contestation within the administration, the White House was 
careful in how it publicly justified the programme and was initially reluctant to link it to its 
speech on Soviet untrustworthiness. This can be seen in a provisional draft of NSDD 172 
which acknowledged the existence of ‗considerable suspicion that the US is emphasizing 
Soviet noncompliance with the ABM Treaty and other obligations in order to justify a 
future move to abrogate the ABM Treaty.‘ Therefore it advised that concerns about 
noncompliance ‗should not be linked to SDI in such a way as to reinforce this fear‘.177 It 
was not until after the President made his decision on interim restraint in the lead up to the 
Reykjavik summit in October 1986 that he began to talk about the issue of SDI in 
connection to the language of trust.  
Wayne Howell has claimed that Reagan used the issue of SDI to push for greater 
liberalisation and democratisation of the Soviet Union by concentrating on human rights 
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and framing them as a matter of trust during the Reykjavik summit.
178
 While the 
connection between human rights and trust was a prominent theme in Reagan‘s language, 
this does not tell the whole story. Howell considered SDI mainly to have functioned as a 
means to another ultimate end, suggesting that the Reagan administration had a unified 
view of the use of the programme. However, the issue of trust was actually linked to SDI 
in a much more complex way and over a longer period of time. Also, as previously 
illustrated, although SDI was a very useful bargaining chip within the arms control process 
this was not its only use, as Reagan considered SDI to be a goal in itself.  
Howell is correct however, in claiming that by the end of 1986 the administration 
was making a more overt use of trust to justify the need for SDI. Reagan first used perhaps 
his most famous saying about trust, his repetition of the Russian proverb ‗doveryai, no 
proveryai‘ or ‗trust but verify‘ in late 1986 at the time of the Reykjavik Summit in 
connection to the need for SDI and the importance of US technology within the 
superpower relationship. He declared that SDI was an 
insurance policy to protect us from attack or from accidents or some madman or 
some other country that develops ballistic missiles, or in case the Soviets don‘t keep 
their side of the bargain. No responsible President could rely on Soviet promises for 
his country‘s safety. The record on Soviet treaty violations is clear. Now, I‘m not a 
linguist. I‘m very limited in foreign languages. But I did say something in our 
negotiations in Iceland in Russian: Dovorey no provorey. That means trust but 
verify. We can either bet on American technology to keep us safe or on Soviet 
promises, and each has its own track record. And I‘ll bet on American technology 
any day.
179
 
Reagan repeated the same point in a speech one week later, and in a radio address the 
following month he declared that ‗no country should rely solely on a piece of paper for its 
safety‘.180 By framing the issue in this way he made a choice for the audience about 
whether to trust the Soviet Union, or be released from the requirements for trust, and 
therefore exposure to vulnerability, of the nuclear age by the power of American 
technology and progress.   
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 The concept of SDI also fit with Reagan‘s general political message of apocalypse 
and salvation. SDI was indeed a perfect linguistic match for a President whose rhetoric 
was, to a certain extent, incompatible with the acceptance of vulnerability and a certain 
moral equivalence associated with the nuclear revolution and the doctrine of Mutually 
Assured Destruction. Reagan‘s political message was that of optimism, it was a refutation 
of the policies of his predecessors who attempted to manage a relative global American 
decline.
181
 SDI could save the United States from this inescapable vulnerability from above 
that was so incompatible with Reagan‘s rhetoric of the American jeremiad. G. Simon 
Harak characterises the rhetoric around SDI as that of soteriology, ‗a redemptive return to 
a time free from the threat of nuclear annihilation‘.182 By trusting in the power of the 
American people, the United States could return to a time prior to the nuclear revolution 
when it did not have to accommodate any notions of vulnerability or limitation. 
 
The contradictions of trust in Reagan’s nuclear era 
The requirements of international politics in a nuclear age led to a central paradox in the 
Reagan use of trust with regard to nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union. This can be 
illustrated through an examination of the Senate hearings before the Committee on Armed 
Forces on the question of SDI. While Reagan‘s rhetoric on SDI implied that trust in the 
power of American ingenuity and technology could be taken for granted, much of the 
congressional debate on the issue of SDI was centred on whether or not the technology 
could be trusted. This dilemma of trust existed because the characteristics of this type of 
weapons system meant that it could not be fully tested under real-type conditions. The 
Senate hearings therefore largely revolved on the question of whether or not the SDI 
system would be ‗trustworthy‘. For example, the hearings included the testimony of David 
Parnas, Professor of Computer Science at the University of Victoria. He had been 
appointed to the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) panel but resigned 
because he claimed that ‗no system of the sort being considered by the SDIO can ever be 
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trusted.‘183 He claimed in his testimony that ‗it is very important that we trust that 
software. If we do not trust the software, if we do not trust the system, we will make 
decisions as if it were not there.‘184 There was therefore more than one way in which the 
word ‗trust‘ was related to the public debates on the issue of SDI.  
There are two things that should be noted from examining the use of the word 
‗trust‘ within Congressional hearings on the topic of the Soviet Union and arms control 
that have a bearing on Reagan‘s public use of the word ‗trust‘. Firstly, the word ‗trust‘ as 
used by the committee members and the officials and scientists who testified had a 
different meaning to the way in which the word was being used in Reagan‘s speeches on 
the topic of SDI. The idea of trusting the technology behind the programme had a very 
specific meaning based on issues of technical reliability and the potential for catastrophic 
failure. It had nothing to do with morality or belief but was discussed in terms of 
testability, programming and systemic faults. The word ‗trust‘ was therefore prominently 
applied to SDI in more than one way but its meaning was highly context specific. In the 
same manner, when Reagan spoke of trust in relation to the technology of SDI, it was still 
with the same ‗trust the people‘ meaning regarding American greatness and values. Neither 
of these meanings could be described as ‗wrong‘. In both contexts the word makes 
complete sense to the participants in the discourse and the meaning is clear. One cannot 
argue either that one use of the word is more correct or appropriate in this context. This 
illustrates that, even within the confines of the public debate on SDI technology, trust had 
distinct and separate meanings in various situations. 
The second, and perhaps more important, point to be made is that, despite the 
prominence in Reagan‘s rhetoric of the need for trust within the superpower relationship, 
the notion of trusting the USSR to any extent was completely dismissed in Congressional 
hearings on US-Soviet nuclear relations. In fact, it is perhaps more accurate to say that it 
was not even considered. Instead, the hearings accepted that no trust existed between the 
two states and took for granted that the Soviet Union was inherently untrustworthy. It was 
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under these assumptions that a discussion of policy was then conducted. In a House 
hearing on arms control for example, Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-NY 13) summed up 
the mood by saying ‗[m]y position has always been that precisely because we can‘t trust 
the Soviet Union, whatever agreements we enter into must be verifiable.‘ He later added, ‗I 
wouldn‘t trust the Russians as far as I can throw them.‘185 In a later hearing on Soviet 
compliance with arms control agreements, Chairman Dante Fascell (D-FL 19) reasoned, ‗I 
mean since neither side trusts the other side about anything...the ultimate as far as any 
agreement is concerned involving the nation‘s security would be the satisfaction that we 
have one way of the other with regard to verification.‘186 Philip J. Farley, Nixon‘s Deputy 
Director of the ACDA who was then at Stanford University, testified in the same hearing, 
‗[w]e do not rely on trust in international agreements...we rely not on trust, but on 
verification [emphasis in original].‘187  
These quotes are indicative of the general tone of the proceedings and illustrate the 
assumption that no action in the nuclear realm should be based on trust in the Soviet 
Union. ‗Our policy is not based on trust or a Soviet change of heart‘, declared Shultz to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ‗it is based on the expectation that, faced with 
demonstration of the West‘s renewed determination to strengthen its defences, enhance its 
political and economic cohesion, and oppose adventurism, the Soviet Union will see 
restraint as its most attractive, or only, option.‘188 Secretary Weinberger also expressed the 
assumption in many public speeches that the Soviets were untrustworthy, ‗not only to deny 
Soviet trustworthiness‘ according to Daniel Frei, ‗but also, to dismiss altogether the idea of 
showing trust when dealing with the Soviet leaders.‘189 
This demonstrates an interesting paradox in the way in which the Reagan 
administration talked about trust. On one hand, the Soviet Union was fundamentally 
untrustworthy. While Reagan‘s rhetoric softened during his time in office, until the end of 
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his presidency he continued to make the point that no policy decision would be based on 
trust of the Soviet Union. In 1987 for example, he claimed that ‗[n]either the INF treaty we 
hope to sign during the upcoming summit nor any other agreement that follows will be 
built on trust. Agreements with the Soviet Union must be based on reciprocity, verification, 
and realism.‘190 This was supported by the pronouncements of his administration officials 
and congressional debates that assumed a starting point of an untrusting relationship in 
their analysis of policy options. However, Reagan was still able to call for the need for 
trust within the superpower relationship and made use of the lack of trust as a basis to 
justify the action, or inaction, of the United States. The message could therefore be 
summed up as ‗trust is essential in our nuclear relationship with the Soviet Union; trust is 
impossible in our nuclear relationship with the Soviet Union‘. Accepting this paradox 
meant that the only way in which the Soviet Union could become trustworthy, and 
therefore a reliable partner in international affairs, would be to no longer exist because the 
nature of the Soviet Union was inherently untrustworthy.  
This paradox also reveals the complex and multifaceted nature of the narrative of 
trust constructed by Reagan. There are multiple audiences for this speech that are 
addressed at different, though often overlapping times. Reagan‘s talk of trust was mainly 
targeted at the domestic electorate, Congress and the people and politicians of Western 
Europe and the place of trust within the rhetoric changed depending on the audience. In the 
domestic sphere, the concept was used by the White House to navigate between strongly 
divided political opinions within the electorate and in Congress. It was used to portray the 
president as a man who was dedicated to nuclear arms control (to mollify arms control 
advocates), while distancing him from any perceptions that his policy was a replay of 
détente (to reassure hardliners). The paradox of trust with the Soviet Union was thus a 
useful rhetorical tool for an administration that had been renowned for its hard-line anti-
Soviet rhetoric when it began to cooperate with the Soviet Union on nuclear arms control 
issues.
191
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Reagan also talked about trust in order to justify increased spending on the strategic 
modernisation programme and on the SDI programme. If the Soviet Union could not be 
trusted, then the President was justified in pursuing other means in order to protect the 
United States. The language of trust therefore could help the administration gain approval 
on the Hill for defence appropriations. This issue of defence budget authorisation became 
important throughout Reagan‘s second term as the Iran-Contra scandal tarnished his 
reputation and he lost the Republican Senate majority in the 1986 mid-term elections.
192
 In 
the early 1980s, high military spending matched the US public mood and gained 
Congressional authorisation but as Reagan‘s second term progressed he faced what Farley 
describes as ‗increasingly bipartisan opposition to full approval of defense budget 
requests.‘193  
The language of trust allowed Reagan to say ‗yes, but...‘ to any arms control 
proposals in order to maintain a positive image on nuclear arms control issues 
internationally. The people and leaders of Western Europe were another significant 
audience for the president's use of trust. Maintaining the strength of the western alliance 
depended on having dependable partners in Europe, and Reagan allies such as Margaret 
Thatcher and Helmut Kohl, needed to convince their electorates of the integrity of their 
ally and be reassured in turn of the reliability of extended deterrence and continued linkage 
of US and European security.  
 
Trust but verify 
Reagan‘s repeated use of the saying ‗trust but verify‘ in particular allowed him to manage 
what Duffy termed ‗the curious and contradictory position of asserting an incorrigible 
Soviet tendency to cheat on arms control agreements while at the same time it was 
involved in a number of different negotiations...to reach new arms accords with the 
Soviets.‘194 Reagan initially used the phrase in conversation with Gorbachev at the 
Reykjavik summit and it became a great favourite. Reagan would publicly admit to 
repeating the phrase to the Soviet leader in private meetings to the point ‗where he's sick of 
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it, and I love it‘.195 Between 1986 and 1989 it became a kind of a catch-all saying, adapted 
to fit with whatever point Reagan needed to make at the time.
196
 Earlier, the chapter 
outlined its use within the justification for SDI at the time of the Reykjavik summit in 
1986. In mid-1987, as discussions were coming to an end on the INF Treaty and the 
president was pushing for agreement on on-site verification, Reagan began to associate it 
more with the verification of treaties: 
It‘s now up to the Soviet Union to demonstrate whether or not it truly wants to 
conclude a treaty eliminating this class of U.S. and Soviet missiles. With regard to 
verification, I have to tell you, I‘m not exactly a linguist, but in my most recent 
meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, I had mastered a phrase, a proverb, 
indeed, in Russian: Dovorey no provorey; it means trust but verify.
197
   
From the end of 1987, Reagan used the phrase most often in the context of the need for 
trust and human rights and connected it to his rhetoric on the Soviet Union not trusting its 
own people.
198
  
The proverb worked well for the President. It expressed his qualities of optimism 
and his trusting nature while also displaying that he was not naive enough to actually base 
relations on trust with such an untrustworthy partner. It was the rhetorical version of 
having one‘s cake and eating it. On many occasions Reagan used an alternative version, 
‗trust everybody but cut the cards‘.199 He made various iterations of the same point at 
fundraisers for Republican candidates throughout 1988: 
I know that there are people that...have become concerned that maybe I‘ve been 
taken in now and I‘m taking us down a dangerous road...I know one little Russian 
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phrase and I‘ve used it on Mr. Gorbachev time after time till he‘s tired of hearing it. 
It is: Dovorey no provorey. It means: Trust, but verify. He finally let me know in 
Moscow that he‘d heard that often enough. [Laughter] So, I told him I had a good 
old American saying that I might switch to: Trust everybody, but cut the cards 
[Laughter].
200
  
By changing to the similar American expression and placing it within a slightly different 
context and for a specific domestic (most often Republican) audience, Reagan altered the 
function of the phrase. In this context he made use of the ‗trust but verify‘ idea to 
emphasise his lack of trust. Its use was to show to Republican voters and donors that 
Reagan was not naive in his dealings with the Soviet Union, that really he wasn‘t being 
trusting at all. In this way, ‗trust but verify‘, or ‗trust everybody but cut the cards‘, was 
making an important point domestically to those who doubted his negotiations with the 
Soviet Union. Reagan‘s meaning for trust came about as a way in which to deal with the 
contradictions of his policy on nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union. ‗Trust the people‘ 
provided a means of dealing with the disingenuous nature of foreign policy in a nuclear 
era. 
 
Conclusion 
I‘ve come here today to suggest that this notion of trusting the power of human freedom 
and letting the people do the rest was not just a good basis for our economic policy, it 
proved a solid foundation for our foreign policy as well. That‘s what we‘ve given to the 
people, why we have repeated what they instinctively knew, but what the experts had shied 
away from saying in public. 
- Ronald Reagan, April 1988 201 
 
This chapter has provided a grammatical investigation of President Reagan‘s use of trust in 
relation to nuclear weapons and nuclear arms control with the Soviet Union. While Reagan 
made little effort on arms control during his first term in office, the chapter has shown 
how, during his second term, Reagan began to engage with the Soviet Union on arms 
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control issues. Throughout this period Reagan often talked about arms control in relation to 
a particular meaning for trust. Reagan‘s grammar of trust was thus based on nostalgia for 
traditional American values and included such words as ‗freedom‘, ‗people‘, ‗faith‘ and 
‗democracy‘ and encompassed a specific, ideological meaning for the word ‗trust‘. The 
chapter demonstrated how this meaning for trust was bound by context, as it was shaped by 
Reagan‘s position within US political culture, the contemporary political climate of the 
1980s and the imperatives placed on politics by the nuclear revolution.  
The chapter illustrated how Reagan used trust in order to frame the arms control 
process in a particular manner that could justify the US policy preferences describing the 
international realm, and in particular the realm of nuclear politics, as one in which trust 
was important and trustworthiness was a necessary attribute for cooperation. Reagan 
initially talked about trust with regards to accusations of Soviet noncompliance with 
existing international treaties, tying the idea of ongoing and endemic Soviet cheating to the 
trustworthiness of the state as a partner in any agreements. The Reagan administration 
argued that the ongoing (though questionable) violations showed just how untrustworthy 
the Soviet Union was and used this argument to legitimate any decisions they might make 
about their own policy of interim restraint and adherence to the unratified SALT II 
agreement.  
As the issue of treaty compliance became less important for the Reagan 
administration, the issue of the trustworthiness (or otherwise) of the Soviet Union was less 
often tied to issues of cheating and more often linked to the idea of freedom and human 
rights. This was a part of the wider White House tactic of placing Soviet nuclear arms 
control proposals within a wider political context in order to deal with international 
pressure to be positive and flexible on any arms control proposals coming from the 
Kremlin. As the international profile of Secretary Gorbachev grew and the series of 
superpower summits focused world attention on the subject, Reagan increasingly began to 
talk about trust as a means of deligitimising Soviet actions and proposals within global, 
and most importantly Western European, public opinion and used trust as a way to mediate 
between the demands of different domestic political constituencies regarding cooperation 
with the Soviet Union on nuclear arms control.  
 There are two main points to be taken from the grammatical investigation of trust 
in this chapter. Firstly, that the way that President Reagan talked about trust was a 
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reflection of the context within which he came to power, his political background and the 
changing domestic and international situation as his two terms in office progressed. 
Secondly, that Reagan‘s way of talking about his particular meaning for trust in connection 
with the process of nuclear arms control served several useful political purposes. 
What these two points show and what this chapter has established, is that while the 
Reagan/Gorbachev era has often been popularly framed in terms of trust, this connection of 
trust and arms control is perhaps not a natural way to think about that time but actually a 
result of rhetorical decisions by the Reagan administration to link nuclear arms control 
with trust. That the idea of the necessity of trust for any movement on nuclear arms control 
has often been taken for granted shows the effectiveness of this attempt. Rather than 
simply accepting a link between trust and arms control and then attempting to explain it, 
investigating how and why trust was talked about with regards to nuclear arms control in 
Reagan's second term has provided alternative and useful descriptions of the era. How this 
use of trust contrasts with President Nixon‘s use of trust in Chapter 2, and what can be 
learned from a comparison of the two, will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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4 
 
Reassessing assumptions and insights about trust 
 
Here it is difficult as it were to keep our heads up,--to see that we must stick to the 
subjects of our every-day thinking, and not go astray and imagine that we have to describe 
extreme subtleties, which in turn we are after all quite unable to describe with the means 
at our disposal. We feel as if we had to repair a torn spider‘s web with our fingers. 
-Ludwig Wittgenstein 1 
 
The reality that is linguistically created is not random or accidental. It is the 
constraint under which the process of creating meaning operates that makes it peculiarly 
relevant to political behaviour, for concepts become meaningful when they are related to 
people‘s affective demands... 
-Murray Edelman 
2
 
 
 
Introduction  
The first chapter of this thesis contained a critique of the current literature, specifically in 
International Relations but also throughout the social sciences, on the subject of trust. It 
argued that, despite the many disparate approaches of this wide body of research, on the 
whole the literature suffered from a lack of engagement with one fundamental issue: that 
of meaning. All of the existing research is underpinned by a representational approach to 
meaning. By taking as its starting point the premise that the word ‗trust‘ is a term that 
represents a thing that exists and acts in ‗reality‘, that it has an essence and can thus be 
defined, understood and explained in abstract, the current literature has accepted a specific 
way of thinking about meaning without question. This approach actually begins, without 
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reflection, at a point where certain important decisions have already been made, and then 
continues on its path without realising that these decisions have unalterably set the course 
of the research in a particular direction. 
The point of this work is not to contend that this is an incorrect view (though it 
does argue that this view leads to some unavoidable semantic and methodological 
challenges as outlined in Chapter 1), but simply to point out that it is not the only or the 
‗natural‘ one. It is to press for an acknowledgement that a decision about meaning has 
been made by every one of these scholars whether they realise it or not and that this 
decision has had consequences for their research.  
This thesis also claims that if one acknowledges that there are alternative ways to 
talk about the meaning of trust to that which is dominant in the existing literature; these 
alternatives could provide an original contribution to the study of trust in International 
Relations. The previous two chapters were therefore an attempt to practice an alternative 
way of talking about trust in the realm of nuclear arms control during the Nixon and 
Reagan administrations in which the meaning of trust was taken from its use. The point of 
these detailed historical chapters was to ‗look and see‘ whether taking a different view of 
meaning could add a new perspective to the study of trust. The two chapters thus exist as 
an ostensive challenge to the premise that is dominant in the current literature that trust has 
an essence or core that can be understood on a purely theoretical level.  
This chapter will further investigate how taking a grammatical, ‗look and see‘ 
approach to talking about trust can escape some of the semantic confusion in the current 
literature. It will accomplish this in two main ways. The first section of the chapter will 
further examine the two historical narratives and show how the meaning of trust in each 
instance was different and dependent on the context of the era and the person using the 
word. It will thus demonstrate how taking an essentialised and a-historical meaning for 
trust does not allow for nuanced description, and will claim that it is in fact more useful to 
try to understand how and why President Nixon and President Reagan were talking about 
trust, rather than imposing an external definition onto the time period under study. By 
doing so, it will provide a practical argument against the idea of an essence, or core 
meaning for trust that will reinforce the conceptual argument made in Chapter 1. 
The second section of the chapter will address the implications of this argument for 
the continuing and expanding study of trust in International Relations. It will claim that if 
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the implicit central premise of the current literature, that trust has an essence that can be 
grasped and transferred between contexts, is questionable (and methodologically 
unhelpful) then methods of talking about trust in International Relations that are based on 
this premise should also be reassessed. Based on the descriptions of the grammatical 
investigations of trust in the previous chapters, the chapter will suggest several alternative 
means of talking about trust and International Relations that could be part of a more self-
reflexive and critical form of study. 
 
The value of a contextual meaning for trust 
This section of the chapter will illustrate how the two narratives of trust in the previous 
chapters challenge the premise of meaning as representation and thus the assumption of an 
essence for trust. This will be accomplished through a further examination and comparison 
of the contexts in which the two presidents used the language of trust and how the 
meaning of trust was located in its use. To do so, it will first elaborate on the complex and 
changing contexts within which Presidents Nixon and Reagan gave meaning to trust 
described in the previous chapters. 
Firstly, and as previously mentioned, many of the authors who write about trust in 
International Relations focus on some aspect of the Cold War.
3
 This seems like a natural 
and fertile ground for issues of trust but this context also implies some certain qualities in 
the meaning for trust that can be talked about under these very specific conditions. In 
many of these studies, as in this one, the focus is also on the issue of nuclear weapons and 
nuclear arms control during the Cold War, which brings another very specific dimension 
to how one talks of trust. As stated in the thesis introduction, with the development of the 
ICBM and the hydrogen bomb during the 1950s, international politics was forced to face 
the political consequences of weapons capable of destruction on an unprecedented, global 
scale. The consequences of this nuclear revolution placed particular imperatives on the 
conduct of politics in the United States at the time under study and, as the previous two 
chapters have demonstrated, gave particular meaning and significance to the use of the 
word ‗trust‘ by the two presidents under study. The context of the Cold War and the 
unavoidable nuclear vulnerability that was such a big part of it, lends a certain resonance 
                                                 
3
 Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma; Kydd, Trust and Mistrust; Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust. 
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to a word such as trust. When states have the power to destroy each other on command 
and their populations have given to their leaders the responsibility to make decisions about 
using that power, often with limited knowledge themselves due to the apparent 
imperatives for secrecy in issues of national security, the political use of the word ‗trust‘ 
has particular significance.  
Secondly, the meaning for a word like trust will change depending on the role or 
position of the person who utters it in relation to the audience. This is something in which 
relative power is significant, talk of trust from someone who is in some way more 
powerful has a certain resonance and could, for example, carry with it hints of obligation, 
responsibility or even coercion and punishment that are based in the relational context. 
This is evident in this study where the meaning given to trust in the two narratives was 
notable because it was the president of the United States, the most powerful person in the 
world, who was using the word. When the president is addressing a domestic audience in 
the role of both head of government, head of state and Commander in Chief, with all the 
attendant symbolic power that this brings as well as the history of deference to the office, 
any discussion of or request for trust is imbued with a specific significance.
4
 Also, when a 
president says ‗trust me‘, especially in the realm of foreign policy or national security, the 
access to the classified information, intelligence briefings etc. that accompany the office 
do justify his request in an exceptional manner. Therefore the claim to authoritative 
knowledge expressed in any talk of trust by a US president will based on a uniquely 
plausible foundation of practical differences in knowledge due to status, as well as the 
institutional and symbolic prerogatives associated with the office. 
Finally, in the previous chapters the meaning of trust was also influenced by its 
setting. Both Nixon and Reagan were using the word in symbolically loaded settings, 
whether it was the White House, the UNGA, or a superpower summit. Political settings 
are not part of everyday life and they are contrived to be that way, to be extraordinary in 
scale, grandeur, seriousness or formality. As Murray Edelman explains, these settings, 
                                                 
4
 When the deference normally offered to the president in his official capacity is breached this is highly 
controversial, a recent example of this can be seen when Congressman Joe Wilson (a Republican from South 
Carolina) heckled President Barack Obama with the words ‗you lie‘ during his State of the Union Speech in 
2009. See ‗Two words make Joe Wilson an Internet sensation,‘ CNN, 10 September, 2009, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/10/wilson.online.backlash/index.html Last accessed 3 December, 
2013. 
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make for heightened sensitivity and easier conviction in onlookers, for the framed 
actions are taken on their own terms. They are not qualified by inconsistent facts in 
the environment. The creation of an artificial space or semblance thus sets the stage 
for a concentration of suggestions: of connotations, of emotions, and of authority.
5
 
There is additional symbolic weight added to utterances made in these settings that 
allows them a certain privilege, and conversely what can be said in these settings is also 
limited by our expectations of what is appropriate for the setting. For, as Kenneth Burke 
has stated, ‗[i]t is a principal of drama that the nature of acts and agents should be 
consistent with the nature of the scene...‘6 The audiences for these acts have inherited 
particular expectations for what is acceptable in a specific political setting and actors‘ 
abilities to create meanings within these settings will therefore be limited by these 
expectations, as well as by the historical legacy of the acts that have previously occurred 
in the same settings (for example the legacy of speeches from the Oval Office that Nixon 
was keen to exploit in Chapter 2). There is also a difference between public and private 
settings in the invocation of trust. For example, when Reagan and Gorbachev spoke of a 
need for trust between their two countries in their conversations in Geneva and Reykjavik, 
this setting of private conversation, though of course in itself hugely removed from a more 
everyday conversation, nonetheless gave a different resonance to the word than that which 
accompanied Reagan‘s public request for trust between nations at the UNGA.7 
When one is speaking of trust this wider context matters and it is therefore not 
always analytically helpful to talk of trust in this particular situation as analogous to the 
meaning of trust in other contexts such as a personal relationship, or even other settings 
within international politics. However, even within the limitations of the use of trust 
within the language of US presidential rhetoric, Cold War politics and the nuclear threat, 
differences in the meaning of trust are apparent throughout the two preceding historical 
                                                 
5
 Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Chicago and London: University of Illinois Press, 1964), 
96. Space constraints prohibit a more substantial discussion of the relationship between setting and meaning 
but it is an area that is full of potential for International Relations, see further work referenced here by 
Edelman as well as the ‗new rhetoric‘ studies of Kenneth Burke. Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives 
(New York: Prentice Hall, 1955) and Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, 
Literature and Method (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).  
6
 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (New York: George Braziller, 1945), 3. 
7
 For online transcripts of the Geneva and Reykjavik summit meetings see ‗The Reagan Files‘ 
http://www.thereaganfiles.com/the-summits.html. Ronald Reagan, Address to the 40th Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly in New York, 24 October, 1985, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=37963. Last accessed 20 February, 2014. 
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chapters. The following sections will discuss how the context of Nixon and Reagan‘s 
presidencies led to their different meanings for trust. 
 
Differences and similarities in meaning 
Examining the two instances of trust together highlights the differences as well as the 
similarities in what was possible to say about trust. From the range of possibilities of 
meaning for trust, the two examples, to put it in Wittgensteinian terms, have distinct 
grammars. Nixon used the word ‗trust‘ in relation to words such as ‗knowledge‘, 
‗responsibility‘, ‗intelligence‘, ‗facts‘, ‗information‘ and ‗judgement‘, and he talked about 
trust in the context of the long history of deference to the institution of the presidency. 
Reagan‘s grammar of trust included the words ‗people‘, ‗faith‘, ‗liberty‘ and ‗democracy‘, 
and he talked of trust with relation to what he claimed were traditional American values, 
exceptionalism, and the myth of the secular jeremiad. All of which reflected his deep 
conservatism.  
Nonetheless, there was also a level of correspondence in their meaning for trust in 
these instances which could be part of wider set of ‗family resemblances‘ in the meanings 
given to the word.  One way to think about how both leaders talked about trust could be to 
analyse it as a request. Both presidents needed the acquiescence of various actors to 
conduct their policies on nuclear weapons and analysing the use of trust can be one way of 
describing that process.  
Nixon‘s request for trust was blatant, he said ‗trust me, I know better than you‘. 
Trust as expressed in this situation was based on differentiation. It was the exceptional 
nature and role of the president as embodied in Nixon that was the foundation for trust. 
The request was to trust Nixon because he was different from the ordinary American. The 
Reagan request for trust was a much more sophisticated and subtle rhetorical gambit. 
Reagan said ‗trust me because I‘m just like you, and you‘re great!‘ Pandering to a public‘s 
vanity is rarely a poor rhetorical choice and, as was shown in Chapter 3, this particular 
attempt was highly successful.
8
 While Nixon requested trust from the public, Reagan 
                                                 
8
 An example of this can be seen in Reagan‘s radio address to the nation after the Reykjavik Summit with 
Gorbachev in October 1986 where he directly refuted the Nixonian rhetoric of trust in leadership to explain 
his decisions at the meeting to the US public. ‗Now, I know it‘s true that some here in the Capital think the 
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assumed the trust of the public. This was a useful device which meant that Reagan did not 
have to gain anyone‘s trust but merely retain it. Reagan‘s trust was based on the 
recognition of similarity. He emphasised the common bonds he shared with the public as 
fellow Americans and based his meaning of trust on this connection. His request was to 
trust him because he was the same as the ordinary American. In fact it would have been 
contra to Reagan‘s broader political message to ask for trust in an institution such as the 
presidency. Reagan represented a challenge to the establishment, outsider status (even 
after two terms as governor of California and two terms as president) and limited 
government conservatism. Reagan could not ask the American people to trust in their 
government outright and in fact was clear in his public speeches that this was the case. For 
example, he stated of his presidency in 1988 that, 
[w]e made a determination that our dream would not be built on a foundation of 
sand—something called ‗‗Trust Me Government‘‘—but we would trust, instead, 
the American spirit. And, yes, we were unashamed in believing that this dream was 
driven by a community of shared values of family, work, neighborhood, peace, and 
freedom.
9
 
The two leaders thus located the grounds for their language of trust in different 
places, Nixon in the special knowledge of the president and tradition of respect for the 
office, and Reagan in the founding myths of America. Though both successfully 
campaigned for re-election (in 1972 and 1984 respectively) using trust as part of their 
campaigns as might be expected from an incumbent, once again they each expressed a 
different message through trust. While Nixon promoted a ‗Great Statesman‘ image of wise 
world leader, Reagan put forward the growth of American communal trust, of ‗Morning in 
America‘.10 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
people can‘t be trusted with such complex matters as foreign policy. But along with our Founding Fathers, 
I‘ve always believed that the intuitive wisdom of the people is far more dependable over the long run than 
the temporary insights or parochial pursuits of the Washington experts.‘ Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to 
the Nation on the Meeting with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, 4 October, 1986. 
The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=36544. Last accessed 10 
December, 2013. 
9
 Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the Republican National Convention in New Orleans, Louisiana, 15 August, 
1988, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=36273. Last accessed 28 
February, 2014. 
10
 The Reagan campaign team created a series of ads with titles such as ‗Prouder, Stronger, Better,‘ that 
created a vision of restored American optimism and strength. In contrast, one of the most memorable 
television ads of the 1972 campaign was a video of Nixon‘s passport which contained the line ‗In his four 
years in office Richard Nixon has visited six continents and 47 countries,‘ and thus emphasised his role as a 
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Both leaders also talked about the international realm in different ways with regard 
to trust. For Nixon, trust had little part to play in international politics and his rhetoric 
underplayed trust in favour of rationality, strategy and interest. In contrast to the image of 
steady leadership he wanted to project at home, Chapter 2 showed how Nixon actually 
adopted the idea of being seen as unpredictable and irrational in the international realm to 
play on the potential advantages of being viewed as untrustworthy. In Nixon‘s language, 
trust had little part to play in the international and even less significance in the superpower 
relationship. In contrast, Reagan described the international as an extension of the 
domestic, transferring his language of trust and the morality of the everyday American to 
the realm of foreign policy and security. In Reagan‘s portrayal of the international, being 
trustworthy was an important attribute to possess. The two leaders therefore expressed the 
relationship between trust and the international realm in very different terms.  
 
The grammatical approach 
But why were these uses of trust different, and how can we understand these differences? 
The method of Wittgensteinian grammatical investigation proposed in Chapter 1 provides 
the space to negotiate between the strategic, intent and actor-focused analyses of much 
rhetorical or speech act based analysis, and the constraints of the continental, discourse-
based approach.
11
 It allows for staying on the surface of language and locating meaning 
and significance in historical context, for in ‗knowing the grammar of a word‘ as Pitkin 
explains, ‗we know what kind of things are-can be-said with it, what would count as 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
world leader. For a collection of these advertisements see The Living Room Candidate 
http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/ Last accessed 10 December, 2013.  
11
 This brings up the question of the ability to control meaning and the issue of intent and the subject. This 
issue cannot be addressed fully here and remains an ongoing source of difference between the Anglo-
American post-Wittgensteinian and post-Austinian linguistic tradition and the continental tradition which is 
far beyond the scope of this work. For an account of the differences see Michael J. Shapiro‘s introduction in 
Michael J. Shapiro, ed., Language and Politics (New York: New York University Press, 1984); and Karin 
M. Fierke, ‗Critical Methodology and Constructivism,‘ in Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jørgensen, eds., 
Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001). However, it is 
useful to reinforce again the central and shared point of all these approaches about the lack of one meaning 
or essence for a word such as trust. For a good general overview of the ‗linguistic turn‘ see Aletta J. Norval, 
‗The Things We Do with Words – Contemporary Approaches to the Analysis of Ideology,‘ British Journal 
of Political Science 30, no. 2 (2000): 313-346 and Ronen Palan, ‗A world of their making: An evaluation of 
the constructivist critique in International Relations,‘ Review of International Studies 26, no. 4 (2000): 575-
598.  
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appropriate occasions for saying them‘.12 By looking at what can be said with the word 
‗trust‘ in each context, it is possible to see that, while both Nixon and Reagan, to 
paraphrase J. L. Austin ‗did things‘ with the word ‗trust‘, it was with the grammar of trust 
of that time and within a series of overlapping language games; the language games of US 
domestic politics, the language game of the US presidency and the language games of 
nuclear weapons and Cold War diplomacy.
13
 The following passages will examine how, 
by staying on the ‗rough ground‘ of context and comparing the two uses of trust, the 
grammatical approach can provide a description of where the meaning of trust was located 
in these narratives. 
Firstly, the two chapters have shown how Nixon and Reagan had different political 
styles and political histories and operated under differing political contexts. Nixon was 
elected as president in 1968 as the ‗law and order‘ candidate to narrow the Johnson era 
credibility gap.
14
 He presented himself as a candidate of experience; he was the veteran 
Vice President and staunch anti-Communist who had faced down Soviet Leader Nikita 
Khrushchev in the ‗kitchen debate‘ and dodged stones in Caracas.15 This experience would 
help him restore order, both domestically and to US foreign policy.
16
 Reagan, on the other 
hand, was a conviction politician as well as the all-American nice guy who had come to 
prominence playing the best friend and the everyman on screen.
17
 While these descriptions 
are of course two caricatures, the point is that the way in which the two politicians had 
historically framed themselves as public figures limited the way in which they could use a 
word such as trust. 
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 Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice, 121. 
13
 J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). 
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 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership from FDR to Carter (New York: 
Wiley, 1980), 188-190. Also Garry Wills, Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis of the Self Made Man (New York: 
Mariner Books, 2002). 
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 William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1998), 15.  Also Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev‘s Cold War: The Inside 
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 Kimball describes how Nixon carefully projected an image of caution and centrism in the 1968 election, 
campaigning as ‗the ‗‗new Nixon‘‘ – the experienced leader, the man of peace, the champion of law and 
order‘. Kimball, Nixon‘s Vietnam War, 4. 
17
 For an account of Reagan‘s early career see Cannon, Role of a Lifetime; Wills, Innocents Abroad. 
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The two leaders also had different styles of communication. Reagan‘s mode of 
speech was more anecdotal and pastoral than Nixon‘s. Though Nixon was not unfamiliar 
with publicly using sentimental speech, most famously in his ‗Checkers Speech‘ for 
example, it did not sit as easily with him as it did with Reagan.
18
 This method of 
communication, how they publicly performed the role of president, also fed into how they 
were able to maintain a meaning for trust. Nixon‘s perception of the power of the 
executive and need for centralised decision-making contrasted with Reagan‘s idea of 
president as figurehead who, as Raymond Garthoff describes, ‗acted‘ the presidency.19 For 
Reagan, communication was governance, ‗[m]ore so than any president than Kennedy‘, as 
Michael Weiler and W. Barnett Pearce note, ‗Reagan‘s impact depended on and was 
constituted by his rhetorical practices.‘20 Strobe Talbott has claimed that the best way to 
get Reagan‘s attention was to ‗suggest to him what he personally should say publicly 
about a foreign policy problem or a policy‘ because he thought of the ‗announcement of 
the proposal as an end in itself.‘21 Nixon, on the other hand, while constantly agonising 
over his public presentation, saw this as separate from the act of governance and as a 
hindrance to his ability to govern. He would convey his legendary antipathy for the media 
by repeatedly stating that ‗the press is the enemy‘.22  
The White House communication teams developed contrasting strategies to fit 
these styles of leadership. Chapter 2 illustrated how Nixon‘s often highhanded approach to 
governance was reflected in how he communicated to the public. His approach was 
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 See Wills, Nixon Agonistes. The lack of connection was something Nixon constantly bemoaned. A feature 
of much internal correspondence from his first term is his concern with the lack of emotion and connection 
in his public addresses especially on foreign policy. He blamed this partly on his speechwriters whom he 
criticised as ‗all too intellectual‘ and who ‗are ashamed to reach folks and move them‘. Talking Paper re. 
General Comments re Speech Writers, 4 December, 1969, H. R. Haldeman Files Box 152, Talking Papers 
1969, Nixon Library. He was also constantly lamenting the ‗lack of an adequate PR operation‘ in his 
administration to push his image; for example when a speech on Vietnam did not receive the public praise he 
felt due, he complained that, ‘if Kennedy had made it there would have been great acclaim‘ but ‗we haven‘t 
got the big man putting it out...‘Talking paper re. Meeting with Ehrlichman and Kissinger, 19 May, 1969, H. 
R. Haldeman Files Box 152, Talking Papers 1969, Nixon Library. 
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 Garthoff, The Great Transition, 7.  Cannon also describes how aides would use cinematic terminology to 
direct Reagan. Cannon, President Reagan, 34. This is not necessarily a criticism of Reagan, simply a 
difference in how both men conceived of the role of president. In fact looking at their respective public 
perceptions today it appears that Reagan‘s conception of the performance presidency was ultimately a far 
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 Michael Weiler and W. Barnett Pearce, Reagan and Public Discourse in America (Tuscaloosa: University 
of Alabama Press, 1992), 4. 
21
 Talbott, Deadly Gambits, 76. 
22
 Ambrose, Nixon, 250; Chester Pach, ‗―Our Worst Enemy Seems to Be the Press‖: TV News, the Nixon 
Administration, and U.S. Troop Withdrawal from Vietnam,‘ Diplomatic History 34, no. 3 (2010): 555-565. 
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characterised by secrecy and control and he generally only reached out to the public when 
trying to gain a win on a specific issue, most notably in his formal, set piece foreign policy 
speeches on Vietnam in 1969 and 1970.
23
 His team dealt with the press by a process of 
counter-attack rather than a process of continuous management and relationship-
building.
24
 He also limited the media‘s access overall to him, for example limiting the 
number of press conferences that he conducted and attempting to bypass the media and 
appeal directly to the American public through direct television addresses whenever 
possible.
25
  
By the 1980s after the Watergate scandal, Ford‘s pardoning of Nixon and the 
disillusionment with Carter‘s leadership, Reagan‘s communications advisors felt that their 
methods would have to be different. David Gergen, Reagan‘s Director of 
Communications, later reflected that ‗[a]ll of us came out of the Watergate years feeling 
very strongly about the importance of trust in government, of developing relationships in 
this town that stood on more than simply power, because titles can change so quickly 
[emphasis in original].‘26 They developed a strategy of strictly controlling access to the 
president so that they could manage his image, while simultaneously practicing what 
Hertsgaard terms ‗manipulation by inundation‘, overwhelming the media with information 
so that, as Gergen explained, 
[a]s opposed to Kissinger and Haldeman and that crowd, whose view was that you 
control the media by giving them bits and pieces [of information], the Reagan 
White house came to the totally opposite conclusion that the media will take what 
we feed them.
27
  
By providing the media with vast amounts of information and multiple news stories, they 
could create a sense of total access so that the media would take the story that they were 
                                                 
23
 Richard Nixon, Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam, 3 November, 1969, The American 
Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2303. Richard Nixon, Address to the Nation 
on the Situation in Southeast Asia, 30 April, 1970, The American Presidency Project. 
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given rather than try to find other, less positive ones. This helped to maintain the sense of 
connection between the public and the president.   
The form of how the two leaders talked about trust is another aspect to be 
considered when looking at presidential communications. Nixon‘s use of the request for 
trust was mainly in written communications whereas Reagan more often spoke publicly of 
trust.
28
 Reagan was also the first president to fully take advantage of the televisual medium 
and what Edelman describes as the ‗semblance of close contact‘ that it provides.29 Perhaps 
his specific version of trust as ‗trust the people‘, as presented to the publics of the United 
States and Western Europe, was only possible on such a large scale because of the 
perception of enforced intimacy that television as a medium provided to him.  
 
The domestic landscape 
These differences in personality, style and strategy all occurred in a specific domestic and 
international political landscape. On the domestic front, the party makeup of Congress   
during their administrations and the two presidents‘ relationships with Congress differed. 
Following his election, Nixon faced Democratic control over both houses of Congress that 
continued throughout his six years in office as well as significant legislative pushback on 
many of his initiatives, including spending on military programmes such as the ABM.
30
 
Nixon‘s relationship with Congress was strained and he made it quite clear both at the 
time and later that he did not have much respect for a legislature that was ‗cumbersome, 
undisciplined, isolationist, fiscally irresponsible, overly vulnerable to pressures from 
organised minorities, and too dominated by the media.‘31 Congress was also often less 
than impressed with Nixon‘s frequently high-handed manner towards them and the lack of 
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 This is symptomatic of a wider preference both presidents had in their means of communication. While 
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information and communication from the White House. In fact, during the Congressional 
Hearings on the topic, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations Senator J. W. 
Fulbright (D-Ark) complained about the lack of Congressional briefing on the ongoing 
SALT negotiations and Nixon‘s demands for trust in his decisions from the legislative 
branch. Fulbright asked, ‗[w]hat in the world is going on? Are they taking the attitude that 
this has nothing to do with the Senate, that they trust the President to make whatever 
judgement is to be made?‘ Speaking of the ACDA, he stated that ‗they refuse to brief us 
on this and it is all a great secret. Then you say trust the President...‘32  
Although Nixon became president at a time when the credibility of the office was 
in decline, it is undeniable that his actions made this situation much worse and Congress 
reacted to this by attempting to restrict presidential powers.
33
 Post-Vietnam and Watergate 
Congresses brought in legislation such as the War Powers Resolution of 1973 and the 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Acts of 1974 to limit the autonomy of the 
president in areas such as committing troops abroad and the allocation of appropriated 
funds.
34
 In this political context, the idea of Nixon‘s authoritarian ‗trust the president‘ 
rhetoric did not fit. No president in the late 1970s and 1980s could make that claim with 
the public and with Congress, or at the very least it would be a challenge to make it 
legitimately because of the decline in status of the office. Therefore, even if this had been 
compatible with Reagan‘s political brand, this way of talking about trust was not open to 
Reagan to the same extent at the beginning of his presidency as it had been for Nixon, in 
part because of the repercussions of Nixon‘s authoritarian attitude towards trust and the 
role of the president.  
After two further weak presidents, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, neither of whom 
were able to use their positions as incumbents to be elected in Ford‘s case or re-elected in 
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Carter‘s, Reagan restored a sense of stability to the presidency that had not existed since 
the era of President Eisenhower. Moreover, Reagan‘s large victory against President 
Carter in 1980 brought with it the first Republican Senate majority since 1954, as well as 
an additional 33 seats in the House of Representatives.
35
 Reagan forged a generally 
successful relationship with the Republican majority in Congress at least throughout his 
first term and a half, pushing through his budget measures and military spending increases 
in the first term with relative ease. Reagan‘s timing was opportune, as Henry Kissinger 
notes, he ‗led a nation that had largely recovered from the Vietnam trauma and had grown 
disgusted with the humiliations of the Iran hostage crisis... [and] inherited a 
psychologically recovered American people‘.36 Reagan was also part of an upsurge in the 
conservative movement that began in the 1970s as public disillusionment with Nixon and 
Kissinger-era détente and Carter‘s foreign policy grew.37  
However, with growing deficits, the Iran-Contra scandal and the loss of the Senate 
in the 1986 midterms, the political atmosphere became more difficult for Reagan towards 
the end of his second term, reaching a nadir in 1987 with the publication of the Tower 
Report on the Iran-Contra scandal and the forced resignation of senior aides.
38
 The voting 
patterns of Congress in general also became more partisan throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
as the two political parties became more polarised.
39
  
The two presidents‘ attempts to make use of trust in the area of nuclear arms also 
came at different parts of the electoral cycle. For Nixon as a first term president, re-
election was driving much of the administration‘s actions during the Safeguard ABM 
debate. Reagan‘s major initiatives on SDI and arms control came in his second term when 
the pressure for re-election had been relieved. Electoral concerns were still a factor prior to 
1986 as the Congressional mid-term elections were a source of concern for an 
administration that was beginning to face resistance from Congress to its budgetary 
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policies. However, it was still not an equivalent pressure to facing a presidential election 
for a second term. 
 
The international political setting 
As well as the differences in the domestic political environment, the two presidents were 
talking about trust within very different international contexts. Nixon was dealing with a 
world in which the United States could no longer claim strategic superiority over the 
Soviet Union and in which other world actors such as China, Western Europe and Japan 
were becoming more important factors in addition to the established bi-polar superpower 
relationship. The five-to-one lead in strategic missiles enjoyed by President Kennedy 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis had slipped away during the 1960s with a massive Soviet 
build-up in land-based missiles that, according to William Bundy ‗grew from 250 
operational ICBMs in mid-1966 to 1060 in September 1969 (just ahead of the United 
States‘ 1054)‘, although the United States still had an overall edge due to their greater 
number of sea and air launched missiles.
40
  
Though Nixon had made political use of criticising Hubert Humphrey, his 
opponent in the 1968 election, for speaking of nuclear parity between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, he was aware that strategic superiority was no longer an option. In 
his first press conference as president he began instead to speak of ‗sufficiency‘ which he 
described as ‗sufficient military power to defend our interests and to maintain the 
commitments which this administration determines are in the interest of the United States 
around the world.‘41 This was a rhetorical attempt to move beyond the parity/superiority 
dichotomy but also a clear admittance of the loss of strategic superiority. According to 
Richard Melanson, Nixon believed that ‗an environment characterized by the growth of 
Soviet military power to parity, the remarkable economic recovery of Western Europe and 
Japan, and the fragmentation of monolithic communism‘ had replaced the post-war 
environment of US dominance.
42
 Nixon judged that dealing with this more fragmented, 
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multi-polar world would require strong leadership in order to shape what Kissinger 
characterised as ‗a new foreign policy for a new era‘.43 
After President Carter‘s failed attempt to reshape US foreign policy away from a 
focus on the Cold War rivalry, as well as the concerns of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979 and the Iran hostage crisis, Ronald Reagan came to the presidency 
determined to restore America to its rightful place of global predominance. Supported by a 
conservative foreign policy team, Reagan‘s foreign policy ethos was premised on what 
Williams has labelled as a ‗fundamental rejection‘ of the previous two administrations‘ 
acceptance of a relative decline in US global power.
44
 Reagan determined to overcome 
this through increased military spending and he used inflated rhetoric about the Soviet 
threat to convince a public that these increases were not only necessary but essential.
45
  
However, Reagan‘s portrait of a ‗decade of neglect‘ and his unprecedented 
response to restore American strength from a slow decline is lacking in two respects.
46
 
Firstly, Carter had already begun a military buildup in the last two years of his presidency 
in order to combat political attacks from the right and from hawkish, neoconservative 
lobby groups such as the CPD during his re-election campaign, particularly after the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.
47
 Carter planned to increase defence spending, 
including authorising the development of the new MX ICBM missile, and brought in 
Presidential Directive (PD) 59, a nuclear targeting directive that envisioned the possibility 
of a limited nuclear war and planned for its occurrence.
48
 While Reagan did significantly 
increase military spending, he was also continuing a trend that had begun prior to his 
accession to office and, while the administration‘s public rhetoric was more aggressive, 
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the nuclear war-fighting plan never departed significantly from PD-59.
49
 Secondly, as in 
many Cold War instances, the threat from the Soviet Union in the late 1970s and early 
1980s was overblown, and Reagan‘s depiction of the growing military strength of the 
Soviet Union used to attack Carter in the 1980 election was, according to Raymond 
Garthoff an ‗exaggerated picture.‘50 The Soviet Union was in the midst of an economic 
downturn; over the 1970s the annual increase in national output had declined, leading to 
economic stagnation and eventually to economic crisis by the mid-1980s.
51
   
Moreover, despite effectively doubling the Pentagon‘s budget in his first term, 
Reagan did not significantly alter the strategic balance. In fact, Fitzgerald has argued that 
by 1984, the US had fallen slightly behind in strategic weapons as a number of older Titan 
missiles had been retired and not yet replaced by the troubled MX.
52
 However, this was to 
a certain extent immaterial because people felt as though the US was stronger. As Idaho 
Republican Senator Steve Symms responded when asked about the military balance ‗just 
Ronald Reagan‘s election made us stronger...It‘s a state of mind.‘53 This is supported by 
contemporary polling which showed that in 1982, a majority of those surveyed believed 
the United States to be militarily inferior to the Soviet Union, while by 1986 a majority 
believed that the United States was superior again.
54
  
The previous sections have outlined the differences between the meanings for trust 
as used by President Nixon and President Reagan, and illustrated how the different 
personal, social, political and international contexts within which the word ‗trust‘ was 
used influenced the range of meanings it was possible for it to have. Talking about trust in 
this way requires an acceptance of the limitations of definition and the inability to acquire 
a ‗true‘ or somehow deeper significance for the word ‗trust‘ than that which lies on the 
surface of language. It demands an acknowledgement of where our study should stop 
before we bump our head on the limits of our understanding of language.
55
 However, this 
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does not mean that there is no way to talk about international politics in terms of trust. It 
is, in fact, this very type of acknowledgement, and the questions that ensue that can 
transform the idea of the study of trust into a different and more self-reflexive exercise. 
The following section will examine this potential further. 
 
Alternative ways to talk about trust 
The previous section of the chapter illustrated, through an investigation of the differing 
ways in which context influenced the meaning of trust in the two historical narratives, how 
the Wittgensteinian challenge of meaning as use can provide useful descriptions of the 
meanings for trust in different political contexts. Therefore, organising research around the 
premise that trust has an essence or core of meaning, may not always be the most helpful 
approach. 
Indeed, the popular conception of a role for trust in international politics (as 
exhibited in the literature described in Chapter 1) becomes suspect as it is founded on the 
assumption of an essence for trust. If trust is not an inner force that enables or constrains 
actions with universal characteristics or at least a constant baseline of meanings that can 
be defined, understood and thereby operationalised, then the idea that it ‗plays a role‘ in a 
generalisable sense in international politics is not necessarily a constructive way to talk 
about it. This is not to say that there may not be overlapping characteristics and 
similarities across many different meanings for trust, but that premising study on the idea 
that all cases of trust share the same meaning risks ignoring the specifics of meaning that 
could actually contribute to our understanding. 
However, it is perhaps possible to rehabilitate this notion of a role for trust by 
changing the way we talk about it. If one changes the meaning of this question to 
incorporate many roles (by which I mean the many ways on which the word ‗trust‘ can be 
used) for multiple trusts (that have no necessary or sufficient core of meaning) one can 
reconceptualise the idea of the role of trust from an inner motivating force for action, to 
instead become part of the action itself.
56
 This is a move away from the problematic idea 
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of trust as having agency that is implicit in the literature and towards the acceptance of the 
importance of intent and the singular study that was advocated in Chapter 1. Allowing for 
a plurality of meanings and uses for trust that are dependent on the intent of the research 
and what questions one asks about trust opens up many new opportunities for learning. 
This involves a process of recognising the possibilities of various descriptions rather than 
discovering a deep, true explanation.
57
 Abandoning the idea of unearthing new and correct 
understandings of trust allows for multiple descriptions of trust that can serve several 
purposes and invites a methodological pluralism.
58
  
In true Wittgensteinian fashion, this is perhaps best explained by using examples. 
The following paragraphs show, through a series of possible ways of describing trust in 
these specific contexts, how various interconnecting and overlapping ways of talking 
about the roles for trust in the examples under study in this research can be a valuable 
source of new description. 
 
Example A - Trust and authority/power 
One potential area for further study that has already become clear in the course of the 
research is the idea of the use of trust as a claim to authority and the relationship between 
expressions of trust, authority and power in politics. In the chapter on Nixon, trust was a 
very obvious request for authority based on his privileges as president. This can be further 
seen in the Second Annual Report to Congress on United States Foreign Policy, a 
comprehensive written account of the overall strategy and philosophy of his foreign policy 
planning for the year that Nixon began sending to Congress in 1970.
59
 In the introductory 
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letter sent to Congress with the report, Nixon described the dynamics of trust within the 
relationship between the executive and the public in the following manner: 
It is always a requirement of American leadership to explain, as clearly as possible, 
its overall approach. We must convincingly demonstrate the relationship between 
our specific actions and our basic purposes. In turn, the leadership can ask the 
American people for some degree of trust, and for acknowledgment of the 
complexities of foreign policy. This does not mean a moratorium on criticism. It 
means listening to, the rationale for specific actions and distinguishing attacks on 
the broad policy itself from attacks on tactical judgments.
60
 
The message here is that the public must allow that their leadership simply know 
better than they on certain respects of foreign policy. While Nixon acknowledged an 
obligation to explain his decisions to the people, (for ‗American leadership‘ in this case is 
arguably synonymous with ‗President Nixon‘) it is with the caveat of ‗as clearly as 
possible‘ within the ‗complexities of foreign policy.‘ This is the claim that ‗you‘ve elected 
me now you need to trust me,‘ which is in spirit somewhat comparable to a ‗you break it, 
you buy it‘ argument. So, while wider administration policy is open for critique, Nixon‘s 
‗tactical judgements‘ should not be attacked.61 This description of trust shows it as an 
expression of what Arthur Schlesinger describes as the Nixon administration doctrine ‗that 
institutions of authority were entitled to respect per se, whether or not they had done 
anything to earn respect.‘62  
There is a grammatical relationship between ideas of trust, authority and 
presidential power here that could be the basis for further study with regard to political 
leadership. Labelling someone as untrusting or untrustworthy is a powerful move in a 
realm where trust is spoken of as a valuable attribute or resource. For example, in his book 
on presidential power, Richard Neustadt described Nixon as ‗remarkably inept about a key 
aspect of power and that the most concrete of all, whom to trust.‘63 Thinking about trust in 
this manner could provide new descriptions of presidential uses of and claims to power in 
various political landscapes over a wider historical time span. 
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Example B - Trust as part of a ritual/performance of nuclear arms control 
Mr. President, by reducing arms, we reverse a half-century of steadily growing strategic 
arsenals. But more than that, we take a significant step forward in dispelling a half-
century of mistrust. By building trust, we pave a path to peace. 
-President George H. W. Bush on signing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START) in Moscow 1991 
64
 
 
President William Jefferson Clinton of the United States of America and President 
Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation met today in New York and agreed on a 
Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative as a constructive basis for 
strengthening trust between the two sides and for further development of agreed measures 
to enhance strategic stability and to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, missiles and missile technologies worldwide. 
-Joint Statement on the Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative between the 
United States of America and Russian Federation 2000 
 65 
 
I think it‘s interesting to note that a new relationship based upon trust and cooperation is 
one that doesn‘t need endless hours of arms control discussions...I think we need to have a 
new strategic framework that reflects the new relationship, based upon trust and 
cooperation. 
-President George W. Bush answering a question regarding withdrawal from the 
ABM Treaty at a press conference with Russian President Vladimir Putin 
66
 
 
[T]he relationships and trust that are built from the new START Treaty spill over into 
a whole host of other national security issues that are of vital importance to America. 
-President Barack Obama on the New START Treaty in 2010 
67
 
 
                                                 
64
 Remarks by President Gorbachev and President Bush at the Signing Ceremony for the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Talks Treaty in Moscow, 31 July, 1991, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19853. Last accessed 11 January, 2014. 
65
 Joint Statement: Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative between the United States of America and 
Russian Federation, 6 September, 2000, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1392. Last accessed 11 January, 2014. 
66
 George W. Bush, The President's News Conference with President Vladimir Putin of Russia, 13 
November, 2001, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64429. Last 
accessed 11 January, 2014. 
67
 Barack Obama, Remarks Following a Meeting with Former Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and an 
Exchange with Reporters, 1 December, 2010, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88761. Last accessed 11 January, 2014. 
  
197 
 
The statements above from the US presidents who have served since President Reagan all 
refer to a connection between trust and nuclear arms control. These are but a few examples 
of the common rhetoric on trust and nuclear arms control that continues to promote the 
idea that the two are naturally linked. Reagan‘s slogan of ‗trust but verify‘ is still being 
used by politicians across the political spectrum, from the hawkish former US Ambassador 
to the United Nations John Bolton speaking on Iran, to President Obama‘s description of 
his approach to Russian President Vladimir Putin‘s plans to remove chemical weapons 
from Syria.
68
  
However, it is a great irony that despite all the public espousal of the importance of 
trust and trust building in international politics, during the periods under examination in 
this thesis no one seemed to want to ever admit to actually trusting anyone.
69
 While 
claiming that trust was vital and that building trust was imperative, political leaders also 
often talked about trust in relation to weakness and naiveté and so denied ever actually 
being trusting.  
This denial of trust is a recurring theme of the two periods investigated in the 
previous chapters. Both presidents at times publicly advocated for a role for trust in the 
international system.
70
 This is also reflected in the text of the ABM treaty which features 
the ‗strengthening of trust between states‘ as a desired outcome.71 However, the two 
presidents, as well as members of their administration and members of Congress, also used 
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trust as a form of censure. This is clearly evident in the many Congressional hearings 
regarding arms control and missile defence in the two eras. In hearings in 1970, Marshall 
D. Shulman, Director of the Russia Institute, Columbia University testified that arms 
control ‗is not a question of trust‘ but ‗whether enough responsible men on each side can 
be brought to recognize and act upon their own rational self interest.‘72 Kissinger, in a 
hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the SALT agreements, pointed 
out that the agreements were made ‗not on the basis of trust, but on the basis of the 
enlightened self-interests of both sides.‘73 Nixon also reiterated this point in his Fourth 
Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.
74
   
While Reagan publicly advocated for trust between the two superpowers, he also 
firmly denied that any agreements he made with the Soviet Union were ever based on 
trust.
75
 He also used the word ‗trust‘ as a denunciation of his opponents, for example 
stating that ‗[m]any people believe the answer lies...in reaching arms control agreements. 
Trust and understanding alone, it is said, will lead to arms control‘.76 Members of 
Congress also used this charge against each other. For example, in hearings on Soviet 
compliance with arms control treaties, Congressman William Broomfield (R-MI 18) 
regretfully stated that ‗unfortunately...in Congress we have many people who think we 
ought to be basing our verification just merely on trust, and I think that is wrong.‘77 In 
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another congressional hearing on arms control, Congressman Henry Hyde (R-IL 6) 
described the Democratic Party as putting ‗its trust to a [sic] almost childlike degree in 
paper, in agreements‘.78  
Arvid Schors has described the history of Cold War nuclear arms control 
negotiations as ‗a history of the United States government publicly flaunting that it could, 
should, but above all, would not trust the Soviets under any circumstances.‘79 Allan Krass 
also describes the ‗credibility ritual‘ that anyone with claims to authority on nuclear arms 
control must undergo. This involved the ‗ritualistic incantation‘ that one does not, in any 
way, trust the Soviets and so ‗serves the purpose of demonstrating that the speaker is not a 
sentimental disarmer or unwitting dupe of Soviet trickery.‘80 In this way, trust (or its 
disavowal) played a role in establishing one‘s ability to take part in the discourse on 
nuclear arms. Or in other words, to take part in this elite action you must be trusted not to 
trust.  
 The basic paradox of trust of the Reagan and Nixon rhetoric, in which trust is both 
positive and negative, both aspired to but never acted on, continues today. Today‘s actors 
express a related set of declarations in similar contexts, saying for example that they are 
not naive enough to base any agreements with Iran on trust. For example, Secretary of 
State John Kerry recently announced that ‗nothing we do‘ in negotiating with Iran would 
be ‗based on trust‘.81 Even if one takes at face value the statements made by US leaders 
regarding trust and arms control, they lack consistency and one is still faced with 
contradictory messages in which trust is alternately necessary for arms control, irrelevant 
for arms control, or indeed whether trust makes arms control redundant. Perhaps one 
alternative way to think about how important trust is for arms control is to consider trust as 
a performance in a similar way to Krass‘ discussion of a Cold War credibility ritual. Trust 
is a necessary public part of the practice of arms control in which the articulation of the 
need to build trust becomes the end in itself as it establishes a commonly acknowledged 
good.  
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Trust in this context can be described as a political language trope that, as Edelman 
states ‗is considered a primary goal‘ and therefore ‗to discuss it, praise it, denounce it or 
repeat it becomes a real gratification.‘82 It is a code word for a group of people (in this 
case state leaders and diplomats) to identify themselves and their needs as a valid part of 
the political process through advocating for something that is generally agreed-upon as a 
positive thing. The role of trust is therefore one of a ‗label suggested by our dominant 
cultural values and conceptions‘ which is ‗presented to our attention and demands a 
response.‘83 When a politician invokes trust, as George Orwell has described the repetition 
of political speech forms, ‗he may be almost unconscious of what he is saying, as one is 
when one utters the responses in church.‘84 Thus Reagan was able to repeatedly extol the 
need for trust prior to arms control with the Soviet Union, this was generally accepted by 
the western public and every president since has maintained a similar rhetorical 
connection.  
The noteworthy exception to the link that US presidents since Reagan have all 
made between nuclear arms control and trust is that of President George W. Bush‘s 
statement quoted above. Bush denied the need for ‗endless hours of arms control 
discussions‘ because of the ‗new relationship based upon trust and cooperation‘ that had 
developed between the United States and Russia.
85
  However, Bush was making this 
declaration exactly one month before the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty 
against the wishes of Russia, which Russian President Vladimir Putin labelled at the time 
as ‗a mistake‘.86 Trust is again being used as a symbol of a good thing in international 
politics and therefore talking about it provides a way of framing any potentially 
contentious decision as a positive one. 
The relationship between arms control and nuclear weapons has always been a 
complex one and arms control has always been part of a circular relationship with military 
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spending in discussions of the development of nuclear technology.
87
 In Chapter 2, for 
example, Nixon‘s approach to arms control was mainly as a means to facilitate movement 
on issues such as the Vietnam War or the Middle East and part of the mechanism of a 
wider strategy of détente.
88
 President Reagan also justified his first term military buildup 
as necessary in order to negotiate ‗peace through strength‘ with the Soviet Union.89  
Despite this, and as illustrated above, US Presidents continue to talk about nuclear 
arms control in terms of trust. Both are ideas that have been established through rhetorical 
practices as standard approved diplomatic goals and as interconnecting justifications for 
various actions. As Campbell Craig and Jan Ruzicka have argued, arms control has been 
‗widely accepted as an obvious universal good‘ which has produced the establishment of 
an institutionalised system of NGOs, state agencies and academic programmes that they 
term the ‗nonproliferation complex‘, and which inhibits alternative conceptions of how to 
deal with issues of nuclear weapons by maintaining the status quo.
90
 The language of trust 
and trust building that has been connected to this nonproliferation complex as exemplified 
in the quotes above can be viewed part of a performance of diplomacy through the 
articulation of a universal good thing that is neither means nor end. Therefore, when state 
leaders declare that they need trust for arms control, or that arms control will build trust 
and enable peace, one way to potentially think about the role of trust in this situation is as 
part of a symbolic performance. Further study of the political use of trust and nuclear arms 
control would allow for a critical examination of how much public expressions of trust are 
political goals, means to another end, or a performance to establish the validity of the 
speaker and their place in the arms control establishment.  
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Example C - Trust as an ideology 
Another potential avenue for further research that is illuminated by the grammatical 
approach to trust in these narratives is to talk about trust as the expression of a political 
ideology. This can be most clearly seen in Chapter 3 in which President Reagan used a 
meaning for trust that was closely connected with his conservative ideals. The description 
of trust as a conservative value is evident in an address he gave in April 1988 to the World 
Affairs Council of Western Massachusetts where he announced that he had, 
come here today to suggest that this notion of trusting the power of human freedom 
and letting the people do the rest was not just a good basis for our economic policy, 
it proved a solid foundation for our foreign policy as well. That‘s what we've given 
to the people, why we have repeated what they instinctively knew, but what the 
experts had shied away from saying in public.
91
 
Reagan repeatedly linked trust to his conservative political philosophy. ‗Trust the 
people‘ in economic terms was an expression of Reagan‘s free market, fiscally 
conservative policy of cutting government spending, lowering taxes and deregulation 
while increasing defence spending. Reagan‘s language of trust was about the greatness of 
the ordinary American. he framed trust as freedom from the pernicious influence of big 
government and ‗experts‘ so that he could then frame policies of higher taxes, regulation 
on private industry and government spending as motivated by a lack of trust in America‘s 
potential.  
Reagan‘s grammar of trust included the word ‗faith‘, and the connection between 
the words ‗trust‘ and ‗faith‘ was illustrative of his characterisation of trust as a bond that 
was sacred and special to the people of the United States.
92
 This specialness was rooted in 
conservative and Christian values. This demonstrates a deeply ideological meaning for 
trust and its role can therefore be investigated as part of a wider analysis of Reaganite 
policy or even more broadly in the rise of US conservatism and the religious political 
right. As well as the habitual connection that has been made in the literature between trust 
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and the Cold War or nuclear weapons, one can also make a useful link between trust and 
US political ideologies because of the nature of the founding myths and the political 
culture of the United States.  
 
Example D – Trust as rhetorical coercion 
Moving to the realm of international politics, one way of conceiving of a role for trust is as 
a tool of public coercion of other political actors. The grammatical investigation of 
President Reagan‘s use of trust in Chapter 3 has shown how Reagan advocated for trust as 
a necessary component in international politics, and trustworthiness as a required quality 
in international actors, in order to place pressure on the Soviet Union to take certain 
actions. Reagan was able to frame the issue of nuclear arms control as a matter of trust and 
by doing so force the Soviet Union to amend its actions. This linking together of trust with 
the issue of arms control was a frame that the United States was able to impose on the 
arms control process.  
This potential role for trust is one that fits well with the more strategic, actor-based 
studies of language such as Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson‘s model of 
‗rhetorical coercion‘ where the objective of the rhetor is ‗through skilful framing, to leave 
their opponents without access to the rhetorical materials needed to craft a socially 
sustainable rebuttal‘ to their framing of a situation.93 By positioning trust as important, and 
proposing a politically advantageous meaning for trust, the Reagan administration was 
able to put the Soviet Union in the position of having to accede to certain requests in order 
to fit within the accepted idea of what was important in international politics.  
 In his study on confidence building at the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE), Michael Morgan has described how all the participants used the words 
trust and confidence ‗not as a goal in itself but as a weapon to wage the Cold War by other 
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means.‘94 The Soviets initially used the idea of ‗international confidence‘ to persuade the 
western actors to come to the negotiating table. At the negotiations the United States and 
Western Europeans emphasised an agenda of free movement, Confidence Building 
Measures (CBMs) and transparency through the language of building trust, with all 
participants seeing this ‗not as a way of building trust for its own sake, but as a tool to 
advance their own interests.‘95  In this type of situation and especially if one is taking a 
very intent-focused approach to rhetoric, the description of trust as ‗rhetorical coercion‘ is 
another potentially useful way of talking about a role for trust in International Relations. 
 
Example E – Trust and technology in the thermonuclear revolution 
Another possible way to talk about a role for trust is to look at how trust, technology and 
verification are related to the nuclear revolution, specifically how the mutual vulnerability 
that came with the development of nuclear weapons led to different ways of talking about 
the rhetorical relationship between trust and technology in US politics.  
The relationship between the rhetoric of trust and the nuclear revolution in the 
previous chapters was bound up with language regarding the benefits of technology and 
technological progress. The plans for ABM in the Nixon era, SDI in the Reagan era and 
the development of technological means of verification for arms control treaties were 
quests to make trust unnecessary; to liberate the public from the feeling that they had to 
trust in deterrence, in an adversary or in an arms control agreement. Technology would 
replace trust. In testimony before Congress, Nixon administration officials continually 
affirmed that National Technical Means (NTM) of verification would enable both 
countries to use satellite imagery and telemetry to verify the SALT I agreement, negating 
any need for trust. For example, in his testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Kissinger stated that the NTM provided ‗the highest degree of confidence‘,96 
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that any violation would be detected and that administration officials ‗are not basing this 
agreement on trust, and we believe that this agreement can be verified; and secondly, that 
it has adequate safeguards to prevent its being violated.‘97 
Reagan also looked to American technology as a means of removing the United 
States from its state of vulnerability and any requirement to put its trust in the Soviet 
Union. As he declared, ‗[w]e can either bet on American technology to keep us safe or on 
Soviet promises, and each has its own track record. And I‘ll bet on American technology 
any day.‘98 Though what is noteworthy here is that Reagan conceived of technology in 
terms of the potential of the American people to innovate, rather than in terms of 
technological expertise, of which he proclaimed himself suspicious. Reagan used the word 
‗trust‘ in terms of technology with regard to his language of ‗trust the people‘. For 
example, in a speech in Madrid in May 1985 regarding public criticism of SDI he 
declared: ‗If we put our trust in experts and rely on their knowledge to shape our destiny, 
then we condemn ourselves to live in the past. For how can they be experts in what hasn‘t 
been invented yet, what doesn‘t yet exist?‘99 Reagan thus spoke about technology in a 
specific way that contained both a strong political ideology and a central contradiction that 
one should trust in the power of American technology while not trusting in technical 
experts. 
Of course, all these technologies were limited and none failsafe. There was, and 
indeed is, no technological solution to the problem of nuclear vulnerability, but what is 
significant is that they were presented to the public as such, and as solutions to the 
unfortunate and unprecedented need for trust in international politics because of the 
condition of mutual vulnerability imposed by the thermo-nuclear revolution.
100
 ‗Trust‘ and 
‗technology‘ were words that were intimately bound up in the national political rhetoric on 
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nuclear weapons throughout the Cold War and that could provide scholars with another 
direction for further study.
101
 
What these few, and certainly not exhaustive set of examples show is that it is 
perhaps possible to say that trust ‗is important‘ or ‗plays a role‘ in a certain respect but just 
not in the specific, universalist and limiting way in which the literature to date has talked 
of it. The description of the role of trust in all the above situations rests on a foundation of 
meaning as use and an acknowledgement of context and history. By taking this approach 
there are many roles for multiple meanings of trust in the study of international politics 
and each of these provides a potentially valuable course of study that is not reliant on 
reductionist accounts of the meaning of trust but rather takes the approach of ‗look and 
see‘.  
 
Conclusion  
The literature reviewed in Chapter 1 often claims that trust not only plays a role in 
international politics, but that it is both possible and useful to define, understand and 
operationalise trust and trust building in the study of International Relations. Earlier 
sections of this thesis have challenged how the representational view of meaning inherent 
in the form of this research on trust creates problems for the accomplishment of its stated 
goals. This project has thus far contended that it can be counterproductive to try and 
separate the meaning of trust from its expression and thereby work under the assumption 
that it is beneficial or even possible to look at trust as a phenomenon that exists and acts in 
the world independently and that can be understood in abstract. It has adopted the 
Wittgensteinian perspective on meaning that argues against such essentialism as well as 
dismissing the idea of understanding as an experience or attribute rather than an activity.  
This chapter has further demonstrated how the Wittgensteinian challenge to the 
dominant way of talking about meaning proposed in Chapter 1 can provide an alternative 
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to the current course of the study of trust in International Relations. It has shown, through 
a comparison of the various contexts within which Presidents Nixon and Reagan talked 
about trust, that taking a meaning for trust that is derived from its use is a practical and 
constructive way of dealing with the word. The chapter examined the disparities in the 
meanings for trust as used by Nixon and Reagan and illustrated how it is possible to 
develop an understanding for trust that is located within the context of its use. It showed 
how the meaning for trust in Chapters 2 and 3 can be understood within the differing 
domestic, bureaucratic and international circumstances, as well as within the political 
histories and attributes of the two speakers. It thus provided an ostensive argument for 
why one should try to understand the meaning of trust in use, rather than imposing one‘s 
generalised and a-historical definition for trust onto the situation. 
The chapter united the conceptual challenge of the Wittgensteinian approach to 
meaning that was contained in Chapter 1, with the empirical challenge of the grammatical 
investigations of trust in Chapters 2 and 3. Through this, it contested several of the 
conventions of trust research on a practical level and suggested multiple alternative ways 
to talk about trust. These were taken from the situation under study and founded on an 
acceptance of context and complexity, thus avoiding the semantic and methodological 
difficulties of the existing approaches to the study of trust in International Relations. The 
conclusion will discuss further how the lessons learned from this study of trust can be 
relevant for the study of International Relations more generally. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
On 1 October 1946, at the dawn of the Cold War and eight months after sending the now 
infamous Long Telegram to the State Department in Washington DC while posted as 
Chargé d‘Affaires in Moscow, George Kennan gave a talk to staff at the Yale Institute of 
International Studies.
1
 The talk bore the title ‗‗Trust‘‘ as a Factor in International 
Relations and he justified his choice of topic with the following words: 
And I have chosen a subject which may seem at first glance too elementary, too 
vulgar in the political sense, for so initiated a gathering. But I think you will agree 
with me that in any discipline of the social sciences...there is no postulate, however 
elementary, which is not useful to re-examine from time to time; and the more 
obvious and the more familiar the postulate, the greater the danger that we may by 
inadvertence come to place too great a reliance upon it and commit in this way 
perhaps the most pardonable but also the most grievous of the sins of scholars.
2
 
During his talk, Kennan outlined the limitations of the role of the individual in diplomacy, 
whom he argued must be ‗pretty well ruled out‘ as an object of trust in International 
Relations, because a diplomat must be a representative of the government ‗and nothing 
more when he is doing government business.‘ He claimed that this was particularly true in 
the case of the Soviet Union where ‗the interplay of ideology and tradition has led to a 
state of affairs where almost no confidence is placed in the natural good will or integrity of 
any individual‘. Therefore any examination of trust in International Relations, and 
specifically any analysis of trust in relations with the Soviet Union, must be at the level of 
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government, the ‗great fabrics of habit and tradition in which the personalities of 
individuals emerge for relatively brief periods of time, like skeins in the weave, only to 
disappear again in the mass to which they have added their tiny quantity of substance.‘3  
He further conjectured that, as this was the case, there was no way to ‗properly 
speak of any such thing as ―trust‖ in the relations between great states‘, for to place trust in 
a government attributed to it ‗a moral quality which it does not and can not[sic] have.‘ 
Therefore, he concluded, saying that one has trust in another state was ‗a misuse of the 
term. We have knowledge; we have expectancy, perhaps. We don‘t have trust.‘ 
Kennan‘s pronouncements on the ideology and foreign policy of the Soviet Union 
and the post-War possibilities for relations between the two superpowers that made up the 
rest of the address are well known from their publication in other forms. However, his 
reflections on trust and International Relations in this talk also still have purchase today.
4
 
In fact Kennan, at the start of the Cold War, identified the issues that scholars who study 
trust in International Relations are still trying to address in the present: at what level can 
we talk about trust in international politics, how would trust in the personal relations of 
diplomats and leaders relate to wider state relations, does trust have a moral dimension or 
is it based around knowledge and rationality, and is there a correct way in how one should 
understand and use the term?   
Moreover, in his characterisation of the ‗most pardonable but also the most 
grievous of the sins of scholars‘, that of placing ‗too great a reliance‘ on a familiar 
postulate such as trust without adequate consideration, Kennan‘s talk presages some of the 
concerns of this research, work which is being conducted on the other side of the Cold 
War, almost seventy years and many volumes of scholarship later. In this thesis I have 
embraced Kennan‘s assertion that it is ‗useful to re-examine from time to time‘ an 
‗obvious‘ and ‗familiar‘ postulate such as ‗trust‘, and so I have undertaken a re-
examination of the meaning of the word ‗trust‘ and its place in International Relations. In 
this conclusion, I will evaluate the main points that emerged from this investigation and 
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assess what these findings imply for how we talk about trust, as well as how we talk about 
International Relations more broadly. 
 
The grammatical investigation 
The contribution of this thesis has been to challenge the prevailing method of talking 
about trust and International Relations. The thesis as a whole makes the claim that the 
existing literature is based on a problematic assumption that one can find the meaning for 
trust and thereby understand and operationalise its role in international politics. This 
project suggests that, alternatively, it is in grammar, the place of the word ‗trust‘ in the 
form of life that is our language, where one can find a meaning for trust. Trust‘s ‗nature‘ 
therefore lies in what we talk about when we talk about trust. Looking for a deeper 
meaning than this is simply a refusal to acknowledge where the boundaries of 
understanding are located and is the source of several difficulties this thesis has identified 
in the current form of the study of trust in International Relations.  
I began to make this claim by reviewing the literature on trust, both in International 
Relations and more widely in the social sciences. I argued that on the whole, the literature 
takes a particular view of meaning as representation and that this particular way of talking 
about language and meaning, though not the only way to talk about these matters, has been 
adopted by the authors reviewed without question. While not necessarily explicitly stating 
this, all discuss trust as if it were an object in the world that has stable and universal 
characteristics represented by the label ‗trust‘. I argued that it is this specific way of 
conceiving of meaning that leads to the dominant picture of trust as playing a role in 
international politics.  
I then claimed that this adoption of the representational view of meaning 
influences the nature of the subsequent research from its core and leads to certain 
methodological inevitabilities. These include the consequently necessary search for the 
‗true‘ meaning for trust and the need for a complete definition. When this proves difficult, 
the literature often resorts to what I have termed as three descriptive fallacies to help 
explain the nature of trust. This thesis has claimed that the difficulties of explanation in the 
study of trust as presently conducted stem from that first unacknowledged decision on 
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where the meaning of a word resides, and that opening up a discussion on this would be a 
valuable contribution to the current literature.  
As an opening step in this discussion, I proposed a way of talking about meaning 
in the case of trust that was not predicated on language as representation. This is the 
Wittgensteinian challenge of ‗meaning as use‘, that words get their meaning from their 
context and that understanding is not a body of knowledge or an experience but an 
activity. The purpose of this was not to suggest an alternative Wittgensteinian theory of 
meaning in International Relations. The function of the Wittgensteinian critique is rather 
to unsettle the dominant viewpoint, to dislodge some of the assumptions in the literature 
and to place some uncertainties into the discussion. I suggested that one way to practice an 
alternative study of trust was through a grammatical investigation that would involves a 
method of description based on the ethos of ‗look and see‘. This investigation could 
provide a means of release from the imperatives for definition and abstract meaning that 
are imposed on the current research. By staying on the surface of language and looking at 
how meaning is located within a range of possibilities for a word in use, I maintained that 
a grammatical investigation of trust would avoid the requirement for definition by 
providing a context-bound understanding of the word. 
To illustrate this, I conducted two investigations into meaning as use in the 
language of trust regarding nuclear weapons as expressed by two US Cold War presidents. 
Rather than being guided by any previous idea of what trust was or what trust did in either 
of these cases, I took a Wittgensteinian approach of ‗look and see‘ and described meanings 
for trust that were located within their specific background. The investigation of President 
Nixon‘s use of trust in the debate over ABM in the context of the SALT negotiations and 
President Reagan‘s use regarding his nuclear weapons policy and the arms control 
negotiations with the Soviet Union, demonstrated two meanings for trust whose 
foundations were located in different circumstances. 
In a time of social unrest and widespread discontent with authority, Nixon referred 
back to a long-standing tradition of trust in the office of the president, locating himself in a 
long line of venerated past leaders such as Presidents Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and Dwight D. Eisenhower. He also used his position as president to draw a 
distinction between the qualities of his judgement on foreign policy issues such as the 
ABM and the judgement of the ordinary American citizen, and based an appeal for trust 
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on that difference. Nixon‘s meaning for trust was thus a reflection of the political context 
and his response to the imperatives of the nuclear revolution.  
Although President Reagan often based his rhetoric around themes of nostalgia, he 
did not talk about trust in terms of the history of the office of president, but rather spoke of 
trust with reference to a vision of America built on the principles of freedom and limited 
government. Reagan related trust to democracy, faith and free-market principles and, as 
such, spoke of it as an innately American characteristic, which was shaped by his place in 
US political culture, the contemporary politics and his vision of politics in a nuclear era. 
Unlike Nixon, Reagan also placed trust prominently within his public speech on the Soviet 
Union and nuclear arms control. He talked about the international realm as a place where 
trust was important and framed the Soviet Union as an inherently untrustworthy partner in 
nuclear arms control. 
The grammatical approach to these subjects allowed for a comparison between the 
two meanings that highlighted the significance of use to meaning when talking about a 
word such as ‗trust‘. Contrasting the two uses of trust described in the historical chapters 
showed how, in both these stories, meaning was located within and inseparable from a 
wider background of understanding. Through a discussion of the similarities and 
differences of the personal, bureaucratic, domestic and international situations in which 
the president‘s uses of trust were situated, the thesis illustrated how meaning is affected by 
context and is thus perhaps best understood in its place. I concluded with some brief 
suggestions taken from insights gained in the two chapters as to how the study of trust in 
these particular examples could proceed in a manner that is more in line with a non-
representational approach to understanding.  
 
Implications for the study of trust 
One of the principal conclusions and contributions of this research is the claim that the 
idea of uncovering trust‘s nature and the role it can play in international politics is actually 
a particular picture of the world. While this picture may be a useful one in the conduct of 
specific research agendas, it is also inevitably limiting, for as William Connolly explains, 
‗[t]hose who simply use established concepts to get to the facts of political life, those who 
act unreflectively within the confines of established concepts, actually have the 
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perceptions and modes of conduct available to them limited in subtle and undetected 
ways.‘5 This work contends that the lack of acknowledgement in the existing literature on 
trust of the limiting power of this picture is important and has led to what John Gunnell 
describes as ‗internal contradictions and self-generated dilemmas‘, such as the problematic 
tendencies and the three descriptive fallacies associated with the representational account 
of trust that I outlined in Chapter 1.
6
 
 In practice, if one accepts this picture and takes the view held within the existing 
literature that trust needs to be defined on an abstract level, there are two possible 
variations of compromise to accept in order to deal with the ambiguity of meaning: one 
must either define trust very loosely or in very specific terms. Each of those two 
compromises has its own problems in terms of an actual contribution to the study of 
international politics. If one creates a very broad, general definition for one‘s specific 
purpose, one runs the risk of being able to make everything and anything in politics fit into 
a narrative of trust, thus explaining little. In contrast, if one takes a very specific definition 
of trust, one is likely to be left with the proposition that ‗according to my definition of 
trust as ‗x‘ in specific circumstances ‗y‘ this is an occasion of trust‘. This circular 
explanation may be technically accurate but once again has a problem with how much it 
can actually contribute to furthering an understanding of politics.  
This work therefore recommends an alternative way of talking about trust that 
might avoid some of the most common dilemmas. By challenging the current form of trust 
research on both a conceptual level and through the grammatical investigations contained 
in the historical chapters, this research has exposed the frame of the picture of the world 
contained in the dominant methods of conducting research on trust in the social sciences. 
The thesis thus advocates dislodging the dominant methods, or at least dislodging the 
assumptions upon which the methods are built. It also argues that breaking down this 
picture of trust in International Relations can create new possibilities for further research 
                                                 
5
 William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993), 1. 
6
 John Gunnell, ‗Desperately Seeking Wittgenstein,‘ European Journal of Political Theory 3, no. 1 (2004): 
77-98. 
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and enable a methodological plurality that allows the nature and circumstance of the 
enquiry to decide its means.
7
   
Another contribution that emerges from this research is a caution that one should 
be critical of what one is doing by choosing trust as a priority for study. Just as we should 
question the politicians who claim the need for trust in international politics, we should 
also ask what the implications are of privileging trust in the study of International 
Relations. Chapter 3 demonstrated how the Reagan administration created a narrative of 
the importance of trust in international politics to advocate for specific political goals 
regarding nuclear weapons. If it is clear how imposing a narrative of trust onto politics can 
shape perspective in practice, imposing a similar narrative onto the study of politics also 
influences research agendas. Taking a call for trust or an acknowledgement of its 
importance from a political setting, in a political speech or document for example, and 
bringing it into an academic setting runs the risk of reproducing an existing political 
agenda or bias.
8
  
There are limitations in what one can see if one is framing international politics in 
terms of trust, so that trust becomes, as Wittgenstein describes ‗like a pair of glasses on 
our nose through which we see whatever we look at‘ and we are left with the problem that 
it ‗never occurs to us to take them off.‘9 Also, if the enterprise of studying trust in 
International Relations is focused on whose explanation of trust is most correct, it 
becomes a possibility that in conducting the study of trust in International Relations, one 
learns more about differing authors‘ competing theories of trust than about international 
politics.  
When trust becomes embedded in the form of our questions, it places a boundary 
around the world of potential answers. And, if all stories, as Michael J. Shapiro claims 
‗have a mythic level‘ in that they ‗have a job to do, a perspective to promote, a kind of 
world to affirm or deny‘, it is important to stop and question what the story of trust in 
                                                 
7
 This is congruent with the Wittgensteinian idea of philosophy as therapy, ‗[t]here is not a philosophical 
method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies [emphasis in original].‘ Philosophical 
Investigations, 133. 
8
 This issue of transferring the biases of sources is discussed with regards to the study of history in Richard J. 
Evans, In Defence of History (London: Granta Books, 1997), 80.  
9
 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 103. 
  
215 
 
International Relations is doing as a necessary beginning to any research on the subject.
10
 
Talking about politics in terms of trust necessarily privileges certain concepts and actions 
that are related to the grammar of trust and undermines those that are not. 
  One response to the challenge of ‗meaning as use‘ could be that, separate from its 
expression, there was a deeper role for trust in these Cold War encounters. However, this 
is still placing a false distinction between words and meaning that does not allow the 
Wittgensteinian point. As Wittgenstein explains, ‗[y]ou say: the point isn‘t the word, but 
its meaning, and you think of the meaning as a thing of the same kind as the word, though 
also different from the word. Here the word, there the meaning.‘11 This work has argued 
that we cannot get behind our words to some real thing underneath and, in fact, trying to 
get beneath what we talk about when we talk about trust to some ‗true‘ or more real 
meaning will only cause confusion. However, this does not mean that meaning is arbitrary. 
On the contrary, meaning is located in a background of understanding and based in certain 
material conditions, the ‗scaffolding of facts‘ upon which we play our language games.12 
Meaning in use does not mean that meaning is random and acknowledging complexity is 
not admitting that the world cannot be understood; it simply questions what it means to 
understand. 
Of course the grammatical approach in this research is not without its own 
problems and questions. Firstly, there is the question of what can or should be considered 
as context in any context-bound description. The Wittgensteinian suggestion of ‗look and 
see‘ is not a systematised approach, and this work is by nature qualitative, interpretive and 
personal, and must rely on the judgement of the individual scholar.   
Secondly, and linked to this is that the Wittgensteinian suggestion of description 
over explanation and the approach of ‗look and see‘ may raise questions when bringing 
the idea into practice in an analysis of politics. It invites the critique that taking a 
Wittgensteinian approach does not allow for certain types of theory or any wider 
understanding beyond the singular. However, as argued in Chapter 1, the Wittgensteinian 
use of description is more nuanced than this criticism would allow. What description 
means is also a function of its particular language game. As Wittgenstein states, ‗[p]erhaps 
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 Michael J. Shapiro, Introduction, in Michael J. Shapiro, ed., Language and Politics, 2. 
11
 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 120. 
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 Wittgenstein, Zettel, 330. Quoted in Baker and Hacker, Wittgenstein Rules, Grammar and Necessity, 229. 
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this word ―describe‖ tricks us here. I say ―I describe my state of mind‖ and ―I describe my 
room‖. You need to call to mind the differences between the language games.‘13 Just as 
there is not one meaning for trust, the question to ask is not ‗what is describing?‘ but ‗what 
is meant (or for this purpose intended) by description here?‘ Descriptions can take many 
forms; they are ‗instruments for particular uses.‘14 What this points to is that ‗look and 
see‘ allows for openness to a multiplicity of methods and theories (as was shown in 
practice in Chapter 4). While the Wittgensteinian approach is not compatible with 
International Relations when framed as a social science that conducts covering law-style 
theory, it is not inherently anti-theory if theory can be thought of as a way of describing 
the world. Theory as description simply requires the appropriate choice of descriptive 
instrument that entails the judgement of the author and must originate in the nature of the 
specific issue that is under investigation. 
In fact, this is not dissimilar to some other more conventional work on theory and 
International Relations. In an article that addresses a similar subject from a different 
perspective, Adam R.C. Humphreys has argued for the ‗heuristic application‘ of theories 
in International Relations.
15
 Humphreys asks how explanatory theories are applied in 
International Relations and claims that rather than providing covering-law type 
explanations, theories ‗indicate what sort of explanation is required, provide conceptual 
categories and suggest an empirical focus.‘16 He concludes that theories must be looked at 
in an empirical context and that their use cannot be separated from the ‗good judgement‘ 
of the scholar.  
While Humphreys adopts a more traditional social scientific approach to the idea 
of theories, explanation and International Relations to the Wittgensteinian one taken here, 
they are nonetheless sympathetic claims. Humphreys places his emphasis on the 
contextual and the importance of the personal experience and judgement of the scholar in 
a manner that is similar to the contextual approach of ‗look and see‘. He also advocates for 
scepticism of abstract explanations and the place of the historical and the specific case. 
This is not incompatible with the description of theory as a ‗picture‘ of seeing the world. 
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 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 290. 
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Finally, it is obvious that the frame of trust also shapes this work which, although a 
critical one, is nonetheless a study of trust in International Relations. Despite this 
boundary, this study still constitutes a more flexible and self-reflexive approach to the 
topic of trust than that of the existing literature. By keeping on the rough ground of the 
everyday use of words, this study of trust, while framed by a word and of course limited 
by that frame, is nonetheless able to take the limits of the word from the subject under 
study rather than imposing limits onto the subject from above. Reforming the commonly 
asked question from ‗what does trust mean?‘ to the more grammatical, ‗what is be meant 
by trust here?‘ provides new and different answers and understandings while remaining 
within the framework of trust and International Relations.  
 
The wider contribution to the study of International Relations 
The recognition of a Wittgensteinian approach to language can also contribute to the study 
of International Relations beyond the literature on trust. It can add to our understanding of 
other grand concepts and categories in International Relations as well as provide a way to 
question the assumptions that go into the general form of our research questions. As James 
Tully explains, the Philosophical Investigations is a ‗vehicle for [Wittgenstein‘s] profound 
aim of unsettling and resisting the most basic conventions of thought of our scientific 
civilization‘.17 This research therefore contributes to the wider study of International 
Relations in exposing certain dominant conventions, or ‗pictures‘ of the world and how we 
talk about it in both theory and practice.  
Moving the focus away from whether trust existed or acted within the historical 
chapters also makes a contribution to the literature on these two historical eras and on the 
process of nuclear arms control, US foreign policy and political communication. The 
analysis of President Nixon‘s meaning for trust exposes Nixon‘s approach to foreign 
policy and to governance more broadly, as well as the administration‘s methods of 
political communication. Framing the narrative of the battle for ABM deployment in this 
way also effectively highlighted the connection between nuclear weapons programmes 
and domestic politics. By critically examining President Reagan‘s meaning for trust, 
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 James Tully, ‗Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy: Understanding Practices of Critical Reflection,‘ 
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Chapter 3 was able to describe his use of language in the international realm, to query the 
idea of a role for trust in the process of nuclear arms control in the late 1980s and again to 
illustrate the connection between nuclear weapons policy and domestic politics. Indeed, 
another contribution of this work is to highlight the significance of domestic politics in all 
the decision-making on nuclear weapons throughout these periods. The approach of 
‗meaning as use‘ also allows the possibility of questioning the traditional way of 
discussing motivation as an inner source of action in the study of Cold War History and I 
believe that this is a potentially fruitful avenue for further research. 
While this work has focused on the study of trust in International Relations, many 
of the same points apply to how we talk about other words such as ‗fear‘, ‗power‘, 
‗liberty‘ or ‗legitimacy‘. All of these terms share the potential danger of hypostatisation, 
which can lead to misplaced contests over meaning overshadowing the potential 
usefulness of the study of the word. There have been Wittgensteinian inspired 
interventions into debates on the meaning of other words in International Relations. Shane 
Mulligan has conducted a conceptual history of the use of the word ‗legitimacy‘ in 
international affairs through an incorporation of Wittgenstein‘s idea of language games to 
understand the continuity and change in the use of legitimacy in the study and practice of 
international politics.
18
 Jonathan Havercroft uses Wittgenstein‘s discussion of changing 
aspects to argue that political philosophers should not try to gain an explanation of the 
word ‗liberty‘, but should instead view liberty as an ‗aspectival concept‘.19 Véronique Pin-
Fat has also undertaken a grammatical reading of the expression of universality in 
influential literature on ethics and International Relations.
20
 This review of trust adds to 
the existing literature advocating for the recognition of Wittgenstein in debates over 
meaning and International Relations by focusing on the dilemmas of definition and 
explanation that are relevant to much of the existing work on these words.  
This research also offers a contribution to a wider discussion about how we talk  
about International Relations and the idea of thinking conceptually more broadly. Taking a 
Wittgensteinian perspective to theory provides a language through which one can question 
what a theory is and does, it illuminates theory‘s role in creating pictures of the world, and 
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by thinking of it in this manner, exposes its effects on our thinking. The importance of this 
for broader study can be seen in the resonance of these themes in recent and differing 
works on theory‘s place in International Relations. For example, Chapter 1 discussed the 
connection between the recent practice turn in International Relations and Wittgensteinian 
descriptions of language as a form of life. The approach taken here has much in common 
with this literature in terms of advocating for a wider approach to understanding and 
knowledge than what has typically been allowed.
21
 I have also shown that the 
Wittgensteinian approach is not incompatible with Humphreys‘ work regarding the 
heuristic application of International Relations theory. 
 In his 2012 book, Daniel Levine argues that prevalent in all existing approaches to 
International Relations theory is an underestimation of the extent ‗to which the limitations 
of theory come into play in understanding political realities‘.22 He contends that the 
‗essentially complex, interconnected, ―lumpy‖ quality of real-world things‘ eludes the 
limitations of social science which often then falls prey to the general danger of reification 
in thinking about politics.
23
 He advocates the confrontation and acknowledgement of the 
inherent limitations of conceptual thought. While Levine‘s Frankfurt School foundation 
significantly differs from the Wittgensteinian basis of this work, there are several 
similarities and overlapping points in both intent and in conclusions. 
Both Levine‘s work and this research recommend a continuous process of self-
critique and reflection as well as the recognition of the limits of our ways of understanding 
the world in abstract terms. Both argue for an acceptance of the excesses of theory and 
categorisation, and the distorting effect of what Levine describes as reification and what I 
have labelled as hypostatisation.
24
 Levine‘s ‗sustainable critique‘ and the Wittgensteinian 
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analysis through the grammatical ‗look and see‘ investigation offered here also do not 
result in the proposal of any one method or theory and neither see any particular school or 
paradigm of thought as more or less susceptible or immune to the dangers of forgetting the 
impact of conceptual limitations on International Relations scholarship. In this manner 
they are both works about the importance of remembering.  
The Wittgensteinian critique in this project has something to say to all these 
differing approaches. A main contribution of this thesis is to promote the consideration of 
language within the general literature on the conduct of study in International Relations 
regarding the limitations of conceptual thought and the importance of history and 
judgement. This work has claimed that, in order to address these concerns, it is necessary 
to begin a point that is often prior to that at which most debates begin and that is with our 
words. Bringing Wittgenstein into the debate provides a reminder of how many of the 
issues of International Relations theorising are located in how we talk about our discipline 
and the world and this has its origin in how we conceive of the meaning of words.
25
  
This thesis has argued that the pictures of the world that shape much of the 
International Relations literature are pervasive because they are located in our language: 
‗A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and 
language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably [emphasis in original].‘26 Wittgenstein tells 
us that the picture is intractable because by talking in the same way we have no choice but 
to repeat it to each other. This research has claimed that if one dismantles the idea of 
discovering a true meaning for words, then many conceptual problems in the existing 
literature cease to exist, but to do so it might be necessary to talk in a different manner. To 
attempt to think differently using the same words is not easy, proposing a change of 
thought without a change of language may not be the most effective means of avoiding the 
typical traps such as that of reification as identified by Levine.  
 We therefore need to start asking question about the assumptions that underlie our 
language. Before beginning to ask any questions about the world and how we understand 
it, we should question the assumptions about meaning and understanding that are in the 
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form of the questions that we ask and the words that we use. I have attempted to do this in 
two main ways in this work. Firstly, by not asking a specific research question about trust 
in the two historical chapters, but instead by being guided by the idea of ‗look and see‘ 
and a grammatical search for the possibilities of trust. And secondly, by choosing to 
change the language in which I talk about trust. 
This thesis has thus been an exercise in trying to avoid the usual language of 
description of trust. I have tried to evade the typical hypostatisation of the term, not by 
adopting a different method but by adopting a different set of words to describe trust. I 
have not only avoided statements about trust ‗doing things‘ or ‗acting,‘ but have also 
abstained from talking about ‗the concept of trust‘ or the ‗idea of trust‘ separate from an 
individual‘s conception of the word. In doing so I have attempted to change what can be 
meant when one says that trust ‗plays a role‘ in international politics. 
I have also refused the use of verbs such as discover, unearth, find, uncover or 
others that would suggest digging down below the surface of language for a hidden, true 
meaning for trust, and I have only reluctantly used the phrase ‗the study of trust‘ with 
reference to the literature because alternative formulations suffered from a distracting 
long-windedness. I have done this to try to avoid perpetuating a way of talking about the 
world that repeats and reinforces the dominant patterns of understanding and explanation. 
This has actually not been an easy task (and doubtless has not been totally successful), and 
the ease with which I have often reverted to these terms without thinking underlines the 
stickiness of the common way of speaking about words and ideas in social science, the 
dominant pictures that lie in our language and reinforce our ways of thinking. It is the 
importance of the acknowledgement of this ‗bewitchment of our intelligence by means of 
language‘ that has been at the centre of this work.27 
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